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Summary 
This study argues that a theory of the distinctively human Individual lies latent within Deleuze's 
readings of Hume and Bergson and his two major metaphysical treatises. This evolving theory 
derives from efforts to re-think the concept of 'the subject' In terms of 'difference', 'becoming', 
'repetition' and 'event'. Using critical exegesis, the study shows that Deleuze's model is precise 
and workable, capable of supplanting discredited accounts of the subject and nullifying charges 
that Deleuze is an 'anti-humanist'. 
Deleuze's subject is neither pre-e)dstent nor stable, but always in the process of becoming- 
other, Individuated by Inherent differences. Chapter 1 argues that Deleuze's account (and 
several theoretical resources) can be traced to an early engagement with empiricism, where he 
uses Humean atomism to define a field of difference 'within which' associationist psychological 
tendencies define the subject as a'fiction'. As Chapter 2 shows, weaknesses in this model lead 
Deleuze to Bergson. Having adopted Bergsonlan Intuition as his method, Deleuze seeks after 
the preconditions of the flow and temporality of consciousness. He determines that the 
subjects constitutive moment is the virtual point of intersection between the physicality of 
material objects and the 'inner life' of consciousness. 
Chapter 3 turns to questions of ontology and ethics, arguing that Deleuze's theory of internal 
difference accounts for the role of contingent circumstances In subject-formation whilst his 
theory of the event establishes each lived moment as unique. Deleuze Interprets Nietzsche's 
eternal return as an ontological device entailing the recurrence of difference in the lived time of 
the subject's 'becoming', and as the means for coherence between the moments of a life. This 
theory leads Deleuze to an 'ethics of the event' with the goal of transforming human thinking 
from a concentration on unity and identity towards a more creative and fulfilling life of 
becoming. 
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Introductlon: ReappropdatIng 'the Subjecr 
I. PHILOSOPHY AND INHERrrANCE 
For Gilles Deleuze, 'doing philosophy is trying to invert or create concepts' (N, 25). But 
whereas Western philosophy traditionally has used concepts to determine or express the 
essel7ce of phenomena and events by way of subsumption (drawing empirical reality under a 
category), Deleuze has something different in mind. With his collaborator, F61ix Guattarl, he 
champions the creation of concepts capable of 'expressing' states of affairs In terms of the 
contingent circumstances and dynamics that lead to and follow from thern. ' He envisages this 
as a thoroughly 'open ended' enterprise. 'Doing philosophy' means creating concepts that are 
as accessible and useful to artists and scientists as philosophers. 
But doing philosophy also entails reappropriating concepts handed down by great 
philosophers of the past In terms of new problems, uses, terms and theories. As Deleuze puts 
it, 'nothing of what the great philosophers have written ... grows obsolete, but this is why, 
thanks to them, we have other problems to discover, problems that save us from a Oretum" that 
would only show our incapacity to follow them. 92 For Deleuze, moving from reiterative history of 
philosophy to the practice of philosophy means engaging with concepts in new ways so as to 
3 better express the events being studied. In his own corpus, Deleuze time and again transforms 
inherited concepts by placing them under the influence of new forces, functions and 
problematics. When a commentator claims that Deleuze's early studies of great philosophers 'fit 
modestly within the history of philosophy', she Is failing to appreciate the extent to which 
Deleuze customarily reworks inherited ideas in terms of his own wilfully creative and transforma- 
tive philosophical projecO 
This thesis deals with the nature and implications of Deleuze's creative re-working of 
one such inherited concept, 'the subject, and the way in which it 'expresses! the human 
Individual. Time and again over the course of his long career, Deleuze returns to rework and 
reappropriate it in the light of new Interests, problems and theoretical resources, sometimes in 
his own voice and sometimes with Guattari. Consequently, rather than a rigid doctrine and 
consistent rendition of theories of the subject, Deleuze produces a range of variable, dynamic 
and radically incomplete interpretations. In his first full-length worK Empiridsm and Subjectivity, 
and again in Foucau&, the subject is a principal presence, but in works such as Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, it hovers at the f ringes, seem- 
ingly unrelated to what Deleuze had written about it previously. 
In a 1988 article, Deleuze acknowledges the importance of the subject as it has been 
conceived by Western metaphysics-as perhaps the inaugurating concept of 'modemit)(--in 
terms of two 'functions in fields of thought: 'first a function of universalization in a field where 
the universal was no longer represented by objective essentials, but by acts, noetic and 
linguistic.... Second, the subject fulfils a function of individuation In a field where the Individual 
can no longer be a thing or a soul, but is instead a person, alive and sentient, speaking and 
spoken to (1-You). '3 in other words, the subject has served as a theoretical category of similarity 
subsuming both the disparate activities of persons and the IndiViduating circumstances that 
define them as persons. Typically-as could be claimed of Descartes's refle)dve ego C09#4 
Kants transcendental subject and Husserl's Intentional ego-the subject is conceived as a 
relatively stable, objective and universally rational centre of Identity. This indivisible and 
I 
ahistorical core of faculties and/or functions 'converts being into being-for-us! and acts as arbiter 
and focus of values, meanings and truths. 8 In terms of 'universalization', the subject is what 
remains after the theoretical 'removal' of the contingent circumstances of existence (body, 
gender, class, history, achievements, perspectives, beliefs and passions); in terms of 'Individua- 
tion', it expresses effects, but only ever in an archetypal manner, consonant VAth humans 
conceived as free Intellectual agents. 
On occasions Deleuze questions this inheritance directly. He asks, for example: 'are 
these two aspects of the subject... necessarily linked? Even if they are, isn't there a conflict 
between them, and how might it be solved? All these questions actuate what has been called 
the philosophy of the subject! At other times, though, he 'writes past it, producing 'philoso- 
phies of the subject' without any clear modernist heritage. In either case, though, unlike Lyotard 
and Baudriliard, who want to dismiss the concept entirely, Deleuze (with Foucault and Guattari) 
aims to develop new forms of the subject. (We ought to remind ourselves that philosophy's 
'subject is always a concep4 so that, as Vincent Descombes puts it 'what we call the critique of 
the subject Is in fact the critique of the conceptof subject. )a 
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Some philosophers are unconvinced that a concept with such weighty 'metaphysical 
baggage' can be reappropriated at all; at least not whilst retaining a sense of continuity with a 
heritage extending from Augustine to Husserl. Jacques Derrida, for example, believes that one 
cannot break with post-Enlightenment thinking on the subject whilst retaining its language. At 
best, Derrida insists, 'the subject' can be just 'an index for ... discussion, since open reappropri- 
ation risks re-introducing precisely those problematic characteristics that are in question. " By 
contrast, for Deleuze, It Is always better to develop new functions and theoretical fields for an 
inherited concept than to set it aside as though 'dead'. 
The question is, however, with respect to the subject, 'can we find new functions and 
variables able to bring about a change? "O The thesis defended here is that Deleuze can and 
does; that an alternative and evolving theory of the subject lies latent within some of his works 
on figures from the received history of philosophy, and in several of the earlier texts written 'in 
his own voice'. This emerging theory interprets the subject in terms of Deleuze's philosophy of 
difference and becoming, and produces a model of the continuous Individuation or 'becoming' 
of a dynamic human form. Deleuze's theory of the subject entails not just a psychology and 
metaphysics of human existence, but also an ethic of affirmation designed to recapture the 
'concrete richness of experience' that Deleuze believes has been lost in modernist styles of 
thinidng and living. 
The importance of finding and explicating such a theory Is at least threefold. First, as 
Jean-Luc Nancy points out 'everything seems to point to the necessity, not of a Nretum to the 
subject' ... but, on the contrary, of a move forward toward someone-some one-else'. 
" 
Inherited models of the subject have been criticized heavily by Marx, Nletzsche, ý Freud and 
philosophers aligned with structuralism and its post-196e derivatives. This Is not to say that all 
these critics wanted to kill off the subject completely, but just that the preeminence of the 
unified, rational and transparent model now appears to many thinkers to be so dubious that Its 
dissolution is justified. 
Considerably less attention has been paid to what follows this dissolution, however. As 
Frank Farrell puts it, many of the critiques presume that there are In their wake no further Issues 
concerning the nature of consciousness, what it means for the world to seem some way or 
other, what it is for a self to be concerned for itself, and so on. 12 But such questions have not In 
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fact gone away simply because one conceptual vision has been denounced. I will show that 
Deleuze's theory goes some way towards filling this void. 
Second, the thesis advanced here recuperates Delauze from charges that, with Guattarl, 
he is an 'anti-humanist' whose theories and rhetorical devices have eliminated the possibility of 
an ethics of equality founded upon the attribution of rights to humans. The best known 
accusers are Luc Ferry, Alain Renaut and Manfred Frank. " The difficulty Is determining 
precisely what is meant by 'antiýhumanism' In this context. On textual evidence, it seems to 
involve two claims: that Deleuze wants to do away with the humanist model of the subject 
inherited from modernism, and that its place ought to be taken by a concept that is not related 
specifically to either human Individuals or the human genre. The first of these seems a 
reasonable characterization of Deleuze's position(s), but I aim to show that the second Is not. If 
'humanism' designates an appeal to 'common essential features in terms of which human 
beings can be defined and understood', then the evolving theory of the subject uncovered here 
is decidedly humaniSt. 14 
Certainly It is easy to find In some of Deleuze and Guattari's works evidence of distaste 
for 'the subject' and instances where the concept is divorced from distinctively human traits. 
Deleuze states overtly that 'there's no subject' and-more relevant to my reading-that 'there's 
nothing transcendent, no Unity [and no] subject! and that 'a multiplicity has neither subject nor 
object' (N, 86,88-9,113,145-46). 13 In An#-0edipu. % 777e Logic of Sense, and DkIagueswith 
Claire Parnet, the le)dcon of the human Is replaced by discussions of individuals as 
'transpersonal abstract lines, 'abstract machined, 'machinic assemblages' and 'desiring 
machines! moved by anonymous 'forces' and 'desires'. There are discussions of how new 
types of 'decentred' subjects or 'nomad selves' rnight come to 'traverse' humans, plants and 
animals. " In short, these works appear to be preoccupied with machinic individuations and 
effects rather than with human Individuals and actions, so that charges of arftlýhurnanism seem 
justified. 
There are two ways to counter such an Interpretation. One way would be to claim that 
Delauze's and Guattari's Immoderate use of metaphor and hyperbolic style (which Frank calls 
'Dadaist and carnivalesque', fronting 'unsubstantial prattle') disguises a critique of the bourgeois 
modernist subject rather than advocating doing away with the concept qua human subject 
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altogether. "' Such a position would be simplistic In the extreme, however, since the more 
radical of Deleuze's and Guattari's texts clearly are serious attempts to vanquish the human in 
favour of freer dynamics of agency and praxis. (In the Conclusion, I shall say more about this 
position In respect to the volumes of Capitalismanct Sch(zophrenia) 
The second way to counter a focus on Deleuze's experimental 'philosophy of desire' Is 
to emphasize that it Is only the main focus of writings in the period from 1972 to 1977. By 
striking a tangent through a wider range of Deleuze's works, one finds an emphasis on the 
subject as distinctively human without a lapse Into the humanism of modern philosophy (that is, 
the unwarranted and arrogant privileging of the human subject as the locus of meaning and 
value). As Nexander Nehamas reminds us, 'to characterize oneself as a humanist is not 
necessarily to be a friend of the human; and to be anthumanist Is not necessarily to be its 
foe. "a Even if one agrees with Ferry and Renaut that Deleuze Is a kindof anthumanist, he is 
not the kind that takes 'the human' as an enemy. When Deleuze writes about 'others of my 
ldnd', he means to refer to a 17u1nan genre (LS, 301-21, DR 260-61). 
A third reason for expounding Deleuze's theory of the subject Is to counter accusations 
of Imprecision. The most explicit of these Is made by Pascal Engel In a highly critical 1994 
paper. Engel wonders 
why, In spite of all [Deleuzels] attempts to find layers in the realm of subjectivity, do we 
have the impression that his criticism of consciousness and subjectivity is so massive 
that it often amounts just to some sort of handwaving In a critical direction? After 
twenty years of criticism of subjectivity we still do not know exactly what was being 
criticized all along. 12 
If Deleuze's theorization is as ambiguous as Engel suggests, then it could not hold much 
promise as a means for rethinking the human Individual. 
But as we shall see, Engel Is plain wrong. Deleuze's model Is sophisticated, precise 
and detailed: Indeed the quest for precision Is what leads Deleuze to re-think his Interpretation - 
over a period of some 40 years. Nor is It the case that Deleuze undertakes 'Ideconstruction" 
without construction', a tendency that Engel believes typifies the kind of philosophy of which 
Deleuze's Is part. 20 As Deleuze reminds us time and again, every theory multiplies itself In the 
course of Its development I will show that his theory of the subject Is a product of progres- 
sively deeper Insights, more incisive criticisms, and now problems and perspectives. 
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2. DELEum's SmEs 
A number of philosophers have commented on Deleuze's interpretations and 
reappropriations, of the subject A brief survey is in order to better situate this thesis, particularly 
as I have not had occasion to refer to them often in developing my alternative rendition. In his 
book Deleuze and Gualtan, Ronald Bogue provides a detailed study of the models of the 
subject advanced in the two volumes of QpMsm and SchL-ophreni4 emphasising the extent 
to which such concepts as 'desiring machine' and 'nomadic subject' supplant notions of goal- 
driven and efficient behaviours. In a later piece, he shows how Deleuze's conception of the 
subject can be allied with Foucault's version by using an ontology of forces to account for 'self- 
coding' and 'self-formation' . 
2' However the subject is not the focus of Bogue's studies of 
Deleuze's historical works, Dfference and Repefifion or 7he Logic of Sense. 
BY contrast, Constantin Boundas agrees with me that 'an important theory of subjectiv- 
ity' runs through Deleuze's corpus as a product of his efforts to 'open a new space for a new 
subjectivity'. For Boundas, however, ths theory should only be assessed in terms of various 
theoretical 'series' running through Deleuze's texts, each of which deals with a different aspect 
of subjectivity, and between which one might locate convergences and resonances. Boundas! s 
most complete depiction of this position is in his article 'Deleuze: Serialization and Subject- 
Formation'. But even here Boundas makes mainly general observations covering a substantial 
number of Deleuze's texts without teasing out any one strand of argument to develop in depth. 
Indeed he holds that one should not try to find 'planes of consistency' across the series' other 
than in terms of two concepts which he deems crucial: the 'cracked I' and 'chaosmos'. I cannot 
agree with Boundas that these are terms marking the most incisive points in Deleuze's studies 
of the subject. In fact it seems to me that Boundas shows in his article why discussion of 
theoretical convergences ought to rest instead upon such critical Deleuzian notions as becom- 
ing, difference, dynamism and repetition. This reservation aside, Boundas! s are perhaps the 
most important writings on Deleuze and the subject. 22 
Colwell uses Deleuze's notion of the 'prepersonall' to frame a study that focuses on the 
singularity of the subject and the status of 'the Othee in Deleuze's work In manner if not - 
methodology, Colwell's is closest to my reading of Deleuze, since it deals with the cowt(hSon 
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of the individual In the light of the dissolution of the humanist subject. Colwell argues that the 
prepersonal field not only constitutes the subject, but is the product of its dissolution. Empha- 
sizing continuities in Deleuze's accounts of 'self, 'subject and 'person', Colwell outlines a 
Igenetic structure of the Self in terms of non-conscious repetitions, using it as a basis for 
describing Deleuze's views on Other and community. The article displays the rich potential of 
this ldnd of reading. 23 
Other commentators on Deleuze and the subject have made less substantial contrIbu- 
tons. Rosi BraIdotd points out Deleuze's commitment to studying the Immanence of the subject 
with an eye to its redefinition in terms of becoming and bodily intensity, but fails to make clear 
what she considers to be the outcome. Peter Canning gives a rich and complex account of 
Deleuze's'subject-mulbplicity assemblage', and opens up numerous theoretical options " 
connections, but doesn't sustain any particular 'thread'. Philip Goodchild and John Marks 
identify Deleuze's emphasis upon subjectivity and consciousness in the 1970S texts as 
continuous with earlier worl-4 but do not provide detailed accounts. Brian Massumi Indicates 
that "human' subjecUvity' is, In CephWftln and SchizophrenAg but a 'special case' of 'a 
dissipated human body system', but makes no connection wfth Deleuze's historical works or his 
overt studies of the subject Finally, Dorothea Olkowsld claims that Deleuze reads Nietzsche's 
texts as countering Kant's transcendentalism by producing a 'residual subject, but her main 
focus is on other matters. 24 
Despite this attenfion and the range of uses to which Deleuze puts his notion of thO 
subject, a sustained study of it has yet to be published. (The most substantial of the works 
surveyed are short portions of an Introductory text, a chapter in a collection, and a journal 
article. ) There are several obvious reasons why this might be. First, Deleuze's works are so 
rich, contentious and creative that commentators have a diverse range of topics and concepts 
with which to deal. Second, the subject is not central to Deleuze's best-known works, And- 
Oedipus and A Mousand PlaWua Third, Deleuze's occasional unqualified rejections of the 
subject might hide from readers its Importance in other texts. Fourth, Deleuze's theories of the 
subject are pursued mostly In works on other philosophers, works with styles of writing and 
interpretation which make difficult the pursuit of a single theoretical continuity. This last matter 
deserves some additional remarks in light of its influence upon this thesis. 
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The difficulty of Deleuze's writing has often been noted. Todd May, for Instance, one of 
Deleuze's most careful and perceptive commentators, has flagged his range of sources, the 
absence of theoretical unity, and the use of Implicit concepts as serious obstacles to wider 
acclaim for Deleuze's work25 One might add to this list Deleuze's unstated theoretical assump- 
bons, failure to distinguish his positions from those of others, contentious definitions, changing 
levels of abstraction, exceedingly selective readings (often focusing on just those aspects that 
strengthen his own position), and a failure to signal continuities with previous of his works and 
their conclusions. Such problems are amplified in Deleuze's texts on figures from the history of 
philosophy which, as Colin Gordon describes them, 'are not so much dissections, still less 
diagnoses, as anatomles! seeking to disclose the 'internal architectonic construction' of a 
philosopher's thought by taking theories out of their traditional domain and relocating them 
amongst Deleuze's own interests and concepts. 2" If 'things and thoughts advance or grow out 
from the middle', as Deleuze puts it then 'that's where you have to get to work! (At, 161). 
Deleuze's style of Interpretation Is part of his attempt to flee the 'patently repressive role' 
that has been played by enforced study of prescribed figures from the history of philosophy (N, 
5). Two factors enabled Deleuze to make good his escape. First, he concentrated upon 
philosophers considered marginal to the received history of philosophy, those who 'challenged 
the rationalist tradition, displayed a'hatred of Interiority', and pursued a'crifique of negativity' 
and a'denunciation of power' (N, 6). This group includes Lucretius, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, 
Nletmhe and Foucault Second, Deleuze produced strikingly idiosyncratic and creative 
Interpretations. 
Deleuze uncovers in the texts of these thinkers, conceptual relations and lines of 
investigation which have been overlooked by or hidden from the view of other Interpreters. 
Rather than trying to report a 'true' or 'definitive' authorial Intention, Deleuze sets out to produce' 
something new from the texts. He describes his approach as 
a sort of buggery or (it comes to the same thing) Immaculate conception. I saw myself 
as taldng an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, 
yet monstrous. It was really Important for it to be his own child, because the author 
had to actually say all I had him saying. But the child was bound to be monstrous too, 
because it results from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions 
that I really enjoyed. (N, 6) 
Notwithstanding its flamboyant tone, this passage captures something of Deleuze's 'method' 
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or-perhaps more accurately-his 'collection of approaches'. His interpretations are always 
productions, as is inevitably Indicated to the reader, either surreptitiously or explicitly. This Is 
not to suggest that Deleuze's style Is as problematic as, say, Nietzsche's; the question to ask of 
Deleuze's works on the history of philosophy is less 'what is it about the interpretation that Is 
being told to us by Its style? ' than 'what does Deleuze's style do to the Interpretation? ' A reader 
must consider Deleuze's role as an acbve rather than relatively passive interpreter. 
These characteristics typify Deleuze's approach. He sees his project as a kind of 
'nomadic thought'which transgresses traditional boundaries and stylistic expectations. Indeed 
Joan-Luc Nancy has suggested that Deleuze violates the bounds of philosophical work 
altogether. 27 Deleuze (and Guattan) proceeds without great regard for such theoretical 
territories, instead occupying a theoretical 'space' defined by particular concepts and their uses 
before moving on. For example, Chapter I shows how Deleuze resides temporarily In the . 
space defined by Hume's work on mind and psychology, exhausting its productive potential (a 
fertile soil designated by the name 'Deleuze's Hume') before moving on to different problems 
and approaches. 
In short, Deleuze thinks Wth other philosophers rather than about them, bringing his 
own approaches to bear upon theirs and, conversely, adopting other philosophers' tools and 
concepts as his own. Consequently, Deleuze's concepts proliferate with each new encounter In 
a manner Indicative of Delauze and Guattari's notion of 'rhizome thinking'. Rather than 
oppos(ng theoretical boundaries and hierarchizations of aspects of reality, rhizome thinking 
seeks to byp= them by generating a range of alternative visions. The Image of the 'rhizome', 
an underground stem that grows continuously and sprouts adventitious roots, Is particularly 
apt. " Rather than conceptual order, rhizornatic philosophy Invokes disorder, connectivity, 
unpredictability, rupture and heterogeneity as operative principles. TotalIzation and unity are 
subverted by new concepts, temporary arrangements, and constantly renewable categoriza- 
tons. Ruptures In a system of meaning, value or interpretation are considered Inherent to It 
and need not be 'theorized away'. Clearly, Interactions with other philosophers are fertile fields 
for Deleuze's rhizornatic generation of concepts, making pursuit of a single theoretical thread 
even more challenging. (Note that the rhizome Is used not only to describe Deleuze's philo- 
sophical approach to concept-creation, but also--as In Chapter 1-4o theorize processes of 
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thinking in general. ) 
Some theorists have argued that study of 'the subject and 'subjectivity' is moot 
because of the under-determined or Indeterminate character of the central concepts. Deleuze's 
aversion to firm and referential definitions and his unwillingness to adopt definitions proposed 
by other thinkers, although consistent with the tenets of rhizomatic philosophy, makes things no 
easier. With this in mind, I have usually left open the meaning of such terms until their place In 
Deleuze's reasoning has been established clearly. However, without some preliminary 
characterization of Deleuze's sense of the terms, It Is easy to 'import' a meaning that is foreign 
to his project and thereby misleading. The depiction that follows is, then, purely preliminary. 
The traditional meaning of 'subjecir, and Deleuze's objections to It have been Intro- 
duced above. If the subject in the traditional sense Is 'something Invested with duties, power, 
and knowledge', as Deleuze claims, then a mejor aspect of his project Is to show that the 
subject is not a thIng at all, but just a passive effect of diverse productive processes (N, 176). 
As such, Deleuze's use of 'subject! can be referred legitimately to the Latin 'subjectum'('that 
which lies unde? ) so long as it Is conceived as a shifting ground of processes rather than as a 
static and substantial structure which thinks, feels, desires or perceives. Deleuze's 'subject' is 
not a power of synthesis, a determinable counterpart of a phenomenal object or the bearer of 
consciousness. Neither does it equate with Individual persons, selves or objects of determina- 
ton. For Deleuze, any semblance of unity is not due to a gifted essence, but to what Braidotti 
calls 'the fictional choreography of many levels into one socially operational self In a manner 
that is always contingent upon the range of lived circumstances. ' 
Since the eighteenth century, 'self has been used to refer to either a person (with 
greater emphasis on the psychological dimensions of the 'Inner life' and less on bodily 
incarnation) or a transcendental self or transcendental ego with attendaýý! ýbitions. 
Deleuze's texts provide few clues on how'self ought to be discriminated from 'subject'. Taking 
a lead from the French ýnol', the emphatic form of the singular personal pronoun translated as 
'self, the term seems to mean In Deleuze's texts something like 'how the subject (qua process) 
seems to Itself in lived reaJity. In other words, 'self seems to function as the subject Of 
enunciation for the T, setting aside traditional requirements for self-consciousness. " (By 
contrast, ý; Oi'is 'self In the broad sense, conveying a referential neutrality absent In ý? wij 
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The term 'l' (7e') also is problematic, since Deleuze's accounts of it are complex and 
diverse. It might be that one knows what'l' means just by saying It, as Deleuze and Guattarl 
claim, but this does not make it easier to theorize. 31 Although Deleuze's meanings vary with the 
text, T Is usually the term that designates the speaker reflexively (that Is, the linguistic correlate 
of the subject), without presuppositions about the speaker's being a loglealsubject of the 
utterance. 
Deleuze uses 'subjectivity' In two distinct senses. On the one hand, It designates 'inner- 
life' or 'how Inner life seems to be' In referring to the subject's direct and pre-reflective acqualn- 
tance with 'itself , without Invoking presumptions about the nature of self-knowledge or the 
subjecVs presence to itself. On the other hand, 'subjectivity' means just 'pertaining to the 
subject' as Deleuze has theorized it to that point. (Deleuze also uses 'subjectivity'-often in 
tandem with'subjectification'--when describing Foucault's account of the Influence of social 
forces upon the constitution of the subject, but this use Is not mentioned herein. ) Deleuze notes 
that 'the simple fact that subjectivity is produced, that its a *way", should be enough to 
convince one the word should be treated very carefully' (N, 115). With this in mind, I take care 
to mark the particular meaning of each use. 
Finally, Deleuze refers to 'consciousness! ( 7a conscience') despite a proclaimed 
aversion to the term and a tendency to devalue consciousness In favour of non-conscious 
aspects of thought. Whereas consciousness In the technical sense usually entails a unity 
amongst conscious states, Deleuze adopts the less technical and pre-reflective sense of simply 
'being conscious! (or aware) of things, persons, thoughts, or qualities. Nor does this entall 
necessarily focusing one's (conscious) attention upon some state or other, but only the state's 
being within the scope of one's awareness. 
3. TRACING DELEuzE ON THE SUBJECT 
My approach to reading Deleuze In the light of his complex style and aversion to formal 
definitions has been to work ciosely With his texts, engaging vvith the Intricate particulars that 
give Deleuze's theory of the subject Its depth. The goal throughout has been to reveal 
Deleuze's theory of the subject qua human individual and to determine whether or not it 
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explains successfully ell that it seems to explain. As such, my approach is more exegetical than 
critical, and more concerned with Deleuze's historical works as presentations of his own theory 
than as accurate re-presentations of other thinkers. Thus, for Instance, 'Deleuze's Hume' Is 
considered more important than 'Hume'. To read these texts otherwise would be to overlook 
the extent to which Deleuze's philosophy of difference permeates his Interpretations, and to 
complicate unnecessarily the revelation of thematic and referential continuities across Deleuze's 
corpus. 
The reading derived from this approach is relatively systematic and linear. I dorYt mean 
by this, however, that it is meant to be definitive or 'closed ofF from alternative renditions. 
Rather, I mean that it forms a'system' in Deleuze's sense of a productive assemblage of 
heterogeneous elements, and that the argument follows a particular thematic 'line of flight 
which develops as more and more concepts are added to the assemblage. In other words, It 
makes no claim to be Deleuze's 'position' on the subject, but just a line of reasoning that can 
be read 'into' Deleuze's texts as well as 'out of them. 
The development of this line has not necessitated 'forcing' Deleuze's texts in the 
manner of some of his own readings. But it has Involved constructing and justifying thematic 
links and conceptual ties from a jumble of hidden relationships and multiple meanings. (Whilst 
agreeing with Andr6 Pierre Colombat that anyone using Deleuze's concepts ought to metamor- 
phose the tools they borrow, I would add that one has little choice in the matter. )' It has also 
required the selection of particular texts from Deleuze's corpus. From the historical works, I 
have focused upon Etnplricism and Subje&Adty and Berpsonism because they proVide the most 
detailed, explicit and sustained accounts of the psychological 'mechanisms! (in Deleuze's sense) 
Involved In constitution of the subject and the experience called subjectivity, especially with 
respect to encounters with the world of objects and the influence of social and economic 
factors. Other of Deleuze's texts could easily dovetail with this project: for example, Foucault 
would locate it within wider sociological, judicial and politico-economic contexts, Deleuze's two 
works on Spinoza could establish a corporeal ethic quite distinct from the psychological one 
developed here, and Metzsche and Philosophy would support a reading of psychological 
phenomena as products and Instances of abstract forces, thus situating the subject within a 
broader metaphysics. 
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Whilst I have had occasion to return several times to Deleuze's relationship With Kant on 
issues of methodology, temporality, 'common sense' and self-reflection, I have not otherwise 
contextualized Deleuze's work in terms of inherited philosophies of the subject. Deleuze Is not 
presented herein as the arch-enemy of Hegel, for Instance, as in Michael Hardt's celebrated 
commentary. ' 
The thesis Is structured around several stages in the development of Deleuze's theory 
of the subject, each signalled by his engagement with a particular thinker or his adoption of 
particular concepts. Chapter 1 shows how Deleuze's engagement with Humean empiricism 
yields a preliminary model of the subject theorized In terms of Interactions between dynamic 
and creative activity on the one hand, and elements of restriction and stabilization on the other. 
Following Hume's introspective 'psychology of affections', Deleuze argues that atomistic Ideas 
are at the origin of the mind (a model which antedates, I will argue, the later model of the 
rhizome). Deleuze locates between ideas a field of difference 'within which'complex thoughts, 
lines of argument and other aspects of consciousness develop. The processes of their 
development described In terms of Hume's 'passions' and 'principles of association', is 
constrained by contingent 'general rules! which form and operate under the influence of the life 
of practice. The subject Is derived from these mechanisms of restraint as an habitual 'fiction, a 
psychological effect called 'I'. On this view, the static, model of the subject Indicates a tendency 
to conceive of one's self as a stable entity rather than as an effect of processes. Only by 
Introspecting the difference and activity between Ideas is the more dynamic model accessible. 
Read refleyively, Deleuze's Humean model of the subject has three main flaws. First, 
the part attributed to ideas makes it a more stable 'structure' than pre-refiective experience 
would suggest, and one devoid of the temporplity_eviden. tin consciousness. Second, it does 
not account adequately for interactions between subject and world. Third, Humean introsPec- - 
bon Is able to deal only with Issues of Intensity and not those of 'Idnd', even though different 
Idnds of conscious activity are Inherent to subjectivity. 
Deleuze's adoption of Bergson's method of IntuXon philosophlque enables him to 
construct a 'transcendental empiricism' that theorizes various Idnds of conscious activity without 
privileging concepts used in the account as Chapter 2 will show. For Deleuze, as for Bergson, 
Intuition leads to the model of duA§e which allows him to study the flow0f consciousness as an 
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interpenetrative continuity of mental states, rather than as a structure invoking dynamism 
between atomistic ideas. For the Deleuze of Betgsonlsm, the principal Issue is to ascertain the 
nature of this dynamism rather than the means for 'reintroducing' movement to consciousness 
theoretically. 
The ensuing model of the subject rests upon a dualism. On one side is the 'line of 
materiality' which explains perception In terms of movements of images, vibrations, and the 
sensory elements of the nervous system. Not only does this account transcend Hume's theory 
of a purely nominal origin for ideas whilst preserving experiential contingency, it also Invokes 
'habit memory' as a model of the non-conscious that surpasses Hume's account of habit. On 
the other side is the 'line of pure subjectivity, which rests upon the capacity of memory for 
preserving the past as a prerequisite for the subjecVs constitution. The Chapter will argue, 
finally, that the subjecVs constitutive moment Is precisely the Virtual point of Intersection 
between objective and subjective realms, a claim carrying important implications for Deleuze's 
theory of temporality. 
From these psychological conceptions of the subject, I turn in Chapter 3 to questions of 
metaphysics and ethics raised principally In Deleuze's first texts'in his own voice', DMwence 
and Repefidon and The Log1c of Sense. Using Deleuze's theories of the 'event' and 'internal 
difference' in conjunction with his interpretation of Nietzsche's eternal return, the dynamism 
Inherent to the subjects constitutive moment Is preserved and multiplied in Its Individuation and 
continuity. The theory of internal difference accounts for the part of particular and contingent 
circumstances In the functioning of Bergson's lines and Hume's principles, whilst the theory of 
the event establishes each moment of subjectivity as unique. Deleuze uses eternal return as an 
ontological device entailing the recurrence of difference in the lived time of the subjects 
'becoming', and as the means for describing how events cohere; specifically, the event of 
constitution returns continually but differently with every new circumstance and psychological 
activity. In the process of recurrence, It multiples the open set of differences distinguishing the 
life of an individual. 
Chapter 3 also proposes a Deleuzian 'ethics of the event that is consistent with both 
his theory of the subject and his Nietzschean goal of the transmutation of human thirildrig from 
a concentration on unity and identity towards a more creative and fulfilling life. Using resources 
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from Deleuze's aesthetics, I suggest that the passive subject qua effect can perform active 
resistance to typically human thinking by conceiving of life in terms of change. 
On my reading, Deleuze's subject Is neither pre-eAstent nor stable, but always In the 
process of becoming, 'determined' and Individuated within a field of difference. More specifi- 
cally, the subject is a continuously actualized multiplicity of events which 'no longer bear ... any 
relationship to the One as subject or as object, as natural or Intellectual reality, and so not to 
the traditional humanist subject, either. 34 If the history of the subject has focused mainly upon a 
ready-made universal type, at least since the time of Kant, then Deleuze brings singularity and 
individuality back Into view (L. Sý 138-40; N, 115). In Difference and Repeffllon, Deleuze writes 
that 'a concept alone Is completely incapable of specifying or dividing Itself, the agents of 
differenciation are the spatio-temporal dynamisms which act within or beneath it (DR 218). 
Deleuze's theory Is an attempt to come to grips with the nature of these dynamisms, and to 
reveal them as Instances of specificity and division, difference and repetition, and becoming and 
dynamism. 
Overall, then, the positive Deleuze who emerges from this reading of his earlier works 
champions a radical theory of difference and becoming whilst theorizing the subject In a form 
that is recognizably human. In fact it is his philosophy of difference that reveals the potential 
inherent 'within' the dynamic subject for undermining more traditional models and enabling 
richer, more creative forms of human existence. As I shall mention In the Conclusion, this 
position does not extend to some of Deleuze's later works, where more radical theories 
emphasize just the continuities between modes of existence and activity. But to Ignore the texts 
prior to OV&Alism and Sch&qphrenla Is to overlook a rich source of theoretical resources for 
engaging productively with traditional philosophical challenges, as I hope that this thesis shows. 
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Deleuze's Hume and the Psychology otAffectIons 
4. DELEUZE's HUME 
Deleuze returns time and again to Hume's empiricism. His most detailed and sustained 
account of It is Empiricism and SubjectMty his first full book and the principal focus of this 
Chapter, although he also contributed short expositions In the earlier Hume., $a vie, son oeuvre 
(with Andr6 Cresson) and in his later contribution to Frangois ChAtelet's Histolre do la 
PlAasophie. l Furthermore, Hume Is mentioned regularly in Deleuze's published works and 
interviews: In DIalogueA for example, where he acknowledges Hume as an Inspiration, In Khat 
Is Philosophy? and, most notably, in Difference and RepetWon 
Hume's appearance amongst the figures considered by Deleuze to be 'marginal' to the 
history of philosophy is striking and apparently Incongruous. As DeleUZe acknowledges, 'every 
history of philosophy has its chapter on empiricism'. 2 In a chapter on Hume, one usually 
encounters either a naturalist, extending and radicalizing the work of Locke and/or Berkeley (or 
Descartes and Malebranche), or a sceptic whose contributions to philosophy are largely or 
wholly critical. Only In the late 1960s and early 1970s did the focus of Anglo-American Hume 
'ýý 
not clearly grounded in studies move away from the epistemological principle that those 
sense Impressions should be 'committed to flames! towards Hume's analysis of the passions, 
the principles of association, and such features of the mind as instinct, propensity, belief, 
Imagination, feeling and sympathy. Deleuze had adopted this emphasis In 1952 and 1953, 
focusing on the naturalism evident in Hume! s principles of human nature rather than on just the 
strident epistemological assertions of the first few pages of the rrea&8-3 
But Deleuze's shift In emphasis extended much further. Whereas it Is often held that 
Hume, finding himself unable to counter his sceptical epistemological conclusions, turned away 
from philosophy In favour of history, sociology, religion and economics, Deleuze considers 
Hume's entire corpus to comprise various aspects of the development of a'science of human 
nature'. On Deleuze's reading, Hume was always aware that a justifiable philosophy failed to 
complete this project. Just as human life involves ethical, epistemological and aesthetic 
16 
a] ones. For Deleuze, one cannot dimensions, so too it involves economic, religious and historic 
properly understand Hume's philosophy without referring to his work In other disciplines, and so 
Deleuze uses elements from Hume's economics, sociology, history, and studies of religion to 
help explain his philosophy. 
Deleuze argues the need for this approach In the light of Hume's quasi-Newtonian, 
pseudo-experimental method. According to Deleuze, Hume begins his philosophical Investiga- 
tons with straightforward observations about the world: humans see objects, Posit the existence 
of gods, make ethical judgements, plan work In order to meet economic Imperatives, and 
remain aware of themselves in some sense. 4 Hume then sets about developing a theory of 
human thought to explain these phenomerA thereby concurrently providing a foundation for the 
moral sciences. Deleuze argues that, because Hume is unable initially to find In thought any 
element of 'constancy or universality' to which he might refer a psychology per Se, he develops 
Instead a'psychology of the mind's affections!, a theory about the regular 'movement of the 
mind according to observable social and passional circumstances! Hence: 
the option of the psychologist may be expressed paradoxically as follows: one must be 
a moralist, sociologist, or historian belore being a psychologist, In orderto be a 
psychologist. Here, the project of the human sciences reaches the condition which 
would make knowledge in general possible: the mind must be affected. (ES, 22) 
I In other words, one needs first to appreciate the conditions surrounding and grounding the 
affection of the mind In order to understand it. Once the affection Is understood, the conse- 
quent theory-a foundation almost entirely new, according to Hume-. can be used to found the 
study of other aspects of human eAstence, since 'there Is no question of Importance whose 
decision is not compriz! d In the science of man' (r, xvi). The theory of the knower undergirds 
necessarily any subsequent theory of the known, but to mistake this for psychologISM IS, on 
Deleuze's account, to underestimate the Influence on human thought of socio-cultural circum- 
stances. 
Deleuze locates 'the essence of [Humean] empiricism in the specific problem of 
subjectivity' (ES, 85). He understands Hume's psychology of affections to be concurrently a 
theory of the constitution of the human subject, guided by a series of questions that can be 
paraphrased as'how must the human mind work so as to produce a stable entity capable of 
believing, anticipating and Inventing? ' or again, 'how is the mind able to construct a subject? ' 
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Deleuze argues that Hume's moral science is founded upon his answers to these questions. 
Economic, religious, historical, and sociological realities can only be understood In terms of the 
thought implicit In their construction, operation and comprehension. 
Although Deleuze's conception of Hume's philosophy is unusual in the field of Hume 
and selective interpretations of, scholarship, readers more familiar Wth Deleuze's idiosyncrati 
say, Leibniz or Nietzsche, might be surprised at his 
( 
gri iv e strategy. Deleuze's Hume Is not 
a pafticularly monstrous offspring, and a close reading of Emphicism and Subjfeývityrevea! S 
that most (but not all) of the detail of Deleuze's Interpretation is present Wthin Hume's own 
woric Nonetheless, Deleuze's emphases and lines of argument are unique: his concentration 
on 'general rules! and the dynamism of Imagination rather than, say, causation and memory 
stamps Empirkism and Subjec#05)f as a distinctively Deleuzian work 
This originality can be put down to Deleuze's atypical understanding of the empiricist 
project generally. His take on empiricism has little to do with the nature of sense Impressions or 
with Isolating empirical facts. He considers Hume to be Instead a'philosopher of the outside', 
distinct from the tradition of metaphysics that has predominated since Plato. Hume does not 
critique conceptual understanding by drawing distinctions between experiences and concepts, 
nor does- he use concepts transcendentally, such that experience Is understood In terms of. the 
concept. Deleuze contends that to have followed such well-worn philosophical paths would 
have meant Hume's hiding the dynamism and richness of experience behind the stagnancy of 
'an abstract first principle', either conceptual or experiential. " 
Instead, Hume reads concepts from out of the reality of experience, treating them as 
contingent explanatory tools that can always be replaced or supplemented without building or 
demolishing some philosophical edifice. Deleuze holds consequently that Humean empiricism 
Is: 'by no means a reaction against concepts.... On the contrary, it undertakes the most Insane - 
creation of concepts ever seen or heard. Empiricism is a mysticism and a mathematicism of 
concepts, but precisely one which treats the concept as object of an encounter' (DR, xx). 
Hume's philosophy is mystical because It contains no ultimate, permanent or subordirmfing 
explanatory concept and mathematical In its complex constructions from out of the terms of 
experience. Concepts determine the tlanslent equivalency amongst actualities (as real 
existences), but the sensible always determines a difference between them. 
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The alms of this Chapter are threefold. First, it will show that various of the philosophl- 
cal 'tools! and concepts deployed by Deleuze In developing a philosophy of difference have 
their origins In Empkiclsm and Subjectbity. Difference-in-Itself Is conceived In terms of Hume's 
atomism, the model of 'rhizornatic' thinVing is a radicalized version of relational associationism, 
and the subjectivity-of-becoming is a dynamic process constituting a psychology of the 
imagination's affection. 
The latter Is the locus of the second aim: to demonstrate that Deleuze's Interpretation of 
Hume's theory yields a viable (though preliminary) model of the human subject. A critical 
exposition of Deleuze's rendition, focusing on the reconciliation of atomism and association 
(Section 5) by way of the life of practice (Section 6) and general rules (Section 8), vOll reveal 
Hume's understanding of the human subject as a product of systematic, habitual thinking, given 
the name T (Section 9). This Humean subject is-understood by Deleuze as a fiction, sufficiently 
stable to. have identity posited of It and to eAst in a social realm, but 'containing' elements of 
dynamism with the capacity to transcend hierarchical thinking of human being In favour of 
rhizornatic thinking of non-human becoming (an Issue Introduced In Section 10 and pursued in 
Chapters 2 and 3). Whilst portions of the model become targets for Deleuze's subsequent 
attacks on the ontology of identity and being, others provide him Wth means of escape to a 
radical metaphysics of becoming. 
The Chapte? s final (and incIdental) aim Is to show that, although Deleuze Is usually 
faithful to Hume's writings, he lavishes most attention on elements where his reading is 
idiosyncratic and goes well beyond the text. These interpretations-of general rules, artifice, 
habit, and stabilizing fictions-might be intended by Deleuze to correct weaknesses in Hume's 
theory, but they carry an inordinate weight in his subsequent theorization of the subject. Taking 
these aims together, the Chapter explicates the basis of the relationship between Deleuze's later* 
philosophy of the subject, and his Interpretation of Hume. 
5. OF ORIGIN AND ORDER 
Deleuze begins his study of Hume In the same manner as Hume begins the rrefifise. 7 
vvith a statement of Hume's conception of the mind as a set of singularities or, more particularly, 
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as a collection of ideas, each with a distinct origin or set of origins in experience. Thus 
experience Is not given to the mind so much as the given ofthe mind, or, as Deleuze puts it, 
'the given is the idea as it is given in the mind, without anything transcending it--not even the 
mind, which is therefore identical with the Ided (ES, 28). The given thus encompasses Ideas 
which are radically disparate, and which lack any capacity to transcend themselves. To be 
more particular, it comprises'the flux of the sensible, a collection of impressions and Images, or 
a set of perceptions' (ES, 87). It Is the radically disparate and separable nature of Ideas, allied 
with the unique origin of each, that comprises what Deleuze, following the usual Interpretation, 
calls Humds'atomism'. 
Deleuze spends little time on Hume's well-known ayJom whereby all Ideas derive from 
corresponding Impressions of sensation or reflection. Instead, he uses the relationship between 
the two kinds of Impressions to Indicate Hume's psychology as a system of dynamism and 
structure, movement and limit or difference and Identity. He writes that 'the Impressions of 
sensation are only the origin of the mind; as for the Impressions of reflection, they are the 
qualification of the mind and the effect of the principles [of human nature] on it' (ES, 31).? 
Deleuze consequently reveals the positivist Interpretation of Hume to be bankrupt, since It deals 
just with the origin of the mind and not with the qualification, or dynamism, evident in the 
process of affection. The epistemologically-odented positivist tradition Is preoccupied With 
exclusion from the privileged realm of 'knowledge' of whatever ideas cannot be traced to 
distinct impressions, whereas, for Deleuze and Hume, one must always bear In mind that the 
collection of Ideas Is always and essentially In flux which merely delivestom Impressions of 
sensabon. 
For Deleuze, the collection of Ideas Is called not only 'mind', but also 'Imagination', 
'Insofar as the collection designates not a faculty but rather an assemblage of things, In the 
most vague sense of the term' (ES, 22). The Humean Imagination Is not, then, for Deleuze, 
some 'agent' which controls or manipulates Ideas, nor alaculty' which forms Ideas. Deleuze 
therefore wams that one must not be misled by Hume's reiteration that Ideas are In the 
imagination, wfiting that'the use of the preposition Is metaphorical, and it means to exclude 
from the mind an activity which would be distinct from the movement of Ideas.... Nothing is 
:7 
done bythe Imagination; everything is done In the imagination' (ES, 23). The imagination can 
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be said to be active only in the sense that the collection of Ideas moves, or Is actively in flux. In 
other words, the imagination cannot Itself be productive and act as a faculty because any 
movement within the collection of ideas Is merely 'the reproduction of an impression In the 
imagination' (ES, 23). 
No doubt many a Hume scholar wishes that things were quite this transparent. Hume 
is clear that the mind is a collection In flux, a series of isolable perceptions (impressions and 
ideas) which appear as 'a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their 
appearance' (T, 253). But his account of the imagination is a different matter. In the Treadse, 
Hume writes that the imagination is a 'faculty' which variously forIns complex Ideas, founds the 
memory, senses and understanding, assodates ideas, and so on (r, 10,92,265). He also 
discriminates explicitly between the mind and the Imagination: in the first Enquity, for example, 
he states that Ideas are perceptions of the mind whereas certain impressions are anticipations 
of the imagination (EHU, 17). 
It may be that Deleuze means his account to 'iron out difficulties with Hume's theory. 
He might be suggesting that Hume's persistent references to the imagination as a faculty should 
be subordinatedto his conception of the mind as a succession of perceptions. If there is no 
independent entity called 'mind' separable from perceptions, then 'It' cannot have 'faculties! 
such as imagination. Alternatively, Deleuze might be proposing that 'imagination' Is Hume's 
short-hand for the relationship between the principles of association and the passions in the 
formation of complex ideas. If so, then Deleuze's account of his position is Inadequate. 
To make consistent Delauze! s various characterizations of the imagination, one must 
adopt a third position, an amalgam of these others. The Imagination, like the mind, Is a 
collection of ideas, but whereas the mind is a collection simpliciter, the imagination Is a 
collection which incorporates movement between its elements. On this reading, Hume's 
portrayals of the imagination as 'founding', 'forming, 'associating' and so on refer to activity 
between elements of the collection rather than to the imagination understood as a unified whole 
(that is, a faculty In Deleuze's sense, which Is capable of doing the 'founding', 'forming' etc. ). 
One should conclude, then, that for both Hume and Deleuze the term 'Imagination' is a precise 
but inconsistently employed technical expression, Incorporating two potentials: the potential for 
elements to be connected, and the potential for other, contingent principles of human nature to 
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do the connecting (that is, to actualize the dynamic structural potential of the collection). 
Deleuze believes that any study of the subject ought to begin with the character of the 
mind or imagination because the observation that there Is experience Is free from philosophical 
presuppositions about its nature. By employing Hume's 'experimental method' of Introspec- 
tion-a simple (though problematic) turning of one's attention 'Inward' so that one Is 'conscious' 
of a thought-one becomes aware of experiences without having to say anything else about 
them (although Hume denles the possibility, suggested by Locke and Descartes, that one can 
observe the mind observing; all one can perceive are impressions, and not some 'thing'--an 
T-perceiving the Impression). But Deleuze thinks that this simple point is often overlooked or 
misunderstood: 'Empiricism is often defined as a doctrine according to which the intelligible 
"comes" from the sensible, everything in the understanding comes from the senses. But that Is 
the standpoint of the history of philosophy ... [which has] the gift of stifling all life In seeldng and 
in positing an abstract first principle. "' To first posit some concept or principle and then 
interpret all of life in terms of it is to Introduce an abstraction to any consequent theory. With 
respect to the doctrine mentioned above, Deleuze identifies three problems in particular. First, it 
'stifles life' by detracting from the 'concrete richness of the sensible'. The differences that 
permeate experience from moment to moment, event to event, and person to person become 
hidden behind static concepts and 'thought in general'. Second, even if the definition were 
attributable to empiricism, merely stating the relationship between the Intelligible and the 
sensible Is an insufficient characterization. At some level, a//phliosophical positions-even those 
of non-empiricists, such as Plato and Leibniz--derive from experience. Third, according to 
Deleuze, 'experience for the empiricist, and for Hume In particular, does not have this univocal 
and constitutive aspect (ES, 107-8). Deleuze considers Hume to attribute two distinct roles to 
experience: the collection of distinct perceptions and the various conjunctions of past objects. 
In neither role Is experience constitutive of the dynamism of experience as it Is thought. 
Deleuze is again pointing out shortcomings In the positivist position since, I one places an 
emphasis on the relationship between sense impressions and ideas, then Hume's philosophy is 
Incapable of leading anywhere but to the dogmatic determinations of 'Hume's forw. Not only Is 
this contrary to Hume's Intentions for his project, but it ignores his subsequent work on the 
passions and on morality. " 
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For Deleuze, 'empiricism does not raise the problem of the origin of the mind but rather 
the problem of the constitution of the subject', and the atomIstic nature of the mind means that 
'a true psychology is not immediately or directly possible' (ES, 31,27). Atomism cannot 
account for thought, but merely provides thought with an object-the mind--having a simple and 
nominal origin. Hume wants to establish the problematic of Ideas as experience, as representa- 
tions of Impressions, while freeing them from any obligation to represent thinga The re- 
presentation of impressions as ideas provides a limit to Hume's theory which cannot legitimately 
be surpassed: there is no way beyond one's experience, no way to 'peer past the mind to a 
world, perhaps, of substances. For Hume as for Descartes, we are familiar only with percep- 
tions, with those events not open to public view. While a study of the nature of the mind could 
employ a speculative physiology and refer to bodies and matter, this Is not Hume's method. 
According to Deleuze, Hume Instead understands the mind In terms of 'a psychic 
equivalent of matter, wherein psychology finds its unique, possible objects and its scientific 
condition' (ES, 28). This Is Deleuze's richest characterization of Hume's atomism, hinting at a 
materialism whilst remaining firmly within the psychological framework established in the early 
part of EmpNdsm &7d Subjectivitv Deleuze agrees with Hume that 'undoubtedly, there Is a 
nature, there are real operations, and bodies do have powers!, and that the given most likely 
comes'through' the senses In a manner that presupposes organs and a brain (ES, 88). But as 
Deleuze observes, Hume 'presents this explanation as Oprobable and plausible", but ... neglects 
It willingly' (ES, 89). (This neglect will lead Deleuze beyond Hume's theory to Bergson's, as we 
shall see. ) 
Rather than guessing at the affiliation between nature and the subject, we must content 
ourselves'with knowing perfectly the manner In which objects affect my senses, and their 
connections with each other, as far as experience Informs me of them' (T, 64). Mind, for 
Deleuze's phenomenalist Hume, Is not a representation of nature, but just a set of Ideas and 
Impressions. We can be sure just that perceptions are the only substances and the only objects 
and that the consttutlon of a subject requires something more. Hume's atomism employs these 
certainties to provide the subject with a 'nominal origin' for, as Deleuze writes, 'if every 
discernible perception is a separate existence, [then it has] "no need of any thing to support 
[its] existence" (ES, 88 quoting T, 234). 
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Hume's atomism provides Deleuze with more than just a nominal start-point for the 
development of a theory of the subject, however. Deleuze also finds latent within it a philoso- 
phy of difference which is developed, adapted and utilized in his later analyses of various 
ontological, moral, social, and psychological phenomena, Including his studies of the subject. 
Deleuze considers difference to be the principle of empiricism: 'the constitutive principle giving a 
status to experience ... [is] that "everything separable Is distinguishable and everything 
distinguishable is different"' (ES, 87). The collection of Ideas Is fundamentally permeated by the 
difference and separateness of its elements. Consequently, and also because Ideas are 
continually 'copied' anew from impressions having a transient eAstence, any particular Idea has 
(but does not contain within itself) the capacity to relate to any other Idea or group of Ideas. 
Deleuze finds here a way of thinking difference; specifically, as the In-between of thinking Itself, 
the 'space' between ideas, as it were, where thought transcends the given. This notion must 
not be read geometrically, despite Deleuze's later propensity for using geometrical metaphors. 
The Idea of the 'between' Is purely relational, since, for Hume, only relations between 
ideas-and not particular ideas In ft atomistic array-can be the-subject of belief. 
Although the space between elements can be defined only In terms of an array of 
multiple parts, it can never be thought as 'empty, because to even think about the space-to 
think at all-requires that thought operate within it. Just as it would be Impossible to think if 
ideas were not different, difference could not be thought without the movement between Ideas. 
The Humean mind can never be static, but must always be active and mutating. Impressions of 
sensation and reflection constantly pass in and out of e)dstence with 'an inconceivable rapidity' 
(at least when one Is awake and conscious), so that new Ideas are always coming Into 
eAstence. Impressions of reflection cause particular movements between the elements of the 
array, In a manner that determines simultaneously the arrangement of the whole. 
Consequently, Deleuze considers Hume to have shown that the mind's multiplicity of 
separable elements Is the empirical and prior condition for the conceptualdeterminations of 
thought (ES, 87-8). Given Deleuze's belief that one's image of thought guides the creation of 
concepts, and bearing in mind that Hume's model of the arrangement of Ideas presupposes no 
vertical hierarchy, Deleuze develops in his later works a concept of thought as a tangled web of 
relations between ideas, proliferating 'horizontally' rather than being arranged 'verticall)( 
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according to privileged concepts (N, 148). This is Deleuze's model of the 'rhizome', outlined In 
the Introduction. " By using this image of thought in conjunction with Hume's notion of mind, 
the creation of concepts can be richer, more creative, and Wiled to the affirmation of becoming. 
Deleuze means his model to reflect more accurately than the arboreal one the creative 
and dynamic thought-activity in the space between Ideas. Humean difference does not 
constitute a space that demands subsumptive ordering In order to arrive at 'common sense' 
thought. The 'structure' incorporating lines of potential and actual connections between ideas 
contains no Inherent hierarchy or logically necessary unities or totalities, but only a multiplicity of 
heterogeneous elements and the potential for more-or-less complex assemblages. In Hume's 
model, the Imagination Is never complete, but always open to now generations and qualifica- 
tons, and to the constitution of new and more extensive connections. Changes In circum- 
stances lead thought In new (connective) directions. Similarly, Deleuze's rhizome 'can be 
broken at any point of Its growth without being prevented from spreading through a multitude of 
alternate lines'. " This is just what Deleuze means when he writes (with Guattan) that 'a rhizome 
is precisely a case of an open system', such that 'the concepts relate to circumstances rather 
than essences'. 12 The rhizomatic system of the imagination Is 'open' to the extent that it relates 
the particularity of relations between Ideas to the specific circumstances that lead to them. Uke 
Hume's model of mind, the rhizornatic open system can be defined only by Its heterogeneity 
and the potentia/connectibility between any element and any other. 
The Importance of Hume's atomistic model of mind for Deleuze's 'rhizome' goes 
beyond intellectual genealogy. It also leads to a later reading of empiricism with Implications for 
any refleyive Interpretation of EmpIrkism &7d Subjectivity. For Deleuze, one of the lessons of 
the rhizome is that thought 'grows from the middle' or starts to 'move' or 'live' In-between. 
Vftt Is It, he asks, 'that the empiricists found ... which is like a vital discovery, a certainty of life - 
which, if one really adheres to It, changes one's way of life? Relatlons are external to their 
temm.... Relations are in the middle, and e)dst as such. '13 Deleuze considers this to be a 
position common to all empiricisms, showing ffud there can be no 'essence' In an Idea: there Is 
nothing that can assure an Idea of a particular place In the array of the given. Thus rhzomatic 
thinking is clearly contrary to essentialism, where a term and its relatlons 'belong' to one 
another, so that relations are Intemalto 'thele terms. According to Deleuze, such notions 
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conceal the variety evident in life, denigrating the diversity of experience. By showing that 
relations between Ideas are inherent neither in a single idea nor in two terms taken together 
(except in the taking; that is, in relating them 'together'), but can always change without a 
commensurate change in the terms, Deleuze reveals the difference between instances, and the 
dynamic potential for changes in relations. 
He takes Hume to think similarly. Atomism 'contains' inherently the possibility of the 
connection of elements, but Is unable independently to account for its realization. Yet to 
express or even think about the radically differentiable nature of the given demands that Ideas 
be related; the Initial focus on simple ideas merely clears the way for analysis of the formation of 
complex ones. t 
By emphasizing both the lack of dynamism, or'qualification', implicit In the atomistic 
mind, and the presence of dynamism-as-thought within the imagination, Deleuze moves from his 
sweeping Interrogative characterization of Hume's project to a more subtle and more particular 
question: 'how is the given transcended? ' or again, 'how can a subject transcending the given 
be constituted in the given? ' (ES, 86) Deleuze writes that, for Hume, 'the subject is not a quality 
but rather the qualification of a collection of Ideas.... defined by the movement through which it 
Is developed' (ES, 64,85). The Humean subject Is not some 'thing', some structure, that 
derives from a linear organization or mathematical aggregation of elements, and nor Is it to be 
understood in terms of the 'copy principle' and the relationship between the sensible and the 
Intelligible. For Deleuze, it must be grasped instead in terms of the dynamic movement 
between elements of the given. 
The imagination is naturally 1nAW&, a disordered 'fancy'. Its activity is without constancy 
and uniformity, and has the character of 'delirium, or-same thing from another point of 
view-change and indifference' (ES, 23). In other words, the imagination is at first without limit - 
stability or direction. But Hume points out, 'were Ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance 
alone wou'd join them; and 'tis Impossible the same ideas should fall regually into complex 
ones' (T, 10). It would be impossible under such conditions for the mind to become a relatively 
stable subject capable of being an 1. Yet introspection reveals that there Is something we call T 
and that Ideas are regularly related In particular ways. Therefore, Hume must seek out the 
means by which the productive Imagination becomes settled: N the Imagination Is by nature 
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unstable, then some other element must provide It with constancy, structure, coherence, and 
generaJity. 
Hume's study of the transcendence of the given reveals that, as Deleuze puts it, 
'constancy and uniformity are present only in the way In which Ideas are assoc(ated In the 
imagInatiod (M 23). The formation of relations between ideas is a kind of 'law of human 
nature and, as Deleuze tells us, 'like every other law, It Is defined by its effects, not by a cause' 
(ES, 24-5). To be certain of avoiding 'supersfition', philosophers must be content with examin- 
ing these effects, rather than pursuing 'obscure and uncertain speculations' in seeking after 
what cannot be found: the cause or origin of the law. The tendency for Ideas to be attracted to 
one another In this manner must be 'resolv'd Into orIgInal q ueftes of human nature' rather than 
being attributed to some 'faculty', which In this Instance would be a meaningless word hiding an 
inability to locate an origin (T, 12-3). 
Hume Identifies these effects In terms of three 'principles of association', according to 
the kindof relation produced: contiguity between ideas In space or time, resemblance, and 
causality. Whilst insisting that it is unnecessary to justify the names and number of the 
principles, Deleuze Is faithful to this account (ES, 114). He considers these principles to occur 
In the space between atomistic Ideas, relating them and thereby transcending the given. The 
principles 'produce an association among Ideas, and upon the appearance of one Idea naturally 
Introduce anothee, or, In Newtonian terms, they make for an 'ease of transition' from one Idea 
14 to another, a tendency that constitutes the essence of relations (r, 58). By this means, simple 
Ideas are tied together to form complex ones, and chains of Ideas form lines of thought, one 
idea leading the imagination naturafly to the next in flows of words, thoughts, arguments, 
reasonings and so on. 
The constitution of relations, or transcendence of the given, is not, then, a wholly 
random matter, but regular and consistent. In composing relations, the Imagination proceeds 
passively along the path of least resistance, according to a principle of ease of transition. The 
principles of association represent the potential for movement In the army of the given, and 
determine the 'links and principles of union' between Ideas, yielding a relative uniformity in 
relations, which Deleuze considers to be human nature (ES, 23-4). '5 Human nature Is, them a 
set of propensities and dispositions which on Hume's evidence are 'permanent, Irresistible, and 
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universal', the most original human instincts (T, 225,368). As a result, they are also the most 
secure underpinning for study of the consistent operations of imagination, and it is because of 
this characteristic uniformity that Hume calls 'natural' those relations which derive from the three 
principles and hold between ideas objectively. 
The places of consistency, universality and inevitability might suggest that Hume's 
principles are in some substantial way similar to Kant's categories of the understanding, which 
would problematize Deleuze's reading. But although 'functionally parallel', there is a crucial 
difference between them: Hume does not mean that the principles determine allpossible 
experience, unlike Kant's categories. Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories makes 
them formally and logically necessary, whereas Hume considers the principles to be prectIcaly 
necessary, relative to the contingent workings of the Imagination, and changeable If future 
observations Indicate the need. (I shall say more about this In Chapter 2. ) Deleuze favours 
Hume's approach because of the manner of Its conception. By dealing solely with questions of 
practical necessity, Hume affirms that 'nothing In the mind transcends human nature, because it 
is human nature that in its principles, transcends the mind; nothing Is ever transcendental' (ES, 
24). There is and can be no subject that does the associating; neither the mind nor the 
imagination Is a pre-existing subject, whether empirical or transcendental. "' Instead, the subject 
Is produced in the process of the production and stabilization of relations in, but not by, the 
Imagination. Thus order is not imposed from without the mind, but generated within, as a 
practice of affection, consistent with Deleuze's prescription for the Humean empirical cure for 
transcendentalism. It is to this practice that I turn now. 
6. BEUEF-FORMATION AND THE WORLD OF PRACTICE 
Hume's emphasis on belief rather than knowledge is bed closely to associationism. 
Beliefs are sometimes described by Hume simply as Vivid or intense conceptions of an idea, but 
he more often and, according to Deleuze, more tellingly, defines them in terms of the source 
and nature of this vivacity: a belief is ýen idea related to or a&vc&ed Wth a present impre$- 
slon', such that some of the vivacity of the impression is transferred to the idea (T 93; see r, 
86,101,103). Not only is the imaginabon 'transported' by impressions to 'such ideas as are 
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related to it', but some of the vivacity of the impression is communicated to the idea. Should 
the degree of vivacity be sufficient, the Idea is believed. 
As Deleuze points out, the formation of beliefs Is only possible because of the unifor- 
mity granted the imagination by the principles (ES, 24,34). Without human nature's consis- 
tency, beliefs would be unthinkable and differentiation between the vivacity of Ideas Impossible; 
degrees of vividness require a relative measure. Additionally, the principles of association are 
the means by which vivacity is transferred. To believe Is an act of the imagination, but the 
consequent Idea still must find its content and vividness In the simple ideas offered separately 
as the given (ES, 72; T, 119,140). Typically, vivacity attends an Impression of sensation, is 
communicated to the commensurate Idea and then, by giving rise to an impression of reflection 
which activates one or other of the principles, is transferred to the attendant idea in the 
constitution of a relation (although some impressions of reflection do not operate via ideas). 17 
Notwithstanding Hume's claim that his definition of belief will 'be found to be entirely 
comfoýqa Is to every one's feeling and experience', it Is actually problematic, not least because j 
some beliefs seem to lack vividness, while other ideas that are believed seem vivid and plain (r, 
97). Furthermore, like other eighteenth century philosophers, Hume's focus is on how beliefs 
are possible rather than on locating attributes that define woff fortned beliefs. Therefore, as 
Deleuze points out, 'an entire art and all sorts of rules Will be required In order to distinguish 
between legitimate beliefs and ... illusior& (ES, Ix). 
It is possible to overcome the dilemma regarding the relative vivacity of beliefs and 
other ideas by treating 'belief as a technical term, following comments In Hume's'Appendix! to 
the Treafise. Hume writes there that: 'an Idea assented to [believed] feels different from a 
fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to 
explain by calling It a superior force, or vAwcfty or solidity, or fim7nesg or steadinW (T, 629). 
As Oliver Johnson points out, this description attributes io(belieif 
"Idea'special 
weight or 
gravity in our minds' that Is lacking In Hume's original definition, and a note of steadiness 
evidenced by Introspective study of one's beliefs. " We might consequently agree with Hume 
that belief 'is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the Ideas of the judgement from 
the fictions of the Imagination' (r, 629). This revised characterization is consistent with both 
Deleuze's reading of Hume's theory as one of the affections of the mind (one which Is felt rather 
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than observed as a product testable against 'truth') and Hume's dismissal of the philosophical 
privilege usually accorded knowledge. For Hume, knowledge is limited to whatever is immedi- 
ately apprehensible or intuitively certain. Whenever we go beyond such ideas to those which 
are only more or less probable, we are concerned instead with belief. 
Deleuze's reading of 'belief as a technical term leads him to dismiss the role of 
knowledge In Hume's theory of the subject seemingly sympathetically, on grounds of epistemo- 
logical scepticism. But Deleuze's position actually centres on another Issue: his objection to the 
philosophically privileged status usually accorded knowledge (and attendant truth claims). 
Knowledge Is the'great first principle' of traditional epistemology and its attainment becomes a 
universal goal involving one's identifying and grasping some particular thing-a fact-as though 
It were the same for everyone at all times. In contrast, belief has no such privileged conceptual 
status. Belief Is never an absolute, but is defined by Hume and Deleuze In terms of merely 
relatIve vivacity and reladve stability, consequent to a dyn&nlc process of changes In relations. 
Hence Hume shows not only that beliefs have an origin In dynamism and becoming rather than 
In static being, but also that this dynamism is inconsistent with the concept of knowledge. 
Deleuze consequently considers that, with Hume, the subject ceases to be a locus of knowl- 
edge, and Instead becomes constituted in the process of belief-formation (N, 98). " 
Given the dynamism of the principles of association, belief-formation Is a matter of 
practice; specifically, a practice of affection. To establish beliefs Is to establish relations, 'a fact 
and a practice' at the heart of subject-formation. If the subject ceased with Descartes to be 
defined by practico-ethical questions and exercises, and became instead the pure subject of 
knowledge, as Foucault suggests, then, Deleuze Is arguing, Hume completes philosophys 
return to practice. 20 It is the nature of practice which counts, and not the inevitable illegitimate 
beliefs that 'surround thought like a cloud of illusions' (ES, lx) - 
Hume's account of the dynamic formation of relations between Ideas provides Deleuze 
with a logic that supplements the model of the rhizome, and a strategy that enables thought In 
its Image, and these influences will become critical in his later thinidng of the subject. Any 
relation can change without a change In terms, so that ideas are always compossible and 
serializable. If there Is nothing inherent in ideas to determine a particular place for them In the 
array of the given, if thought 'moves! In the 'space' between Ideas, and If this movement is ' 
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unrestricted (although relatively consistent), then it is possible at every Instant for new and 
different Ideas to be generated. Relations not only represent differences, but simultaneously 
constitute and engender them. 
The implications for Deleuze's model of the subject are profound, as the ongoing 
constitution of relations undercuts the possibility of locating a final and static subject within a 
psychology of the mind's affections. It suggests to Deleuze that the subject must be under- 
stood according to a logic of 'AND' rather than "IS', where'AND' does not denote a particular 
form of relation (the conjunction), but that which overturns the possibility of establishing the 
subject as One, Being, or Whole . 
21 The 'AND' of relations prevents the subject from becoming 
a closed system, and represents the abiding possibility of thinldng again under different 
circumstances, of thinidng differently, perhaps Ignoring or forgetting particular ideas and lines of 
thought 
Deleuze's interpretation of Hume's associationism suggests two justifications for a logic 
of 'AND'. First, It reveals that there Is nothing permanent about relations between Ideas. Each 
qualification of the Imagination is new, original, and In the process of becoming other and 
different (older, past memorized, inspirational, ... ): 'this! qualification will make way for a new 
passional state, and 'that' one. Second, the rhizometic 'AND' Is thought independently but for 
the context of the terms it relates. It Is never 'subordinate to the One which divides or the Being 
which encompasses it'22 Therefore it can never be understood dialectically, or as Internal to 
some conceptual model of the actual. 
With the production of relations, Deleuze asserts, the Imagination, 'having been a 
collection, becomes now a faculty; the distributed collection becomes now a system' (specifi- 
cally, a system of relations) so that Humean empiricism is characterizable as a dualism 
Incorporating both the given of experience (or 'nature') and relations which 'do not depend on 
Ideas' ('human nature') (ES, 92). Hume has moved consequently from the absence of Ideas to 
the presence of affections of the mind. W he has yet to Isolate the means by which affections, 
are given a direction, such that the stable subject might be thought There Is nothing about 
either the principles of association or the given which grants relations a direction or specificity. 
Hume's famous analogy between the three associative principles, operating on mental 
objects, and gravitation, operating on physical ones, doubtless is somewhat forced (r, 12-13). 
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But it is apt in at least two respects. First, both association and gravitation are 'laws' which act 
invisibly but for the evidence of their effects. Second, they both appear to W universally within 
their domain. All objects have the potential to be drawn towards all others, and all Ideas have 
the potential to be associated with other Ideas. 
However, in the case of gravitation, the actualcausal connection is exceptionless; all 
bodies attract all others in accordance with a precise, measurable relationship. In contrast, 
relations between Ideas lack universality. Ideas (as the given) are Initially Independent of one 
another, and association acts only In designated cases; between particular Ideas. As Hume 
reminds us, nothing is more free than the human Imagination, and the principles of association 
constitute orgy 'a gentle force, which commonly prevails' (EHU, 47; T, 10). Whilst the principles 
of association make the connection of ideas possible, they cannot explain why particular Ideas 
become associated. 
Deleuze considers Hume to have found the source of this direction In the interrelated 
forces of the passions, practice, and society (or 'culture', read generally). Whilst the principles 
of association provide a constantly shifting framework of potential stability, it Is the passions, 
impressions of reflection arising out of the experience of pleasure or pain, sometimes in 
conjunction with other qualities, which provide them a direction, content, and particularity. As 
Deleuze puts It 'the relations find their direction and their sense in the passions; association 
presupposes projects, goals, intentions, occasions, an entire practical life and affectivity...., 
Association gives the subject a possible structure, but only the passions can give It being and 
G)dstence' (ES, 120). The principles of association link Ideas, but the passions designate which 
particular links are constituted. The relationship between the two SIOMents is therefore one of 
simple effect the passions are selective and the principles of association constitutive. 
TO explicate the relationship still more clearly, Dsleuze uses his conception of 'reason. 
Hume defines 'reason' diversely and myriad times In the course Of the Treafise and the first 
Enquir3ý In the former, after much prevarication, he uses the term to mean whatever it Is that 
engages In 'reasoning' about matters of fact. In the latter, It means Variously the Opposite Of 
sentiment or taste, the opposite of Intuition, the opposite of experience, and the employment of 
the 'understanding' to correct sympathy and the senses. ý But although Deleuze hints that his 
conception of 'reason' Is meant to parallel Hume's, he actually uses the term to denote the 
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imagination under the influence of the principles of association. 23 Reason is, then, for Deleuze, 
'the totality of all of the simple effects of the principles of association, general Ideas, substances, 
and relations!; that is, the totality of the principles of association and the Idnds of Ideas that they 
produce (ES, 65). 
Deleuze points out that 'reason' (whether as a technical term, as above, or according to 
its common meaning) is often considered Independent of, or even opposed to, the passions 
and emotions. But Hume has shown that reason and the passions are mutually Implicated 
since, as Deleuze puts it, 'we associate our ideas because we have passions! (ES, 31). 
Furthermore, 'the mind Is riot reason; reason is an affection of the mind', so the forces that 
generate the mind's (or, more correctly, the imagination's) 'movement or affection are essential 
to reason (ES, 30). Not only do the passions provide reason its direction, then, but reason can 
only be'moved'at all because of some Initial upset determined by the passions. Hume writes 
famously that "tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the 
scratching of my finger; but it Is contrary to the passions and so, for example, we reason our 
way through ethical discourse (T, 416). 
Hume distinguishes two kinds of passions. Direct passions'arise Immediately from 
good or evil, from pain or pleasure', whereas indirect passions 'proceed from the same 
principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities' (T, 276). Whereas direct passions operate 
according to 'a "primitive Instinct" by means of which a mind that has experienced emotion 
tends to obtain the good and to avoid evil', indirect passions operate according to a principle of 
'natural organization assigning to an emotion a certain Idea, *which (the emotion) never falls to 
produce"' (ES 117 quoting T, 278,287). Passions are 'excited' by ideas or Impressions; by 
pleasures or pains distinct from the passion itself. 
Pleasure is an end always pursued by the passions, whereas pain is avoided, so the 
passions act as motives to action. (it Is pointless to ask me source of this principle since, on 
Deleuze's account no answer can be found: recall that principles can be understood only 
according to their consequences and not their origins. ) Afthough the principles of association 
invoke means to achieve ends, It Is the passions that provide these ends. The principle and 
relation Invoked are both determined according to the utility that they provide in meeting the 
end, 'although this Is not decided consciously, but in accordance with the principles' (ES, 126). 
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The mutual implication of the passions and society Is a complex matter and not at ail 
clear In Hume's work, yet Deleuze provides only a short account of it. His main point Is that, 
since a human individual always belongs to a community, the passions are conditioned by 
social expectations (ES, 39). But social interactions demand relatively constant actions and 
reactions on the part of each member of a society, along with 'the availability of collective and 
individual characters! (ES, 21). The latter refers to the affective and mutually beneficial 
interaction between Individuals and society, which Involves consistent compliance by Individuals 
with consistently defined societal expectations. 
The passions serve as motives and ends for one's actions arid, with respect to the 
place of an Individual within society, they have two effects. First, since an Individual's actions 
determine whether or not she meets social expectations, the passions dictate Indirectly whether 
or not she Is able to partake of a 'mutually beneficial' relationship with society. Should she fail 
to meet social expectations, she will likely experience censor or ostracism. Second, the 
passions 'Implicate society as the oblique means for their satisfaction' (ES, 21). Individuals rely 
upon social arrangements, via the experience of pleasure and pain, for the provision of 
communal and material means. Therefore, as Deleuze puts it: 'associationism exists for the 
sake of utilitarianism. - Association ... defines a set of possible means for a practical subject for 
which all real ends belong to the moral, passional, political, and economic order' (ES, 120-21). 
Social arrangements provide means and ends for one's actions, but the passions are the 
implicit determinants of the relationship between social motives and individual actions. 
Reason can only be brought to bear'on a preexisting world and [it] presupposes an 
antecedent ethics and an order of ends: Hume's studies of the world of practice, his econom- 
ics, history and ethics, reveal as much (ES, 33). There must be, then, a unification of the 
system of reason which is particular to the individual with the shared system of culture and 
ethics that enables the constitution of a settled Imagination nameable as'l'. As Deleuze puts It: 
'transcending the partiality of the subject whose idea it Is, the idea of subjectivity Includes within 
each collection under consideration the principle and the rule of possible agreement between 
subjects. Thus, the problem of the self, Insoluble at the level of the understanding, finds, 
uniquely within culture, a moral or political solution' (ES, 64). According to Deleuze, Hume finds 
the means of this alliance In the nature of reason as the effect of association (ES, 32). Given 
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that the principles are conferred their direction by the passions, so too must reason finally be 
subordinated to them. Consequently the 'understanding reflects Interest, and the role of reason 
is 'to make the passions sociable and the Interest social': that Is, reason acts as Intermediary 
between the passions and the subject situated within a world of practice, culture and ethics (ES, 
22). The imagination is not finally, the origin of culture, but its product. 
Deleuze details several consequences of the argument that reason relies In some sense 
upon the experience of a practice] world. The most Important for my purposes Is that only with 
reference to circumstantial experience can one comprehend the particularity of the subject, the 
particular affectivity of a designated array of the given: 
Circumstance gives the reMon its sufficient reason.... We must take literally the Idea 
that affectivity is a matter of circumstances. These are precisely the variables that 
define our passion and our interests. Understood in this way, a set of circumstances 
always individuates a subject since it represents a state of its passions and needs, an 
allocation of its interests, a distribution of its beliefs and exhilarations. (ES, 103) 
Each subject, as the affectivity of mind, could have been otherwise. So not only Is the subject 
necessarily culturally embedded, but the Import of the relationship between reason and culture 
contains no logical necessity. Consequently nothing can be said justifiably of the subject (or 
'the Subject') that is not a summation of all circumstances, all affections, and all subjects-Ahat 
is, nothing can be said of it without abstracting to a point where 'the subject' refers to nothing at 
all distinctive. 24 On Deleuze's account of Hume, the expression makes sense only when it is 
understood as always and necessarily a parficu&gr subject. This point is not pursued in 
EmPlricism and Subjectivity, but is examined more closely by Deleuze in other texts. 25 He 
means to show here just that the contingency of experience and passional affections makes 
subject-formation a distinctive and individuating process. 
To this point, Deleuze's reading of Hume has been quite straightforward, entailing a 
credible account of the dynamics Implicated by introspection. But he has only sketched the 
place of practical life in restraining these dynamics. Developing this position takes Deleuze 
beyond a simple (though distinctive) explication of Hume's position towards a more radical 
appropriation of notions occupying a seemingly minor place In Hume's texts. This effort Is the 
focus of Sections 7 and 8. 
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7. THE HAsiTuAL PRINCIPLES 
Deleuze announces that Hume's answer to 'the problem of the Self is that 'we are 
habits, nothing but habits' (ES, x). Having spelled out Hume's atomism and associationism, 
Deleuze is able to say more about 'habit and its place in the relationship between nature and 
human nature. This will not be his final say on the place of habit in subject-formation, however. 
As I will show in Chapter 2, Deleuze's subsequent adoption of Bergsonism will entail a radical 
shift towards a richer and more complex account But Hume's theory Will have pointed Deleuze 
on his way, raising questions concerning the part of contingency in the development of habits 
which will become central to his 'transcendental empiricism. 
Hume emphasizes the central and primitive place of habit (which he also calls'custom') 
in constitution of the subject when he writes that 'all inferences from experience ... are effects of 
custom, not of reasoning' (EHU, 43). For Hume, custom 
is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience 
useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those 
which have appeared In the past. Without the Influence of custom,, we should be 
entirely Ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what Is immediately present to the 
memory and senses, We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to 
employ our natural power in the production of any effects. (EHU, 45) 
Since Deleuze has shown that 'usefulness! is a matter of the relationship between ends and 
means, embedded in a social or communal context, and also that matter-of-fact reasoning has 
to do with belief-formation, habit Is clearly central to his account of the subject. Only by 
explaining the affective psychology of habit and anticipation is he able to reveal howwe are 
habits'. 
Hume's most protracted and precise explanation of habit is in the Enqiiry Concernlnq 
Human Understanding, where he presents a study of cause and effect in terms of repeated and 
constant conjunction. Hume attributes to habit the inclination to infer'the existence of one 
object from the appearance of the other' and to renew some previous 'act or operation' without 
this being dictated by reasoning (EHU, 43). Habit is not simply a customary movement of the 
mind acquired over a period of time as a consequence of conditioning, but 'a species of natural 
instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to 
produce or to prevent', given its impetus by experience (EHU, 46-7). In other words, habit, like 
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the passions and the principles of association, is a principle of human nature, a contingent 
psychological principle whose origin cannot legitimately be sought. Furthermore, Hume finds 
that habit 'stands behind' reasoning, as it were, in the guise of the principle of causation. 
Deleuze Identified two elements that make experience a distinctively social phenome- 
non: first, the consistency of one's actions and reactions as a function of social expectations 
and mores, and second, the means-ends relationships Implicated In and by the bonds between 
subject and society. Although each of the principles of association might be active In enabling 
the recognition and assessment of such consistencies and expectations, only causation can 
provide the vital anticipatory connection between ends and means (whether these be economic, 
social, religious, legal or whatever). Experience and sociality only Implicate each other because 
of the stability of the expectations that stand behind them, and only by employing the principle 
of causation Is one We consistently to make judgements of the kind: 'If I work 40 hours this 
week, then I shall be able to pay my rent'; 'if I abide by the law, then I shall avoid the payment 
of a fine, and be able to expect protection of my property, and so on. 2* Hume sees this as an 
unexceptionable principle: 'When the mind ... passes from the Idea or Impression of one object 
to the Idea or belief of another, it is not determin'd by reason, but by certain principles, which 
associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination' (T, 92). 
But in this role, Deleuze points out causabon is not solmy a principle either of nature 
(experience, the given) or human nature. Without experience, there Is no 'in between' of Ideas, 
no space for causation to operate; yet causation Is a principle of human nature, a means by 
which the subject Is granted uniformity. Causation requires 'a foot In both camps!, as It were. 
How can the two be reconciled? 
Deleuze considers that affection of the Imagination provides evidence that the two are 
actually In agreement Wore, human nature does not by itsellproduce &s ffec, 'S 66 et (E. , ). 
Experience does not give rise independently to the 'always! of causation essential to the 
assessment of means-ends relationships. This property comes from habit, the principle that 
allows the Imagination 'to reason about experience, as R transforms belief Into a possible act of 
the understanding' (ES, 68). Habit gives to anticipatory beliefs about what will follow from an 
antecedent event the epistemological status of certainty, of knoWedge. That is, habit makes the 
relation between antecedent and consequent 4opearcertain (thereby making It possible to 
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reason about the causal relationship) while remaining on the level of probability (ES, 67,68). 
The mutuality of the relationship between nature and human nature goes deeper, 
however, even though it is unsupported by a theory of perception. On Deleuze's reading, 
Hume holds that, in the constitution of causal relations, 'human nature takes the detour of the 
observation of nature, or of an experience of nature' (ES, 65-6). Specifically, causation Is 
constituted by degrees, becoming 'stronger and Increasingly certain as more and more 
Instances of constant conjunction between two events are observed (r, 130). An experienced 
reasoner considers It certain that, under ordinary circumstances, one's striking a nail with a 
hammer will drive the nail Into timber, whereas a young child must learn this by observing 
multiple instances of constant conjunction between a hammer's blow and a nail's movement. 
Deleuze's exposition of Hume reveals that the principle of habit presupposes experiý 
ence whilst remaining different from It, and also that experience forms the basis of practical 
decision-maldng on the condition that it Is subject to habit in conjunction with the principles of 
association. The consequence of this agreement is that a new impression of reflection Is 
produced, 'a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another' and 'to transfer the 
past to the future' (T, 165,134). Precisely such Impressions as the" are necessary to ensure 
consistency of thought and action in a social context. 
One might have expected Deleuze to have given at this point an account of the role of 
memory In Hume's theory, as the means of relating past experience with future expectations. 
Without memory, defined by Hume as'a faculty, by which we raise up the Images of past 
perceptions! (where these images are more Vivid than those of the fancy), there can be nothing 
to transfer (T, 260). Furthermore, Hume holds that memory contributes to production of the 
relation of Identity, which becomes crucial to his account of the subject, for'memory not only 
discovers the Identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of 
resemblance among the perceptions! (r, 261). But Deleuze falls to provide an account of 
memory, asserting that 'habit has no need of memory, and holding Instead that 'the past as 
such Is not given' but constituted by a reflex synthesis of time (ES, 95). This Is a surprising 
(and frustratingly enigmatic) position-especially given the important place of memory in his later 
works-due perhaps to weaknesses In Hume's own account of memory. 
Deleuze believes that the only worthwhile objection to a philosopher's position Is the 
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kind that 'shows that the question raised by a philosopher is not a good question, that it does 
not force the nature of things enough, ... that we should raise a different question' (ES, 107). 
Kant's critique of Hume's empiricism is like this, and hinges on the question of agreement 
between the given, the principles of association, and the passions. Under Hume's psychologi- 
cal model, what Is 'given' to the mind Is both the collection of ideas and'the relations which do 
not depend on ideas; that Is, nature and human nature (ES, 108). Kant agrees with Hume that 
the relationship between the two must be explained by the operation of the Imagination. 
Hume's theory Is that the imagination becomes 'settled' and 'consistent in Its operation 'insofar 
as a law of reproduction of representations as a synthesis of reproduction Is constituted as a 
result of the principles [of association and the passions]' (ES, 110). But, according to Deleuze, 
Kant holds that Hume is providing an answer to a question already tainted by a dualism which 
presumes that the 'accord' between human nature and nature Is an agreement In so far as they 
interact by means of shared principles. 27 Suppose Instead, Deleuze considers Kant to suggest, 
'that the given Is not InffiWlysubject to principles of the same kind as those that regulate the 
connection of representations in the case of an empirical subjecf; that Is, suppose that Hume's 
dualism Is not immanent to every experience (ES, 111). Any agreement between the subject 
and the given could then be only accidental, and the subject 'would not even have the occasion 
to connect its representations according to the rules whose corresponding faculty it neverthe- 
less Possessed' (ES, 111). In other words, the rules would not form any kind of 'connection', 
nor represent an 'effecV shared by the subject and the given. 
In KMM9 CrificalPhilosophy, Deleuze wdtes: 
we can see the point where Kant breaks with Hume. Hume had clearly seen that 
knowledge implied subjective principles, by means of which we go beyond the given. 
But these principles seemed to him merely principles of 17umen nature, Psychological 
principles of association concerning our own representations. Kant transforms the 
problem: that which is presented to us In such a way as to form a Nature must neces- 
sarily obey principles of the same kind (or rather, the same principles) as those which 
govem the course of our representations. The same principles must account for our 
subjective moves, and for the fact that the given submits itself to our moves. That Is to 
say, the subjectivity of principles is not an empirical cw psychological subjectivity, but a 
'transcendental' subjectivity. " 
For Hume, there Is no a pribli synthesis and no transcendental aspect to the agreement, but 
neither are the principles of knowledge derived from experience. How, then, can Hume ansswer 
Kant's criticism without resorting to transcendentalism, and still 'present the agreement between 
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human nature and nature as something more than an accidental, indeterminate, and contingent 
agreement'? (ES, 112) 
Deleuze finds Hume's answer in what he calls the 'metaphysical theory of purposive- 
ness'. For Hume, unity between the principles of association and the principles of the passions 
is evidenced by the formation of the subject: the principles of the passions'elect, choose, 
designate, Invite' some Impressions of sensation over others for transformation Into impressions 
of reflection by the principles of association. For this to be possible, Deleuze states, 'the mind 
must possess faculties constituted in an appropriate way; there must be a constitution which 
does not depend upon the mind-a nature' (ES, 113). For Kant, this 'nature' must include a 
transcendental structure comprising various faculties. But for Hume it involves the dynamic 
operation of contingent laws of human nature and their complex effects. Not only are the 
'faculties' to which Deleuze refers defined by Hume in terms of processes arising from the 
principles of association, but the particulanty of the operation of the principles Is determined by 
contingent passions serving practical interests, and not by a pro-existing structure. The 
Interaction between these two constituents Is what Deleuze means by 'purposiveness!, juxta- 
posed against the imposition of a Kantian 'rule for representations'. 
Deleuze's characterization of Hume's position in the debate appears to be question- 
begging: Kant asks of Hume the Implications of dropping the assumption that the accord 
between nature and human nature Is an agreement; as Deleuze interprets him, Hume replies 
that the implications cannot be specified precisely because nature and human nature are in 
agreement. On my reading, Emphicism and Subjectivity does not provide means for defending 
Hume successfully. The text suggests that Deleuze favours Hume's position because agree- 
ment between nature and human nature Is locatable by introspection, whereas Kant's question 
can be asked only from a transcendental viewpoint. But it does not declare Deleuze's objec- 
tions to transcendentalism clearly. As I will show in Chapter 2, a resolution only comes In 
Deleuze's works on Bergson, where he clearly distinguishes Kantian from Humean methodolo- 
gies on the way to developing a transcendental empiricism and a very different conception of 
habit. 
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S. THE MIGHT OF GENERAL RULES 
As a species of natural instinct, habit produces impression of anticipabon. But nothing 
about habit ensures its consistent operation. Without direction and limit, habit will sometimes 
lead to the unjustified anticipation of events; that is, to the production of causal relations 
between events which are not actually connected. Therefore, even habits must be qualified by 
some other principle in order to produce the subject's characteristic stability. The conditioning 
of habit-formation is undertaken by what Hume calls 'general ruW to which he attributes 'a 
mighty influence on our actions and understanding' (r, 374). Deleuze's interpretation makes 
this influence mighty indeed. 
General rules are 'passions of the imagination' formed by the reflection of the passions 
'together with their circumstances.... through the principles of association' (ES, 64). In the 
process of reflection, general rules transcend the circumstances of their original production to 
produce 'a system of directed means, a determined whole' or artificial unity which integrates the 
disparate Individuations of subject-formation by binding and directing the Imagination. 
Moreover, Deleuze submits: 
when drives are reflected in an imagination submitted to the principles of association, 
institutions are determined by the figures traced by the drives according to the circum- 
stances. This does not mean that the imagination is In its essence active but only that 
it lings ou4 and resonates... We can then conclude that nature and culture, drive and 
institution, are one to the extent that the one Is satisfied by the other, but they are also 
two insofar as the latter Is not explained by the former. (ES, 41,49) 
General rules are necessary for the stabilization of activity within the imagination, not according 
to logically necessary relations between ideas, but to the direction given by the passions. 
Therefore: 'the general rule is the resonance of an affection in the mind and the imagination. 
Rules reflect processes and Ideas of practice.... [T] he Imagination reflects affection, and 
affection resounds inside the mind. The mind ceases to be fancy, is fixed and becomes human 
nature' (ES, 69). If this activity of the imagination is analogous to the reverberations of sound, 
then general rules act to 'quieten' or 'soften' it, and to prevent excessive 'echo' in the formation 
of relations and the transfer of vivacity. 
Hume describes two kinds of general rules in Book I of the Peadse (although he 
sometimes describes them as two separate functions of each and every general rule). The first 
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Wind, 'extensive' or 'determining' rules, represents a propensity of the Imagination to extend the 
scope of judgements formed under one particular set of circumstances to other resembling but 
non-ldentical ones. Hume holds that although the tendency to form extensive rules'proceeds 
from those very principles, on which all judgements concerning causes and effects depend', 
they are actually of a 'higher order' than the habit of anticipation. Further, the tendency to 
Invent extensive rules Is 'seldom destroyed, where any considerable circumstances remain the 
same' (r, 147). The Influence of extensive rules therefore Is exceptionally broad and powerful. 
Hume characterizes extensive rules as a natural propension whereby we: 'carry our 
maxims beyond those reasons, which first lnduc'd us to establish them. Where cases are 
similar In many circumstances, we are apt to put them on the same tooting, without considering, 
that they differ In the most material circumstances, and that the resemblance is more apparent 
than real' (r, 551). In other words, extensive rules have the capacity to Integrate whatever Is 
experienced as exceptional or epiphenomenal within a system of the general and essential. The 
passions are extended and reflected, liberating them from the conditions of their actuality, and 
projecting them beyond the circumstances of experience. Consequently, habits of thought are 
formed which Incorporate the accidental Into some form of illegitimate belief such as prejudice, 
irrational fear, or some other causal mistake (T, 146). 29 The imagination, which had appeared, 
with habit, to have acquired stability, turns out once again to be unstable, without the direction 
and consistency necessary for subject-formation. 
According to Deleuze, Hume holds that, since Introspection reveals that reason Is 
applied consistently, and since reason Is not provided laws for Its legitimate exercise by human 
nature, such constraints must be provided somehow else. While It Is characteristic of every 
belief or inference 'to transcend experience and to transfer the past to the future.... It Is still 
necessary that the object of any belief be determined in accordance with a past experience' 
(ES, 71). So If the propensity of extensive general rules cannot be destroyed where 'consider- 
able circumstances remain the same', there must be some compensating element that limits ft. 
Hume contends also that 'general rules commonly extend beyond the principles on 
which they are founded; and ... we seldom make any exception to them, unless 
thfit excePtIOn 
have Me qualldes of a general ruld (italics added)(r, 551). Thus It must be another kind of 
general rule that holds belief-formation within the limits of past experience and proper reason- 
42 
ing, negating extensive general rules whenever their unchecked operation leads towards 
erroneous belief and unjustifiable action. Hume calls them 'corrective general rules'. 
As Deleuze characterizes them, corrective general rules 'reflect' the affections which 
resound in the Imagination as a consequence of extensive rules, providing beliefs with unifor- 
mity even when they are subject to contrary observations. Corrective rules allow us to think 
reliably, and to differentiate beliefs which cohere with perceived reality from those which do not 
(ES, 56). They reveal how exceptions and accidents, too, arinatural or general occurrences, 
thus accounting for what extensive rules cannot. 
Neither Deleuze nor Hume explains how corrective general rules operate only In correct 
Instances, such that extensive general rules are able to operate legNInate&, in conjunction with 
the principle of habit. 30 Deleuze hints, however, that this, too, is a natural propensity of human 
nature, a suggestion agreed by Passmore in his famous text (ES, 68). 31 On this reading, there 
need not be a conscious recognition of the 'direction' in which extensive general rules lead 
belief-formation (whether to justifiable or unjustifiable beliefs), nor a conscious formulation and 
application of corrective rules, because both kinds of rules are simple propensities. Uke all the 
principles of human nature, corrective general rules can be generated and applied in appropri- 
ate instances 'automatically' and non-consciously. 
This suggestion is by no means clear in Hume's own (somewhat vague and disordered) 
account of general rules. Whilst it Is clear that Hume considers general rules to be contingent 
rather than logically necessary, It Is deba4able whether bott) kinds of rules are propensities and 
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principles, or whether only extensive rules are propensities-as, Hume specifies clearly-whilst 
corrective rules are deliberate and conscious judgements and interventions. Contrary to 
Deleuze's reading, Hume seems to suggest the latter. 
In every judgement, which we can form concerning probability, as well as concerning 
knowledge, we ought always to correct the first judgement, derWd from the nature of 
the object, by another deriv'd from the nature of the understanding.... Here then arises 
a new species of probability to correct and regulate the first, and fix its just standard 
and proportion. As demonstration Is subject to the control of probability, so Is probabil- 
ity liable to a new correction by a reflex act of the mind, wherein the nature of our 
understanding, and our reasoning from the first probability become our objects. (T, 181- 
82) 
Hume is arguing that the imagination's generation of a belief is inevitably followed by an 
examination of the process by which the belief is formed. Corrective rules, which must also 
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arise from 'probable reason', take a regulatory role, evaluating both the experiential evidence 
standing behind the belief and the consequent inference. Thus the imagination's first object is 
the experience that leads to the belief, whilst its second is the process of belief-formation. Such 
assessments need not be especially intrusive (such that one feels like one Is constantly double- 
guessing oneself), but might be, as Thomas Hearn puts it a kind of 'reflex activity of mind 
wherein our cognitive abilities themselves are scrutinized. '32 If this is the case, then reason can 
be considered self-correcting, and any errors in the formation of a belief originate from a 
different source to errors in the correcfive rules. 
There is other evidence to suggest that Deleuze's take on general rules is contrary to 
Hume's. When Hume writes that 'nature provides a remedy in the judgement and understmd- 
Ing, for what Is Irregular and incommodious in the affections! (italics added), Deleuze takes him 
to be referring to the principles of association (T, 489). Yet Hume's context-a discussion of the 
nature of artifice-mimplies that he is concerned with the ldnd of 'whole' that Deleuze considers to 
be a general rule. Moreover, Hume first deals with general rules In his analysis of probability (in 
a section on 'reflectionV), where he is concerned with the assessment of the validity of beliefs 
on the basis of evidence for and against them (r, 141). Numerous texts show Hume to hold 
that reflecting upon one's mental activity can help correct propensities that are 'destructive of all 
the most established principles of reasonings' (r, 150). 
On my reading, corrective general rules are not 'reflective' because they 'turn bacle 
those affections of the mind consequent to extensive rules, but because they require one to 
reffect upon the validity of 'resonances! according to the experiential evidence available for 
them; to engage with one's reasoning in a circumspect and contemplative manner. If this 
Interpretation Is accurate, then corrective general rules are indiscernible from what Hume 
describes as 'general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgement concerning causes 
and effects, which he clearly means to be applied consciously, and which, through experience 
and learning, become the precinct of the wise (7' , 149). 
33 To reason In harmony with these 
higher order principles Is to reason according to corrective general rules, which Hume clearly 
considers preferable to less disciplined reasoning (the Idnd conducted by 'the vulgar') which Is 
dictated predominantly by extensive rules. 
The question of whether or not Deleuze has mishandled Hume's account of general 
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rules would riot be so important were it not for Deleuze's heavy reliance upon Hume's texts to 
establish the place of habit and natural tendencies in constituting a passive subject. But 
Deleuze has provided neither strong reasons for agreeing that the operation of corrective 
general rules Is a precondition for subject-formation, nor an aftemative account of the imagina- 
ton's self-stabilization. This is another flaw In Deleuze's theory which will be solved only later, 
by his Bergsonlan account of habit. Compensation for the reader of Empilia&m and Subjec#Wy 
comes only from Deleuze's agreement with Hume concerning the effects of general rules upon 
the imagination. 
The two ldnds of general rules appear to be functionally opposed, yet must work 
together to produce stable beliefs. On the one hand, the passions are'liberated from the limits 
and conditions of their own actuality; from the specificity of the means-ends relationship in the 
light of which they operate (ES, 56). On the other, this liberation Is constrained by recognition 
of the particularity of passional activity. General rules allow both the Integration of various 
elements of the subject Into a coherent system andthe integration of this self Into society. It 
remains for Deleuze to spell out how Hume relates the two functions and to describe the 
precise mechanisms by which the social whole and the stable Imagination are reconciled; to 
answer the question: 'what can make us take hold of something and live In it, because it Is 
useful or agreeable to the Other or to persons in general? ' (ES, 37) 
According to Deleuze, Humift answer Is found In the natural mechanism of sympathy. 
One's activity In the world of practice Is not determined solely by self-interest (a theory which 
leads Inevitably to psychologies of egoism and philosophies of Identity), but by a natural and 
partial sympathy with others. Deleuze omits from his account Hume's claim that selfishness 
characterizes the 'natural temper' of humans, dismissing Hume's theory of egoism In the light of 
his claim that sympathy Is'equally natural' (r, 487; ES, 37-40). In fact, Hume largely abandons 
his theory of sympathy In the Enqully Conceming the Principles ofM"Is; arguing Instead that 
selfishness and benevolence are the key motives to action. Deleuze also drops sympathy from 
subsequent works, where relations with 'the Other' are subordinated to more self-contained 
versions of the subject. 34 
Sympathy arises from the Idea that one has of an emotion in another, evol4ng a 
corresponding impression In oneself and, consequently, one's 'sentiment of morals' In the case 
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of most (if not all) virtues. While this requires 'a great effort of imagination', it is also an 
unavoidable Idnd of interaction (T, 386). But despite its naturalness, sympathy is partial, being 
felt most intensely In respect of one's family, clan and friends, so that there are always contra- 
dictions between sympathies, carrying the potential for dispute and even violence, the effects of 
which inevitably are associated with the experience of pain. 35 Therefore, as Deleuze puts it, 'as 
for the passions, they must either be satisfied artificially and obliquely or snubbed out by 
violence' (ES, 43). 
The problem, then, is to integrate sympathies rather than to limit or restrain them 
(whereas social contract theory, for example, assumes the latter course). Although the natural 
partiality of sympathy cannot be transcended, nor sympathies made identical, it Is possible to 
extend sympathies. To this effect, the passions, Involdng general rules as their complex effect, 
produce associations that lead away from conflict and towards integration. Specifically, social 
Institutions are invented which provide a broader social context to one's belief-formation. 
Therefore, as Deleuze puts it, 'nature does not reach Its ends except by means of culture, and 
tendency is not satisfied except through the insfitutiorY (ES, 44). 
To the extent that humans are naturally inventive, even artifice, the Invented means of 
transcending partiality, is natural, or, more specifically, a natural product of 'practical reason' 
(ES, 64). But such Inventions are also artificial: whilst sympathy is natural, its extension Is not; 
we cannot reduce society to nature. When Deleuze claims that 'when drives are reflected In an 
Imagination submitted to the principles of association, institutions are determined by the figures 
traced by the drives according to circumstances, he Is referring to the creativity of the Imagina- 
tion and to extensive rules (ES, 49). But there is conscious effort In the design of social 
Institutions, Deleuze and Hume remind us: effort responding to particular circumstances and 
requirements, correcting and harnessing the imagination's creative potential. 
Having pointed to Inter-relationships between subject and social world, Deleuze has 
next to theorize the means of their mediation. For their part In the operation of social Institu- 
bons, corrective general rules require dictates of adequation. As Deleuze puts it 'the question 
Is no longer how to specify the ruAR but rather how to provide it with the vividness which it - 
lacks' (ES, 50). If extensive rules relate individual sympathies to a social whole, then corrective 
rules must make the social whole and its circumstances sufficiently immediate to the Individual 
46 
to ensure its effect. This, too, Is achieved by the invention of institutions, so that each one 
either 'corrects' others (maWing them directly relevant to individuals) or relies on others for its 
effects. The general rules of culture might therefore be characterized as a multimlayered reality, 
full of complex effects and compensations. -a 
Deleuze's Hume provides detailed analyses of two Institutions which illustrate the 
compensatory relationship between the two kinds of rules. The first Is'the moral world', which 
produces a relatively stable and communal point of view, recognizable by all members of a 
community regardless of their partial sympathies (ES, 41). Humans naturallyposit the eAstence 
of a social whole or'society', their membership of it, and various mechanisms that allow it to 
integrate the sympathies of members, although, Deleuze argues, these constructions cannot be 
explained solely by drives and needs (ES, 48). The particular kinds of institution comprising a 
social whole can be understood only by referring to the reasoning of subjects within it, so that 
once again the worlds of practice and understanding invoke one another. 
Without correction, the authority of the moral world might override the natural partiality 
of sympathy upon which other aspects of socialization depend. Also, whilst the subject Is only 
possible as the correlate of a moral-practical world, the Institutions of the moral world must have 
immediacy for Individuals. Hume provides commentaries on several of the Institutions gener- 
ated by the resulting corrective rules: government, justice, obligation, obedience, language, 
religion, sexual mores, property rights, political economy, micro-economic theory and shared 
histories and customs. These analyses occupy much of Hume's later worlý reminding us of 
Deleuze's characterization of his project and his status as 'more than a philosophee. 
The second Institution given Deleuze's attention, justice, Is the example pff exceffence 
of institutions operating within (or 'beneath) the construct of the moral world, 'correcting' It by 
aflowing various other institutions to retain Immediacy for the individual. As Deleuze writes of 
the State: 'according to Hume, [it] Is not charged with representing the general Interest but 
rather with maWng the general Interest an objed of belief. it succeeds In this by giving general 
Interest, mostly through the mechanism of sanctions, the vividness that only particular Interests 
can have for us naturally' (ES, 51). A system of Justice Is the means to this end. According to 
Hume, people have no Instinctive motive to act In accordance with laws except for prudential 
self-interest. But once laws are established, their usefulness is recognized. The moral 
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sentiment of humanity and sympathy with the public interest ensures moral approval of whatever 
serves the social good, producing a natural obligation towards laws which functions in much the 
same manner as a sense of duty towards one's 'clan' (ES, 44,47; T, 499-500). In turn, this Is 
reinforced by legal sanctions and a host of social forces which satisfy the passions with a 
measure of utility (albeit in an 'oblique' or 'indirect manner). 
Utility, the relation between institution and need, proves particularly fertile ground for 
Deleuze's Hume. By means of general rules, it stabilizes habitual anticipation in palVeWar 
circumstances and provides a stabilizing framework for Othought. Thus the imagination 
contains potential for both the extension of the influence of the passions and Us constraint: on 
the one hand, experience Is transcended and the imagination is creative In its capacity to form 
beliefs; on the other, experience in a social context acts as a limit, making the imagination 
stable and habitual, restricted to beliefs justifiable in terms of Hume's rules for distinguishing 
causes and effects. (However, as Peter Fosl points out, with the latter function, Deleuze has 
created what seems to be almost a social determinism, where convention and Its effects on the 
subject become a kind of negotiated agreement between Individuals) ý7 Consequently, Deleuze 
observes, culture and nature form a composite whole, and 'the real dualism, In Hume's work, is 
... between the whole of nature which includes the artifice and the mind affected and determined 
by this whole' (ES, 44). Deleuze locates therein both the human potential for the transcendence 
of experience, for a becoming-other and different from the given, and an explanation of why this 
potential Is only ever partially realized: as a becoming which Is sufficiently restrained as to be 
identifiable over a range of experiences. 
9. MADNESS AND THE RcTIONAL SUBJECT 
In addition to their role in the integration of partial sympathies, general rules are 
applicable to many other aspects of thought. General rules take myriad forms or, the same 
thing, form many diverse wholes having a part in the stabilization of the Imagination. After 
examining two instances, Deleuze is lead to a radical conclusion regarding constitution of the 
subject. 
First, Deleuze examines belief in the existence and extraordinary powers of God and 
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religion, which possesses the character of a general rule because 'religious feeling confuses the 
accidental with the essential..,, [and] Is awakened in the strange encounters which we make in 
the sensible world, and In the exceptional and fantastic circumstances of the unknown phenom- 
ena which we (mis)take for essence, precisely because they are unknown' (ES, 74). Hume Is 
clear that claims that one can 'knoW God and/or God's'work! are strictly Illegitimate. The 
extension and reflection of the passions at the root of religious belief does not refer to experi- 
ence or occur in an imagination stabilized by consistent operation of the principles of associa- 
tion, but only in the unstable imagination of 'mere fancy' (ES, 76). 
The place of Hume's theory of religion within Deleuze's account of the subject warrants 
just a sketched explication. Because the entire content of religious belief Is unjustifiable (so that 
the passions are reflected In an imagination lacking stability), the only correction possible would 
seem to be total and destructive critique. Yet Deleuze reads Hume's deliberately ambiguous 
assessment as Implying that there is a place for religious belief within the systematic imagina- 
tion: God assumes the place of the origin or cause of the principles of human nature, serving as 
a thought of something in general' which, qua cause, unites nature with human nature. 
This is a problematic position. Not only does Deleuze simplify and misrepresent 
aspects of Hume's subtle and provocative account of religion, he also ignores Hume's warning 
that all beliefs about divinity reach 'into fairy land, long ere we have reached the last steps of 
our theory; and there we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument, or to think 
that our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority' (EHU, 72). Hume's reasoning, 
guided by this maxim, never posits belief In God as a 'limiting idea!. In short, Deleuze Is right to 
say that Hume does not launch an a/koa attack on religion, but wrong to argue that this Is 
because there Is a justifiable place for religion within the psychology of affections. It seems to 
me as though Deleuze Is trying to force Hume's theory to fit his belief that corrective rules 
create 'a theory of experience wherein all possible cases find a rule of Intelligibility ... under a 
statute of the understanding' (ES, 75). 
The second form of whole Is belief In a world of objects having a distinct and continued 
existence (which Deleuze calls'the World). In this case, Deleuze's account Is plausibly close to 
Hume's. He considers Hume to have shown that belief in the World originates from the 
operation of extensive rules, Is universal, and Is essential to formation of the subject. Deleuze 
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describes the process of forming belief in the World this way: 
The coherence of changes causes the imagination to feign yet more coherence, as it 
comes to admit continued existence. This constancy and resemblance of appearances 
cause the imagination to attribute to similar appearances the identity of an invariable 
object. In this way, the imagination feigns once again continuous existence in order to 
overcome the opposition between the identity of resembling perceptions and the 
discontinuity of appearances. (ES, 70) 
Thus formation of the belief has three 'moments': the principle of identity, the confusion by 
which an identity is attributed to similar impressions, and the positing of continuous existence. 
These moments are Indicative of fictitious inference; that is, the Improper operation of the 
principle of habit, or the extension of causal reasoning beyond the grounds of legitimate belief. 
With respect to the supposition of distinct existence, a causal relation Is assumed 
between the object and one's perception of it, even though Hume has shown that causality Is 
legitimate only when experience reveals a conjunction of two entities; with respect to continuous 
existence, the object Is conferred with more coherence and regularity than is found in percep- 
ton. On Hume's model of sense experience, the universe would appear to comprise disparate 
instances. The imagination replaces the interruption of appearances given in impressions of 
sensation with a fictional continuity, and allows perceptions to be regarded as originating apart 
from the mind. Despite experience seeming to be 'a flow of perceptions across the mind's 
stage', which might have suggested an ontology of becoming-different at every Instant, we take 
the consequent continuity to represent identity. Each impression of sensation appears to be 
related inevitably and decisively to both prior impressions and objects 'outside' the mind. 
Once again, the principles defining the legitimate exercise of reason are surpassed, and 
corrective general rules are unable to correct the extension. But In this Instance, Deleuze 
asserts, the extensive general rules leading to belief in the World themselves attain the status of 
principles of human nature: 
The entire sense [set4 of the principles of human nature Is, to transform the MUMPIWZY 
of ideas which constitute the mind Into a system ... of knowledge and of its objects. But for a system to exist, it is not enough to have ideas associated in the mind; it is 
also necessary that perceptions be regarded as separate from the mind, and that 
impressions be in some manner torn from the senses. We must give the object of the 
idea an existence which does not depend on the senses.... To that end, the principles 
of association do not suffice. (ES, 80) 
In other words, the principle that disparate elements of experience should be united In a 
supposedly continuous Identity is a part of being human, albeit that it requires the 'cooperation' 
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of the other principles. The imagination is proffered as essential the accidental content of 
experience, without making continuous and distinct eyistence even a possible object of 
experience. Only in this manner, Deleuze is suggesting, can Hume's starting point, his 
atomism, be tied to the principles that constitute thought; only in this way can the system that Is 
the subject be degned-the system Is completed in the identity between system and word' (ES, 
80). 
Consequently, fiction (more accurately, the actualized capacity to produce fictions) 
becomes a principle of human nature. Belief in the World cannot be corrected by the applica- 
tion of a reflective general rule, for as Deleuze puts It: 'to the extent that fiction, along with the 
World, count among the principles, the principles of associabon encounter fiction, and are 
opposed to It, without being able to eliminate It.... It Is precisely because fiction or extension has 
become a principle, that it can no longer be included, corrected, and even less eliminated 
through reflection' (ES, 82). Thus some aspect of the imagination always must remain 
unsettled, as mere fancy, so that, from the point of view of philosophy, the mind Is a 'delirium' 
and 'madness': there Is no system or synthesis that is not founded upon the imaginary 
construction of continuous Identities and other fictions, and reason and unreason seem to 
merge (ES, 83). This Is not to say that the mind Is not at all systematic (which would make 
constitution of the subject Impossible), but only that fictional beliefs are essential to the system. 
The mind Is madness, but it Is a madness of limits, or, to put it another way, the creations which 
constitute madness also constitute the mind as subject by limiting its 'movement. 
I Fosl contends that Deleuze's conclusions about the mind's 'madness! result from 
philosophical abstraction, and not from Hume's own world View, which privileges nature. 38 For 
Hume, he argues, It Is philosophy that perverts and makes alien, and not the operations of the 
imagination. Had Deleuze been true to Hume's Introspective study of human nature, he might - 
not have conceived of disorder as part of an Imagination which Introspection shows to be 
coherent and stable, But Fosl Is mistaken In his interpretation of Deleuze's terms. For Deleuze, 
'madness! must not be read in the usual sense, but rather as a kind of dynamism In the 
Imagination that arises from particular patterns of Interaction between general rules (as we have 
seen). Fosl Is also wrong to read 'madness' and 'naturaF In opposition. For Deleuze, what Is 
natural and what Is madness about the movement of the mind cannot be opposed. His point Is 
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precisely that the imagination cannot become a complete system (naturally) without reference to 
fictions. In fact, only from the point of view of abstract philosophy could madness appear to 
contradict what is otherwise apprehended as order. 
Deleuze contends that because of the mutual implication of reason and madness in the 
constitution of the subject, it is in vain that humans 'hope that we could separate within the 
mind its reason from its delilium, its permanent, irresistible, and universal principles, from its 
variable, fanciful and irregular principles! (ES, 83-4). Any conviction that one might obtain 
reasoned and universal truths corresponding to a world of more-or-less stable relations between 
subjects and objects Is to overlook the Invention of fictions that enables one to Identify oneself 
and one's place in a world at all. 
Whereas Hume's texts follow lines of enquiry to their logical conclusions, regardless of 
how epistemologically unsatisfying these might be, Deleuze writes Empidchsm and SWOCMY 
In such a way as to regularly jolt his reader back to a positive philosophy. At just the point 
where the mind is melodramatically called 'madness! and 'delirium', Deleuze reminds us that the 
subject Is only possible because experience and circumstance regulate the creation of fictions: 
'The only resource and positivity offered to the mind is nature or practice.... Instead of referring 
nature to the mind, the mind must be referred to nature' (ES, 84). At this point, then, having 
followed various general rules to the limits of their operation, Deleuze invokes the empiricist 
principle as a final check on activity within Imagination: experience, in conjunction with Hume's 
rules for proper reasoning, serves as a limit to belief-formation. The question that remains is 
whether Deleuze means this constraint to require an acfive subject (must the subject 'refer 
beliefs to sense experience In order to validate them? ) or whether the 'principles! of madness 
and delirium are restrained by experience In a manner Immanent to the subject's constitution, 
preserving passivity? Deleuze ascribes to the latter option, although he does not state this in so - 
many words. To find Deleuze's position Is to show how he uses Humean resources to move 
beyond Hume's overt theory of the subject. This theory is a good place to start. 
Hume turns to practical life as a potent and comprehensive check on excessive 
scepticism (the sort which threatens to destroy our most fundamental beliefs about the world). 
This is Hume's doctrine of natural belief, which he develops in the early parts of Book I of the 
Treafise and employs In Part IV to nullify various sceptical and speculative (interim) conclusions. 
52 
According to this theory, we hold certain beliefs because it is human nature to do so. Such 
beliefs are not consequent to conscious and rational assessment of experiential evidence, but 
are natural inclinations of what is today called 'naive common sense'. ' Even if such beliefs are 
not always justified on the grounds of Hume's rules for good reasoning, they nonetheless 
cannot be abandoned in practical life. 
Deleuze never aligns his account of general rules openly with Hume's theory of natural 
belief, but the similarities are unmistakable. Uke natural beliefs, the fictions of Deleuze's general 
rules are consequences of the natural operation of the Imagination. Their role, too, is to limit 
the imagination's capacity to produce fanciful and unjustifiable beliefs that are inconsistent with 
the stability of the subject as it appears to Introspective study: one cannot speculate further 
about the nature of the principles once they are attributed to a stable and Inexplicable origin 
called God, and one cannot properly believe In fantasies that contradict one's experience once 
the World Is defined and exposed as the source and limit of impressions (even though the 
fictional products of corrective general rules are themselves exceptions). This is not to suggest, 
however, that Deleuze's catalogue of the beliefs following from general rules would match 
Hume's list of natural beliefs exactly. Hume considers universality to be characteristic of natural 
beliefs, and does not consider belief in God to be universal; Deleuze would agree on this count, 
but considers belief in God to follow from the operation of general rules nonetheless. By 
contrast, both philosophers hold that a belief In physical bodies is universa00 
But Deleuze's theory of fictions diverges from Hume's natural beliefs on the question of 
the stable subject. Whereas Deleuze has developed an explanatory trail from the aboriginal 
perceptions of the mind to the subject as It is Introspected, Hume asserts just that natural belief 
$gives us so great a propension to ascribe an Identity to these successive perceptions [of the 
mind], and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro' the 
whole course of our lives' (r, 253). By referring belief in the subjects identity to the 
Incomprehensibilities of natural belief, Hume Is only telling us that belief In a subject of this kind 
Is unavoidable because of the demands of practical life. His position is utterly without explana- 
tory power, and is riot defended in accordance with introspection or the rules for proper reason. 
Deleuze's whole project in Empilic&m and Subjecffyity has been to show that Hume's 
theoretical resources can and do explain subject-formation. In much the same way that Deleuze 
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uses general rules to 'fill in the detail' of beliefs in God and the World, he uses them to explain 
belief in a subject that is identical over a lifetime. That he is able to do so rests upon his 
understanding of 'universaility' in referring to natural beliefs. While Hume uses the term to refer 
to the degree to which a particular belief is held in common by individuals and societies that he 
has observed (a distinctly empirical and scientific conception), Deleuze uses it to refer to the 
Inevitabilityof the operation of general rules; a psychological conception resting upon the 
distinctive nature of the human genre. 
Whereas for Hume natural beliefs are inexplicable, for Deleuze they must be understood 
as products of general rules. However, just because certain beliefs require the presence of 
these fictions does not mean that commonality in the operation of rules leads necessad&, to 
commonality In the content of beliefs. As Deleuze has shown in his account of the dynamism of 
the imagination, subject-formation is guided by the particularity of passional affections In 
response to circumstances: 
The specific progress of a mind must be studied, and there Is an entire casuistry to be 
worked out: why does this perception evoke a specific idea, rather than another, in a 
parficular consciousness at a particular moment?.... Cftulnwtance gives the relation fts 
sufficient reason.... Understood in this way, a set of circumstances always individuates a 
subject since It represents a state of its passions and needs, an allocation of its 
interests, a distribution of its beliefs and exhilarations. (ES, 103) 
Afthough this quotation appears straightforward, its implications are profound. If general rules 
explain the stabilization of Imagination (and, consequently, the constitution of the subject), and if 
the effects of general rules are particularized and mediated by experienced circumstances (as 
Deleuze's casuistry has shown), then the principles of 'madness' and 'delirium' are not nearly so 
free as they seemed at first: they, too, are constrained by the experienced circumstances of 
practical life. But whereas Hume's theory of natural belief conservatively refers beliefs In self 
and world to experience, Deleuze makes the altogether more radical move of explaining natural 
beliefs as flefiolm Delouze Is right to claim that fiction cannot be corrected by reflection (ES, 
82). Correction and limitation Is immanent to the constitution of the subject as an Individual, 
and Is always a product of circumstances. As such, Deleuze's model of the passive subject Is 
preserved. His remaining task Is to delineate the way In which general rules lead to belief In the 
particular subject called T. 
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10. THE DYNAMIC SUBJECT AND INDIVIDUATION 
For Deleuze's Hume, the dynamic and productive imagination has two qualifies crucial 
to formation of the stable subject. On the one hand, the mind is relational; a dynamic play of 
forces that produces fictions and transcends the given. The lafter function involves both the 
emplacement of relations according to the principles of human nature andthe development of 
fiction as a further principle. Thus the dynamism of the constitution of relations is implicated in 
both justifiable and unjustifiable transcendence of experience (these terms being differentiated 
by Hume's rules for proper reasoning). There is, then, for Hume, a natural human capacity to 
create increasingly long, disparate and 'obscure' chains of relations. The imagination is able to 
move habitually beyond the assimilation of the given to the creation of winged dragons, gods, 
and fantastic ideas that range in and out of existence in the twirilding of an eyeý' 
But on the other hand, Deleuze has shown that this dynamism serves to limit move- 
ments in the imagination and make its productions uniform. These productions are many and 
varied: a world of stable and more-or-less permanent objects, overt and covert social 
expectations accompanied by institutions ensuring general conformity, fantastic creatures 
recognized as fictional, and God. For Deleuze, the tendency to create stabilizing fictions is not 
incidental to subject-formation, but inherent to it. Throughout Empilicism and Subjectivity, he 
reiterates that a stable imagination is a precondition for the habit of saying T in referring to 
oneself. 'I' is a name of an identifiable particular that is sufficiently stable and uniform for the 
name to have a determinable referent. The principles of human nature--including the principle 
of fictional creation-are, for Deleuze, synonymous vAh this uniformity. 
Uke the principles of human nature, stability Is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for the habit of saying T. Of the other requirements identified by Deleuze, the first, the natural 
propensity to develop habits, has been considered already. But the second, the principle of 
attributing Identity to experientially disparate Ideas, has only been alluded to with respect to 
belief In the world of objects. Deleuze holds that the implications of this allusion extend to 
identification of the subject from the flow of Ideas within imagination. 
Deleuze's determination of the need for stability in subject-formation is peculiar to this 
early work; for the later Deleuze it would be anathema. I will show In Chapters 2 and 3 that T 
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becomes In later texts just one effect of dynamic processes amongst others, without a referent 
in the concrete sense. The change in Deleuze's position can be traced to his move away from 
Hume's philosophy of the movement between atomistic ideas towards Bergson's concentration 
upon the movement or flow'itself. 
According to Hume, one Is unable to locate by introspection any single Idea, simple or 
complex, corresponding to the existence of a subsistent subject: 'when I enter most Intimately 
into what I call moeff, I always stumble on some particular perception or other.... But I never 
can catch myseff at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the 
perception' (T, 252). The multifarious network of perceptions that one finds instead is 
characterizable either as 'a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each 
other with an Inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement' or 'a kind of 
theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide 
away, and mingle In an Infinite variety of postures and situations' (T, 252,253). Of course, this 
is not to say that we are just bundles of perceptions-Hume's associationism and Deleuze's 
study of the subject qua social Individual both testify to the contrary-but only that thoughts, 
memories, feelings, inclinations, beliefs and so on are the phenomena locatable by Introspec- 
tion, and these lack identity over time. 
Yet Hume's account of natural beliefs and Deleuze's study of social expectations have 
revealed that belief In the subjects unity Is essential to practical life, and the feeling of Identity Is 
sufficient on Hume's account to constitute ft. If there Is nothing about perceptions which leads 
one to posit the subjects Identity, one must look instead to the Imagination. Hume considers 
that: 
'Us evident, that the Identity, which we attfibute to the human mind ... Is not able to run 
the several different perceptions into one, and make them lose their characters of 
distinction and difference, which are essential to them. 'Tis still true, that every distinct 
perception, which enters into the composition of the mind, is a distinct eAstence, and Is 
different, and distinguishable, and separable from every other perception either 
contemporary or successive. But, as ... we suppose the whole train of perceptions 
to 
be united by Identity, a question naturally arises concerning this relation of Identity; 
whether It be something that really binds our several perceptions together or only 
associates their Ideas In the Imagination.... This question we might easily decide, R we 
wou'd recollect ... that the understanding never observes any real conne)don among 
objects, and that even the union of cause and effect ... resolves 
itself Into a customary 
association of Ideas. For from thence it evidently follows, that identity Is nothing really 
belonging to these different perceptions and uniting them together, but Is merely a 
quality, which we attdbute to them, because of the union of their ideas In the Imagina- 
tion, when we reflect upon them. (T, 259-60) 
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The origin of identity must be sought in the processes by which ideas are united. Since the 
union of ideas is always facilitated by the principles of association In conjunction with the 
principles of the passions (taken together, the principles of human nature), the idea of the 
subject's unity also must be sought amongst the operations of the principles (ES, 98). Hume 
agrees: "Tis ... on some one of these three relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation, 
that identity depends; and as the very essence of these relations consists In their producing an 
easy transition of ideas; it follows, that our notions of personal Identity, proceed entirely from the 
smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected Ideas, according 
to the principles' (T, 260). 
But Hume's subsequent account is famously unsatisfactory, resting upon a threadbare 
account of memory and the sketchy metaphor of a 'train of Ideas! conveying the mind from one 
Idea to another so smoothly that trwsibon is mistaken for 'one continu'd object (r, 254). 
Afthough the ascdption of identity to a collection of Ideas Is contrary to the Invariability and 
continuity Inculcated by what Wayne Waxman calls 'the perfect Identity prototype', the Inclina- 
tion to do so is, on Hume's model, too great to counter. 42 
It is difficulties with this account that force Hume to retreat to his theory of natural belief. 
In contrast, Deleuze's rendition of general rules enables him to develop a more coherent theory. 
For him, it is not just that corytemplation of perceptions feels so much like that of an Identical 
object that we YeAgn continued eyistence, but that, when Hume writes that 'ourself, independent 
of the perception of every other object, is In reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our 
view to external objects', he means to say that belief In the World activates the principle of 
Identity (r, 340). Consequently, Deleuze argues, the subject comes to recognize itself as one 
object amongst many having a stable, distinct and continued e)(istence. But just as discon- 
nected perceptions cannot justify belief In the World, neither can they justify belief In a subject's - 
Identity. Deleuze therefore Invokes once again the three moments that lead to belief In the, 
world of objects, holding them to be replicated In the attribution of Identity to anyflow of Ideas, 
such that Identical chains of association replace mere regularity In the operation of the princl- 
ples: identical general rules are applied in merely similar situations, the habit of anticipation links 
past occurrences with present ones so that similarities are emphasized and dissimilarities 
ignored, and so on, 
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With respect to the supposed continuity of the subject's eAstence, repetitive thinidng 
confers ideas Wth a greater coherence and regularity than initially is found in the imagination. 
fc Firildrig focuses upon what is rather than on what changes or becomes, and assumes the 
appearance of the same'train of activity' over and over again, even though, stirictly, the transient 
nature of impressions of sensation and reflection make this impossible. Stability thereby 
appears as identity, such that the relative uniformity and ease characteristic of human nature 
becomes homogeneity and passivity, reflected in the continued application of reflective general 
rules. 
According to Deleuze, the result of this process Is habitual thought and, particularly, the 
habit of thinking and saying T and meaning an inert structure 'of the imagination. That the 
Identification of T is Indeed a habit or custom In Hume's terms: a'principle ... which renders our 
experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those 
which have appeared in the past' (EHU, 44). Specifically, it Is a habit of believing in something 
wholly fictional; an Impression of reflection 'triggered' by belief in the World, and expressed by 
belief in the subjects fictional and static identity. 
For Hume as Deleuze reads him, no subject Is ever a completed project Either an 
Imagination Is active-minventing and stabilizing relations between Ideas, and even Identifying 
them as its own-or there is no subject. The constitution of the subject is the dynamic and 
complex evolution and qualification of the system of thinking described by Deleuze's Hume. 
Therefore, as Deleuze puts it: 'the subject Is defined by the movement through which It is 
developed. Subject Is that which develops itself.... In short, believing and Inventing are what 
makes the subject a subject' (ES, 85). The locus of this movement, the Imagination, having 
been Initially a collection identical with the mind, and lacking a principle of organization, 
becomes a faculty or system. The means for this transformation are Inherent within human 
Imagination, so that subject-formation 'is no longer a matter of placing bounds around the mind 
or of t1(ing It up, but rather of nailing it down. It Is no longer a matter of fixed relations, but of 
centres of fixation' (ES, 124). In other words, the subject is defined by the Imagination's 
movement and stabilization, and not by the Imposition of limits external to the Imagination. 
Deleuze's reading of Hume has important Implications for his later work on the subject, 
but only as a starting point or preliminary account: he does not return to the intricate particularS 
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of Humean theory. This is not to say that his findings in Empkic&m and SilbjecMyare 
inconsequential. Of greatest significance for this thesis, Deleuze's Humean model of the subject 
reveals an essential dynamism, and this attribute will characterize Deleuze's other models of the 
subject, as Chapters 2 and 3 will show. There Is dynamism in the atomism of experience, In the 
association of relations, and in the operation of general rules and their fictions. " The subject is 
a consequence of an ongoing process, of becoming rather than being; it Is always a task to be 
fulfilled (lived, thought, theorized ... ). As such, the static 'l' is merely a fiction, a production 
founded upon the imagination's relative stability. 
But stability plays a key role In the model and, as we shall see, it is this aspect which 
militates against Deleuze's adopting it as the way to theorize the subject qua individual. For 
Deleuze's Hume, the imagination must become stable and its constitutive dynamism regular for 
subject-f6rmation to be possible, and only subsequent to this stabilization does it become 
possible to say T. But as we shall see in Chapter 2, this requirement is peculiar to the subject 
as it is grasped by introspective study. With the adoption of a different methodol- 
ogy-Bergsonian Intuition-the subject seems to Deleuze to be who//Ydynamic; resting 
ultimately upon becoming rather than stabilization and manifesting a greater capacity for 
thinidng creatively, richly and intensively than Hume's model would suggest. Furthermore, in 
this more dynamic model, Hume's purely nominal origin of ideas proves unsatisfactory, and 
Deleuze's Bergson will argue that movement begins with perception. 
Nonetheless, theoretical resources with origins In Empecism and SWectMy reappear 
in Deleuze's efforts to surpass Hume's model of the subject. Hume's atomism and 
associationism stand behind Deleuze's philosophy of a relational 'AND' and the externality of 
difference to its terms which both reappear in such texts as Nietzsche andPhilosophyand 
Difference Andflepetiddr; the tangle of relations arising from the Humean complex of Ideas, 
principles and passions has a clear affinity with Deleuze and Guattari's model of the rhizome; 
Deleuze's Identification of the part of specificities and circumstances In defining the individual 
take on greater Import in Me Logk of Sense, The Foldand Mat AP PhAosophyg and; designa- 
tion of Humean relations and general rules always occurs within a context defined precisely by a 
range of cultural, social, historical, psychological, and physiological elements, and the preemi- 
nence of this practical realm will be preserved by Deleuze in aergsonosm and Foucau& Bearing 
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these continuities in mind, we turn now to Deleuze's Bergsonian model of the subject. 
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2 
Delouze's Bergson and the remporality of Consciousness 
11. FROM HUME To BERGSON 
Afthough much of Deleuze's philosophy considers relations between human Individuals in a 
social setting, and critiques various theories of the forces shaping the actions and expectations 
of individuals, Deleuze never again studies the constitution and psychology of the subject in the 
same depth as In Emphicism and Subjec#Wty. Nor does the subject assume a central role In 
Deleuze's accounts (whether on his own or with Guattari) of thinking, desire, knowledge, and 
morality. After Lmollicksm and Subjec#05V, 'the subject' is neither a preeminent stand-in for the 
awkward fact of selfhood (as in early modern philosophy), nor a concept privileged as deserving 
all-out attack (as In so much postmodernism). This is not to say that the subject disappears 
altogether from Deleuzes work. Rather, the concept is expanded upon, mutated, abstracted or 
ignored depending upon its relationships with the forces and concepts, upon which Deleuze 
focuses, serving as one conceptual creation amongst many. 
Nonetheless, I will argue here and in the final Chapter that a coherent account of the 
subject c&7 be developed out of Deleuze's texts after Empiricism &; d Subjec&Wty, although it 
would be misleading and contrary to the lessons of rhizomatic philosophy to suggest that only 
one narrative having 'the subject as a central character (whether it takes the stage fully 
developed or in embryonic form, ready to 'become different' as the tale proceeds) runs through 
Deleuze's texts. My purpose Is not to exhaust the Interpretative options, but to multiply them by 
revealing lines of development lying latent within these works. 
After Empiricism and Sub)iRc#P#y, Deleuze did not publish another book for eight years. 
Hardt considers that the hiatus led Deleuze to 'a dramatic reorientation of his philosophical 
approach'; certainly there was no return to Hume's empiricism. ' But the claim Is tempered by 
noting other significant transformations In Deleuze's tNnidng that occur in much shorter spans 
of time, especially In the years following the May '68 uprising. 
This Chapter will argue that far from representing a 'dramatic reorientation', the pause 
between publications is a 'space' within which the conjunction 'and' is applied to Deleuze's 
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studies of the human individual. He develops a theory of the subject that is both auyjliary to 
Humean philosophical psychology and critical of elements of it. The -next Chapter will show that 
Difference and Repetifion and The Logic of Sense are important products of this evolution, 
whereby an ontology of the event in terms of difference and affirmation is added to Deleuze's, 
theories of the mind's 'affections!. But in order to establish precisely the character of the 
subjects constitutive event I turn first to Bergsonisin 
Uke the book on Hume, BergsoWsm (published in 1966) was written as a short 
introductory text, and Is an innovative account of a famous Philosopher who 'seemed to be part 
of the history of philosophy, but who escaped from it! it is almost entirely sympathetic to 
Bergson, and contains a relatively faithful rendering of a limited range of texts (virtually Ignoring 
Bergson's moral and religious works). But although faithful, Deleuze's rendition Is also stdkingly 
idiosyncratic. He expands upon numerous undeveloped threads of Bergson's arguments, 
leading to important psychological and ontological insights (IV, 43). As Paul Douglass puts it, 
'Bergsonism delights in reminding us of those aspects that caused Bergson to be condemned 
by his contemporaries, showing that Bergson really did have a vision more complex and 
unassimilable than even his sycophantic admirers felt comfortable admitting. '* 
Deleuze means Sergsonism to constitute a 'return to Bergson', by which he means'not 
only ... a renewed admiration for a great philosopher but a renewal or an extension of his 
project (, R 115). Perhaps more than any other text, BergsoNsm constitutes a Deleuzian 
renewal of the project of a great philosopher. Whereas ideas and arguments from Empilidsm 
and Subjectivityonly reappear in Deleuze's later works having been radicaily recast and 
transformed, sometimes barely recognizable, the principal arguments from BWysonism recur 
regularly In forms transparently close to the original. Furthermore, Deleuze often acknowledges 
thematic debts to Bergson. His theories of cinema, for instance, return time and again to 
Bergson's arguments. 
There are hints In Emplriclsm and &1bjvc#viYy that Deleuze had In 1953 already 
adopted aspects of Bergson's problematic. He turned to Bergson to help explicate Hume's 
accounts of habit, association and time, claiming (perhaps untenably) that 'it Is not necessary to 
force [Hume's] texts in order to find In the habit-anticipation most of the characteristics of the 
Bergsonlan durde or memory' (ES, 92)ý Soon after publication of the work on Hume, Deleuze 
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wrote a lengthy essay and a chapter on Bergson, followed by an anthology, before completing 
Bergsod=5 Although none of these texts addresses the concept of the subject explicitly, it is 
never far away. Bergson's preoccupations with consciousness, immediacy, inner-time and 
memory Invoke many of the issues to which Hume meant his introspective account of atomism 
and associationism to be a'scienfific' key. 
Uke Hume, Bergson understands the self as a form of continuity and change, readily 
apparent in immediate conscious awareness. He wiftes that 'there is one reality, at least, which 
we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple anajysis. It is our own personality In its 
flowing through time-our self which endures' (CM, 24). 1 will show that the Deleuze of 
BergsolVsm agrees, and that his reading of Bergsonlan method, perception, dur&, memory and 
actuafization of the virtual contains a theory of the moment of constitution of the subject which 
precludes any model of the subject as an unchanging particular. ý7 
In an earlier essay, Deleuze claims that Bergson's theories operate on two distinct 
levels: methodological and ontological! This Chapter will consider Deleuze's Bergsonian theory 
of the subject at both levels, and reveal how he moves beyond the'version In Emplhldsm wd 
SubjectUty. It focuses on five aspects of Deleuze's Bergsonism In particular. First, In Section 
12, it argues that Bergsonian Intuition Is the method enabling Deleuze to construct a 'transcen- 
dental empiricism', an account of the conditions of actual (rather than all possible) experience. 
Whereas Humean Introspection grouped aJI Ideas together (as mind) and discriminated between 
them on grounds of relative vivacity, Intuition enables Deleuze to divide consciousness 
according to its 'natural articulations'. This division leads him to consider consciousness In 
terms of a dualism between the world of objects and the Inner world of consciousness. 
Second, Section 13 will show that consciousness Is Intuited as a kind of ternporetlity or 
flow. Bergson's notion of dur6e provides a more precise model of this flow than the Humean 
one. Particular thoughts are never discrete elements, but are always part of an Interpenetrative 
continuity of mental states. Adopting this model as a starting point, Deleuze Is able to focus 
upon the nature and implications of the dynamism of 'inner life' rather than the theoretical 
reintroduction of movement to a static collection of elements. 
Third, Section 14 argues that Bergson's account of perception In terms of movements 
amongst images, vibrations and receptive functions of the nervous system-the 'line of material- 
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ity'-supplements Deleuze's theory with an account of the origins and nature of sense data. 
This'line', the first aspect of Deleuze's Bergsonian dualism, is the origin of the movement and 
dynamism evident to intuition In consciousness, and it explains some bodily activity as a Wind of 
non-conscious memory. 
Fourth, Bergson's model of the brain as an interval between stimulation and response, 
and of pure memory as a capacity to preserve the past, will be shown In Sections 15 and 16 to 
be the bases for Deleuze's theory of the movement and becoming of a dynamic subject. On 
the one hand, the brain is the point of intersection between the Inner and outer worlds. On the 
other, pure memory is the means by which the present moment Is related to a past, a necessary 
condition for the continuity of conscious dynamism. Section 17 will argue that It is precisely this 
point of coincidence that is the moment of the subject's constitution. It represents a 'new 
monism', a unity between the lines which is experienced as consciousness in every present and 
which gives rise to a virtual whole called 'subject. 
Whilst Empirldsm and Subjectivity revealed the subject's Inherent dynamism, these five 
aspects of Sergsonism theorize this dynamism in terms of psycho"Ical 'mechanisms' and non- 
conscious aspects of thought. For the Bergsonian Deleuze, the becoming of the subject is not 
restrained by secure rules and fictions, but is an effect of production checked only by contin- 
gent and ever-changing circumstances and capacities. 
Some aspects of Deleuze's interpretation (especially with respect to perception) are 
obscure, requiring familiarity with Bergson's own works. Parts of this Chapter therefore Include 
expositions of the original texts. Also, reference will be made to Deleuze's supplementary and 
complementary readings of Bergson in Difference and Repetition, Uneme I and Cinema 2 
These works not only invoke and illustrate the Bergsonlan ontology of dynamism and Images in 
fields other than traditional metaphysics, but also expand upon some of the cryptically con- 
densed Ideas In Bergsonism, " 
12. DELEUZE'S BEFIGSONAN METHODOLOGY 
Bergson argues the need for philosophical 'precision', by which he means theorization 
of reality on its own terms rather than with respect to concepts supposed to make it (or 
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experience of it) possible. He believes that philosophical arguments typically lack precision 
because, In an effort to make them generalizable, philosophers abstract from the conditions out 
of which they arise; and as Arthur Lovejoy reminds us, generalities are never facts of immediate 
experience. 8 Deleuze allies himself with Bergson's argument, so any immanent criticism of the 
theory of the subject advanced in Empiric&in &? d Subjectivity must examine whether or not it is 
sufficiently precise; whether in the earlier work, Deleuze theorized the subject or abstracted from 
I+,. 
Two aspects of Deleuze's Humean theory militate against its philosophical precision. 
First, any introspective effort must itself be an aspect of consciousness. It is impossible for 
introspection to be distinct from the imagination in the manner of a scientific observer undertak- 
ing a physical experiment (notwithstanding the problematic nature of experimental method In 
this regard). By 'paying attention' to mental activity, consciousness Is necessarily changed. 
Second, Deleuze's Hume consequently has serious difficulties locating those Ideas constituent 
of the subject from amongst the transient ideas of the imagination. 'Interference' by Introspec- 
tion means, as Jay Rosenberg points out, that it is impossible to locate a subject that Is neither 
an intentional object of any of Its experiences, nor an intentional object of perceptioný Although 
introspection seem capable of describing an imagination undertaking introspection, it cannot in 
fact theorize the subject as a consciousness Independent of this activity. Immediate awareness 
of consciousness is clearly not the game as awareness of the Introspective study of the 
imagination. 
Deleuza says nothing in Emp#Wsm and Subjec9vity about Hume's means of accessing 
the dynamics of consciousness. AJthough he begins the book with a discussion of the need to 
substitute a 'psychology of the mind's affections! for a 'psychology of the mind', he fails to spell 
out how Hume's psychology of affections might be more successful, even though founded upon 
the same method (ES, 21). To the extent that he adopts Hume's study unquestioningly, 
Deleuze's reading must be tainted with imprecision. To develop a more precise theory, Deleuze 
requires a method free from pretensions to experimental scientific precision and more attuned to 
the dynamism and immediacy of consciousness. 
In order to achieve philosophical precision, Deleuze abandons the question that framed 
EMPINCISM and Subjecfivityand the method used to develop and answer it, Bergson's work 
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convinces him that all 'false philosophical problems! (questions or problems which are used to 
frame an enquiry but which mislead the philosopher because of presumptions entailed by them) 
derive from a failure to respect differences of nature (or 'kind') in the phenomenon being 
studied. " We must be aware that 'asswiation ... Is not the primary fact: dissocfatlon Is what we 
begin with' (MU, 165). We are in error whenever we try to theorize a whole by beginning with 
parts considered independent of it, and ought Instead to move from the whole (or conditioned) 
to Its parts or conditions by a process of careful decomposition which respects the continuity, 
complexity and unity of the whole. 
This approach marks Deleuze's and Bergson's studies of the subject from those of 
other philosophers, including Hume and Kant. On Deleuze's reading, the relatively stable 
unification of atomistic ideas is central to Hume's associationist theory of the subject, as 
Chapter 1 explained. Kant's transcendentalism, too, presumes a tendency In consciousness 
towards unity, a tendency Integral to his system but not founded in empirical reality. Deleuze 
and Bergson are particularly troubled by Kants; assertion that the various faculties are party to a 
principle of unity, worldng In terms of both an underlying agreement or 'common sense' and 
regulation by a predominant faculty (the understanding). In turn, accord between the faculties Is 
grounded in the unity of the 'I thinle. " In short, Deleuze believes that Kant is In error by 
employing successive subsumptions to move from parts (the manifold of the given, categories, 
faculties) to the whole (thinWng subject) (LS, 105). 1 shall say more about Deleuze's criticisms of 
transcendentalism In the next Section. (Note that Delauze argues In Kantý9 aftelPhIlOSOPAY 
that Kants C-r0que of"gment goes a long way towards overturning the presumption of unity 
by proposing a theory of the free and unregulated operation of the faCUlfie. S. )U 
To be consistent with BergsorYs edict, an appropriate method for Deleuze's study of the 
subject must begin with the apparent unity and persistence of one's self and then theorize the 
components and dynamics o generation. According to Bergson, It Is possible for science 
and metaphysics to 'become equally precise and certain' since 'they both bear upon reality 
itself (CA( 44). But whereas experimental science seems to have at its disposal a method 
which Incorporates the requirement for precision (although perhaps In a self-verifying manner), 
no such technique obviously is available to metaphysics or, more particularly, the metaphysics 
of the subject. As Deleuze puts it, there Is difficulty in knowing 'how to go beyond experience 
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toward the conditions of experience, toward the articulations of the real, and rediscover what 
differs in Wind in the composites that are given to us and on which we live' (Et 26). 
Yet any philosophy that fails to respect the particularity of consciousness in favour of 
broad conceptual sketches is subject to metaphysical illusions. The application of abstract 
concepts merely gathers together discrete particulars despite their differences, and privileges 
concepts over what is supposed to be explained. For example, one might try to understand 
things as instances of Being, or as useful or corpuscular, thereby presupposing an ontological 
and/or epistemological privilege for the concepts 'Being', 'utility, or 'corpuscularity' which Is not 
evident In Immediate experience. Deleuze needs a method capable not only of dissociating 
aspects of the whole called 'I' according to natural articulations, but of grasping conscious and 
material aspects of life without recourse to abstract or general concepts. 
Bergson proposes what he believes to be such a method, calling it Intuition 
philosophique (hereinafter 'intuition). It is notoriously difficult to describe, with as many 
characterizations as scholarly commentaries. Most are unsatisfactory, explaining the goal of 
Intuition but not the method. Sometimes it seems as though Bergson Is trying to express the 
inexpressible: a method that can onlv be hinted at and used. " Nonetheless, for Deleuze, an 
appreciation of intuition is centrW to understanding Bergson. Without it, he Insists, relationships 
between Bergson's key concepts remain Indeterminate (g 14). 
Deleuze claims that Intuition is a 'fully developed method' with strict rules, but Bergson 
Is not reafly as clear as this suggests (B, 13). Sometimes Bergson aligns Intuition with artistic 
sensibility and awareness, or a detachment from reality; at others, he associates it with pure 
instinct. But these are not the versions developed In Bergsonlsm. Deleuze employs Intuition as 
a deliberate reflective awareness or willed self-consciousnm, a concentrated and direct 
attention to the operations of consciousness (in contrast with mediated 'observations of 
consciousness by consciousness in a quest for transparency of thought to itselo, such that one 
must participate In Intuition to grasp fully Its meaning and significance. This depiction aligns 
with Bergson's account of the Intuition of consciousness as: 'the attention that the mind gives to 
Itself, over and above, while it Is fixed upon matter, Its object. This supplementary attention can 
be methodicafly cultivated and developed. Thus will be constituted a science of mind, a 
(CM veritable metaphysics which will define the mind positively' . 
79). 14 The mind continues its 
67 
normal functions, yet somehow discerns simultaneously the nature of its workings; indeed 
intuition can only be considered a 'simple act' because of this essential unity between opera- 
tions (A 14). 
The apparent peculiarity of intuition as a method also is a sign of its difficulty. Bergson 
believes in a universal human capacity for grasping things intuitively. But it is a difficult capacity 
to realize, being contrary to natural tendencies to divide the whole according to degree and 
utility, the more from the less useful. " Consequently he characterizes intuition as a laborious 
effort to 're-ascend the slope natural to the work of thought, in which the mind 'must do itself 
violence, reverse the direction of the operation by which it ordinarily thinks! (CM, 183,190). 
This effort is successful only when intuition enables the formulation of more appropriate 
'concepts!, understood In the general sense of 'categories of relation'. 'a 
For Bergson, the concepts usually deployed In philosophy are useful for scientific study 
and for describing the material world, but not for understanding Me dynamics of one's life. On 
Deleuze's reading, Bergson's Ideal is Instead to tailor concepts that ensure unity between 
themselves and their 'objects', according to the latter's nature or kind. 17 Consistent with his 
denunciation of subsumption as a starting point, Deleuze claims that'it's not a matter of 
bringing aJI sorts of things together under one concept but rather of relating each concept to 
vadables that explain its mutations! (N, 31). As such, concepts must be 'no broader than the 
conditioned', and must refer to and express neither an object or state outs1de themselves nor a 
hierarchy of concepts, but only themselves and the 'objects' for which they are formulated 
27). 
The possibility of studying the unified whole called T relies upon Its dissociation Into 
component parts, bearing in mind that this very act abstracts from reality. To minimize 
abstraction, decomposition must be conducted according to concepts consonant with the 
nature of the whole. Bergsonlan Intuition Is a precise method of division because it determines 
such concepts and operates In these terms: it does not presWpcLse concepts (not utility, 
spatiality or corpuscularity, for example), but creates them according to natural articulations of 
Idnd. As Goodchild puts it, for Deleuze 'a concept always has to be created in an Intuition 
specific to it', rather than being assumed a PriOrl'a For example, Intuition reveals that change 
and becoming are conditions of human consciousness, as we shall see, but these two concepts 
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are only 'revealed' when one 'pays attention' to consciousness. They are not presupposed as 
unchangeable and universal concepts in terms of which consciousness must be analyzed. 
Deleuze adopts Bergsonian intuition as the most suitable method for his own concep- 
ton of philosophy, which he calls 'transcendental empiricism'. "' Utilization of Bergsonian 
Intuition and its edicts will determine the entire orientation and begAng of Delauze's subsequent 
studies of the subject. In order to grasp fully its appropriateness, we first must examine what he 
means by 'transcendental empiricism' and locate its significance for his account of the subject. 
Whereas empiricism refers traditionally to the view that the intelligible derives from the 
sensible, Deleuze makes no such claim. He means just that philosophy should begin from the 
immediate given, real conscious awareness, without presupposing any a pfimicategories, 
concepts or ayioms, and then set out 'to present concepts directly' (N, 88-9). 20 These concepts 
might refer to objects and their relations, to perceptions and their causes, or to any of a range 
of psychological and physiological relations evident In consciousness. As Bruce Baugh puts it, 
'Delouze Is not arguing that the condition of the application of concepts is the eAstence of a 
given sensory manifold; the sensory manifold is just an Instance of empirical multiplicity. o2l it is 
precisely the actuality of the empirical and the priority accorded the a postedodwhich, for 
Deleuze, are ways of avoiding the Imprecision and universalizing abstractions of speculative 
philosophy. 
Deleuze's approach is a transcendental empiricism because it is an attempt to locate 
the conditions of possibility for consciousness (that Is, for evident effects, the immediacy of the 
whole called T). 22 Empirical reality and principles 'leave out the elements of their own founda- 
tion' and, because these elements are inaccessible to consciousness, they necessitate , 
transcendental study of their Implicit conditions (DJý 255). Deleuze does not conceive of these 
unthought conditions as abstract philosophical entities, however, but as 'subloct-tandencies! 
forming an Interiority beyond the reach of empirical consciousness, but part of it: 'an inside, an 
unthinkable or unthought, deeper than any internal world' and Immanent to consciousness (DR 
199-200; C2,278). " 
Some scholars have claimed that transcendental empiricism Is patterned after 
il Bergsonlan intLdtion, and Bounclas goes so far as to insist that lintuition is Identical with 
st usl ra e Deleuze's transcendental empiricism. 24 This Is an over atement, conf ng a gene Im thod- 
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ological approach with a specific philosophical tool (albeit that other commentators have taken 
Intuition to constitute Bergson's philosophy as a 'radical empiricism', equated with the method 
of positive science because both are 'empirical'). 25 
In accordance with Bergson's edict, Deleuze begins his study of consciousness with the 
whole of which we are Immediately aware, and decomposes It into natural articulations of kind 
(of activity, mental state, function and so on) according to contingent and productive concepts 
relevant only to the Immediacy of the conscious whole called 'P. (These parts will be Identified 
In the remaining sections of the Chapter. ) Accordingly, Deleuze maintains that 'there Is some 
resemblance between Intuition as method of division and transcendental analysis. If the 
composite represents the fact, It must be divided into tendencies or into pure presences that 
only exist ki plincole'(A 23). 
Far from Indicating alranscendental turn, however, Deleuze's approach distinguishes 
transcendental empiricism from forms of transcend entalism such as Kant's. For as Massuml 
puts it, 'Delouze's philosophy Is the point at which transcendental philosophy flips over Into 
radical immanentism.... The Kantian imperative to understand the conditions of possible 
experience Aill-from outside and above transposes into an invitAtion to recapitulate'. 20 A brief 
contrast of Deleuze's 'superior empiricism' with Kant's transcendentalism Is in order. 
Although the precise meaning of 'transcendental' shifts throughout Kant's corpus, the 
version that interests Deleuze Is as a form of knowledge, not of objects themselves, but of the 
conditions of the possibiRyof knowing them. 2" As such, they are logically necessary for all 
selves, rather than individual, psychological or transcendent. The transcendental pretence thus 
involves the assumption-unwenranted on Deleuze's view-that the fundamental modes of 
human experience are universal and necessary. But it foils to account for differences between 
whatever one knows of a phenomenon In advance and what one learns about it a posterbrt its 
particularity. Experience Is conceived just In terms of re-presentation and the similitudes of 
mental functioning (D14 138)! " 
In contrast, Deleuze seeks after the conditions of adaWrather than possible experience. 
These conditions are not logically necessary, but contingent upon the nature of experience as It 
is lived. As Baugh puts it, 'Deleuze argues that the empirical is not what the concept *w1d be 
In a representation if It occurred, something hypothetical, but actuality itself, real existence as 
70 
opposed to the possibility of existence'. 20 The conditions never exceed the conditioned: rather 
than being imposed upon actual experience in the abstract, they are located within ie* 
The main flaw perceived by Deleuze in transcendentalism is that it reproduces the 
empirical in transcendental form, and shields these conditions from further critique. In The 
Logic of Sense, he writes that 'the error of all efforts to determine the transcendental as 
consciousness is that they think of the transcendental in the image of, and In the resemblance 
to, that which it Is supposed to ground' (LS, 105). That is, transcendental philosophy typically 
enters into a kind of circularity whereby conditions are conceived in the reified Image of the 
conditioned. Of most relevance here, dynamic and particular conscious states (dreams, beliefs, 
memories, experiences or whatever) are conceived by transcendentalism as contained Wthin or 
given to a pro-existent subject, 'supreme Self or superior V (LS, 106). As the apex of transcen- 
dental unity, this supreme Self serves as a domain beyond the empiriceil and beyond further 
study or 'demystification' (NP, 121). In comparison, Deleuze's starting point Is the contingent 
lived whole called 'I' and intuition opens it to critique by dividing it. 
There Is <Caveý to understanding Belysonism that Deleuze fails to spell out. Bergson 
realizes that to express in language the results of an intuitive study of consciousness Is to 
conceptualize and symbolize, and thus to abstract. Yet he means intuition to be free from 
formal conceptual and symbolic constraints. Accordingly, to communicate about Intuition, we 
should, he implores, use: 'the most concrete Ideas, but those which still retain an outer fringe of 
images. ý Comparisons and metaphors will here suggest what cannot be expressed' (CA( 42). 
Communication of intuition's findings must retain a power of suggestiveness, pointing to what is 
otherwise Inexpressible, and facilitating a kind of participation in it, whilst also describing as 
precisely as possible the reality of consciousness. Deleuze's Bergsonism must be understood 
in these terms. 
In accordance with the Chapter's first aim, we find that Deleuze takes Bergsonian 
Intuition as providing his transcendental empiricism with a method for decomposing a whole In 
a manner faithful to natural articulations, It enables transcendental empiricism to move from 
experience of the particular In Its particularity to the conditions of experience whilst minimizing 
abstraction and consequent imprecision (g 28). Section 13 will outline Deleuze's conception of 
the whole from which his Bergsonlan study of the subject must begin. 
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13. THE TEmpoRALrry OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
In accordance wfth the tenets of transcendental empiricism, Deleuze begins his 
Bergsonian study of the subject with the immediate awareness of one's consciousness. 
According to Bergson, 'there is nothing more immediately given, nothing more evidently real, 
than consciousness, and mind is consciousness. o3l In this simple statement, Bergson moves 
(and moves Del6uze) away from Hume's starting point. Mind is not a collection of Ideas distinct 
from the immediacy and dynamism of consciousness, but consciousness itself. Neither does 
Bergson assume that consciousness is 'possessed' by some particular and unified subject or 
that it must be subjected to synthesis. In an insightful piece, Joseph Chiarl writes that, for 
Bergson, 'our inner life helps us to grasp the true meaning of life, thence the importance of 
consciousness and consequently of psychology as a basis of metaphysical explorabons. '3' This 
Is precisely the direction of Deleuze's Bergsonian project from the inner life of consciousness, 
to a psychology of time and memory, and, finally, to a comprehensive and descriptive meta- 
physics of the subjects constitutive moment. 
For Deleuze and Bergson, intuitive awareness reveals consciousness to be essentially 
temporal; ongoing mental activity which, In As dynamism and the mutual interpenetration of its 
states, constitutes a kind of time internal to one's self. Bergson calls the conscious reality of 
this time ldur&'(often translated as 'duration'). 33 He asserts that 'pure duration is the form 
which the succession of our conscious states assi mes when our ego ... refrains from separating 
its present state from its former states' (7FW, 100). Notwittmianding difficulties invoked by his 
notion of 'conscious states, Bergson's point is that the temporality of consciousness is a flow 
constituted by the inter-penetration of thoughts rather than their successive arrangement: 'a 
succession of qualitative changes, which malt into and permeate one another, without precise 
outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves In relation to one another' (TFW, 104). 
Dtwde is the Immediate awareness of this flow (7FW 228). (Deleuze emphasizes the impor- 
tance of his method when he writes that 'duration would remain purely Intuitive, in the ordinary 
sense of the word, If lntuitiorý--in the properly Bergsonian sense-were not there as method' 
141. ) 
Because he believes that intuition's findings are best expressed in images, Bergson 
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explains dur6o by using analogies with music. Mental states flow together as if parts of a 
melody: previous notes lingering and future ones anticipated by the mellifluous effusion and 
unity of the piece, the permeation of each note by others revealing the extreme closeness of 
their interconnection. To try and grasp this flow as a complete set of notes is pointless, 
because 'a musical phase ... Is consWby on the point of ending and constantly altered In its 
totality by the addition of some new note' (7FW, 100). 34 To speak of mind or consciousness as 
a comprehensive system Is to ignore an analogous attribute of durde., it is always flowing, 
overtaking what might be called the 'not yet' " passing away In the 'already'. (We shall find 
echoes of this in Deleuze's characterization of the present. ) 
Intuition reveals to Bergson that while 'it is true that we count successive moments of 
duration, and that, because of Its relations with number, time at first seems to us to be a 
measurable magnitude, just like space', such quantification is Inconsistent with dur6e qm 
Immediate awareness (TfW 104). indeed dul& can be contrasted wfth'clock time', the time of 
physics and practical life, which either spatializes time by situating elemental Instants end-to-end 
on a referential grid (thus Invoking differences merely of degree) or uses the digits of a time- 
piece as a crass and Imprecise physical image. When arranged In accordance with these 
models, instants of clock time form a complete set of discrete particulars, externalizing instants 
In their relation one to another. Time becomes a series of separable instants, consciousness Is 
'situated' In time as a Series of temporally disparate mental states, and movement Is conceived 
In terms of relations between static positions. Thus clock time abstracts from experience by 
distorting its continuity (TFW, 121; CU. 145,341). 
But the constitutive Integration of moments of durde must not be overemphasized. 
Intuition confirms also that consciousness Is not 'one long thought', as It were, but a flowing 
together of mental states which are dhYerentfrom one another In important ways. As such, 
Bergson contends that differences between mental states allow us to mark one kind of thought 
or one particular thought from another, whilst constituting simultaneously a singular flow, a 
merging of thoughts as one consciousness. As Deleuze puts it, 'it Is duration that Includes all 
the qualitative differences, to the point where it is defined as alteration in relation to Itself'; 
Indeed, he Insists, 'there are no differences In kind except In duration' (A 92,32). In other 
words, durde is the immediate awareness of the flow of changes that simultaneously constitute 
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differences and relationships between particulars. Because mental states are neither indepen- 
dent nor atomic, change must occur 'within' rather than 'between' them, making it a qualitative 
rather than quantitative phenomenon. 35 
This disclosure clearly differentiates Deleuze's Bergsonian and Humean theories. 
Consciousness is, for Bergson, a continuous becoming-different rather than a series of 
conjoined atomistic or molecular states. He believes that the latter conception exemplifies aJI 
forms of assoclationism: 'the capital error of associationism is that it substitutes for this 
continuity of becoming, which is the living reality, a discontinuous multiplicity of elements, Inert 
and juxtaposed' (MM, 134). On such a view, dynamism Is not 'read otr reality but Imposed 
between the 'atorris! according to a spatial model. Thus, although associationism can construct 
pragmatically convenient fabrications, it detracts from the reality of the flow of mental states 
(7FW 128,139). 
Delouze's version of Humean assoclationism used a set of descriptive principles to 
theorize the flow of mental states. Recall Deleuze's claim that In Humean empiricism, 'we must 
... define the given by two objective characteristics: Indivisibility of an element and distribution of 
elements; atom and strwture'(ES, 92). The atomistic given is stabilized and constrained, 
contrary to the manifestations of consciousness. Any consequent re-creation of dynamism must 
be, as Bergson puts It, 'the work of the a ciationist philosopher who is studying my mind, 
rather than of my mind itself (7FW 161). 
Another telling contrast is between Bergson's approach to the temporality of conscious- 
ness and Kant's. For Bergson, durtie Is always Wready present In the given, the empirical reality 
of consciousness, whereas for Kant, time Is both a form of receptive 'intuition' and what must be 
added to the 'categories' to yield the 'transcendental schemata% Thus, for Kant, time is not an 
empirical concept, but an a pAo/inecessity underlying all possible experiencOO Moreover, 
despite Deleuze's claim that Bergson is closer to Kant than he realized, the difference between 
them Is marked: Kant proposes a homogeneous time of successive Instants, standing In need of 
synthesis, whereas Bergson's model Is of a qualitative permeation of states (M 82-3)ý7 
The distinction between dur& and clock time emphasizes to Deleuze the Importance of 
Inner time's dynamism. He sees that dur6e implicates'a *transition", ... a "change", a beconllng' 
(B. 37). The heterogeneity of mental states therefore must be conceived and theorized as 
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continuously changing. But as Deleuze and Guattari remind us, it is not enough to substitute 
traversed space for movement. 3' There Is also a need to determine the nature of the becoming- 
different of consciousness and its temporality. 
Whereas Bergson shies away from this challenge for fear of Introducing spatial degree 
into his philosophy surreptitiously, Deleuze takes it up directly. 30 For Deleuze, intuition informs 
Us that in respect of our immediate awareness of (or 'acquaintance with') consciousness, 
everything Is 'mixed together' so that 'experience itself offers us nothing but composites! (A 22). 
Inner life is a flow of various kindq of mental states (memories, dreams, wishes, jokes, observa- 
tons, emotions, perceptions, calculations and the like) and not just a flow of various degrees 
(more or less intense, more or less useful, greater or lesser vivacity), as Hume's theory had 
suggested. 
Deleuze means the term 'composite' to refer to 'a blend of tendencies which differ in 
nature'ý* Because, on Deleuze's reading, intuition is able to divide composites according to 
natural differences of quality or kind, it Is the perfect means for Isolating these tendencies; for 
dividing the complex whole called T according to the natural articulations of inner life (B, 21,22, 
26). '" For Deleuze, following the first chapters of Bergson's Matter and Memory, principal 
amongst these Is an ontological and epistemological dualism between the publicly perceivable 
disposition of material objects on the one hand, and, on the other, private mental states and 
consciousness. "' He characterizes these as two discrete 'presences': 'that of perception which 
puts us at once into matter and that of memory which puts us at once into the mind' (8,26). 
Deleuze's Bergsonian theory of the subject is built upon this relatively traditional dichotomy, 
Implying a belief that the flow of consciousness and the privacy of one's thinking mitigate 
against a study centred on just public states, whilst the reality of social mores and a capacity to 
manipulate and refer meaningfully to material objects curtails any account based just on mental 
states. 
For Deleuze, intuition works by dividing the reality of a domain 'according to lines of 
different natures' (1ý 115). 43 The two aspects of the composite arise from disparate 'lines' of the 
'development of consciousness. Delouze argues that to theorize matter and consciousness 
precisely, we must'push each line ... to the point where it goes 
beyond our own experience: an 
extraordinary broadening out that forces us to think a pure perception Identical to the whole Of 
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matter, a pure memory identical to the totality of the past' (8,27). We have seen that for the 
early Deleuze, transcendental empiricism must begin with the whole--the apparently unified 1--as 
the principal fact of consciousness. But general applicability and philosophical rigour demand 
that we seek the conditions that make this whole actual. 44 Deleuze must locate and explain the 
generalizable preconditions for both private thoughts and perception of public states. So whilst 
his Identification of the 'lines of development' Is contingent (upon his method and his concentra- 
ton upon actual rather than possible experience), the conditions presupposed by them are 
necessary from this perspective. 
But mere 'broadening out'-describing the functions on each line-wis not sufficient to 
explain their joint occurrence in consciousness. Deleuze writes that we must first divide the 
composite 'Into tm divergent and expanded directions which correspond to a true difference In 
Idnd between soul and body, spirit and matter but 'we can only reach the solution to the 
problem by narrowing' (, R 29-30). We must follow the lines of consciousness (or 'pure 
subjectivity') and materiality ('objectivity) through one full cycle, gathering up the Implications of 
their movement along the way, until we rediscover the 'point' at which they Intersect (B, 28). 
Only by tracing the operative conditions along the two lines can the full implications of the point 
of Intersection be grasped. 
This Section has argued that Deleuze adopts Bergson's durge as a precise character- 
Ization of the Intuited flow of consciousness. It leads him to not only emphasize the dynamism 
that Is characteristic of consciousness, but to pursue the condlflons of Inner time In terms of the 
two aspects of consciousness evident to intuition. His transcendental survey of each of these 
two 'lines! must be conducted independently of the other so as to preserve 'natural purity' and 
make clear the implications of their Intersection. Section 14 will deal Ywith the 'line of objectivity' 
or 'materiality', and Sections 15 and 16 vAth the 'line of pure subjectivity'. Later sections YAII 
detail Deleuze's study of the point of coincidence of the two lines, the moment of the subjects 
constitution. 
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14. OBJECTIVITY AND THE DYNAmics OF PERCEPTiON 
For Bergson, it is Impossible to sustain the traditional philosophical and scientific 
division between movement as the physical reality of an external world and as the psychic 
reality of changes amongst mental states. He insists that movement is ý9ýolutely Indivisible, 
and that 'movement, whatever its inner nature, becomes an indisputable reality' (MM, 193,143). 
According to Deleuze, Bergson 'moves the ground of consciousness! by overcoming the 
tendency in philosophy and psychology to divide changing mental states (possessing qualities 
but not extension) from changing material states (understood as quantitative spatial extension) 
(C1,56). As such, as Peter Hallward points out, the disparateness of the two lines is under- 
pinned by a univocity that becomes crucial to Deleuze's account. 45 
Because Hume had considered the given in respect of a purely nominal or formal 
origin, there was no need in anailiclsm and SubjectMý, for Deleuze to broach the precise 
nature of the relationship between associations within the imagination and the world of objects 
without But the exclusion of this question suggests other, more pressing ones. 'How is it 
possible', Deleuze asks, 'to pass from one order to the other? How is it possible to explain that 
movements, aJI of a sudden, produce an image-as In perception-or that the image produces a 
movement-as Involuntary action? ' (C1,56) Intuition reveals that there /smediation between the 
world of objects and the one of consciousness, and to set aside this profound reality Is hardly 
conducive to philosophical precision. 
For Deleuze as for Bergson, Internal and external movement are reconciled In the 
process of 'pure perception', the direct transmittal of movement from external objects to one's 
own body and thence to the brain. 48 This is not to say that reception of movement by the brain 
Is a sufficient condition for consciousness (as subsequent sections will show), but it is a 
necessary one. Furthermore, perception and consciousness can be considered to coincide in 
one important respect As Bergson puts It: 
we grasp, In perception, at one and the same time, a state of our consciousness and a 
, 
pe)*ent of ourselves. This mixed character of our Immediate perception ... reallty Ind e 
Is the principleltheoretical reason that we have for believing In an external world which -ý I does riot coincide absolutely with our perception. (MM, 203) 
When we perceive, we are aware of both the state of consciousness Irrvoked and whatever 
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object is perceived. But afthough these two states correspond and share a precondition 
(movement, dynamism), they are produced separately, by different 'mechanisms!. The former 
has to do with the internal realm, the line of consciousness or pure subjectivity, whereas the 
latter has to do with matter or objectivity. This Section will deal with the first of these, the line of 
'perception-object-mattee (8,26). Deleuze provides little commentary on the Bergsonlan model 
of pure perception, so I will focus largely on Bergson's texts and their Implications for Delouze's 
theory, bearing in mind that Deleuze's claim to'be an empiricist stems from his belief that, 'on 
the path which leads to that which is to be thought, everything begins with sensibility' (DR 144). 
One must bear In mind, however, that although Deieuze can theorize the line of materiality as # 
it were' independent of subjectivity, the precision of any consequent model of the subject 
demands their reintegration, consonant with intuitive awareness of the self as a composite. 
Deleuze's study of materiality Is, then, following Bergson's suggestion, a provisional 
model of ; oure'perception-perception before the Invocation of memory. Because pure 
percepbon operates just in the present, Bergson characterizes it as 'the lowest degree of mind 
[Ilespli4% on the same level as matter (MM, 222). Deleuze takes this claim seriously, as we 
shall see. Furthermore, the present 'at which time' perception occurs must also be understood 
as a purely theoretical construct. As Bergson puts it: 'for consciousness there Is no present, R 
the present be a mathematical Instant An Instant is the purely theoretical limit which separates 
, 47 the Past from the future. It may, In the strict sense, be conceived, It Is never perceived. 
Mentions of the present instant refer, then, to a theoretical moment, a distinguishing mark of the 
differences between past and future (to be teased out later). 
Materiality is not limited to objects distinct from one's self, but extends to one's body 
and brain. On Delouze's reading, Bergson's theory of perception relies on his characterization 
of a// bodies as possessing material characteristics and spatial volume (A 25). We experience 
these attributes In the form of 'Images!, so that materiality and the image are either Identical or 
very nearly so: Deleuze considers, thern Indistinguishable in practice (Cf, 61). According to 
Bergson: 
it is a mistake to reduce matter to the perception which we have of it, a mistake also to 
make of it a thing able to produce in us perceptions, but in itself of another nature than 
they. Matter ... is an aggregate of 'images!. And by 'image' we mean a certain 
existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a representa, 6617 
[reprdsentW614, but low than that which the realist calls a JNng [chose]. (MA4 9-10) 
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In other words, matter must not be understood just in terms of perceptions of materiality, but 
nor can it be understood as what procluces perceptions, since matter and image are the same 
thing from different 'perspectives'. It is pointless to look beyond Images in order to grasp the 
presence of objects and relationships between them, and we should neither dismiss our 
perceptions as illusions of mind nor suppose some object (such as Kant's transcendental 
object) 'standing behind' Images. " Rather, conjuring up the strictest empiricism, Bergson 
Insists that images are objects In the world which possess the qualities that they are perceived 
as possessing (MM, 10). ' An object perceived as red and square really is that way (except in 
cases of mistake); redness and squareness are not subjective attributes. In other words, there 
Is what Deleuze will refer to in later texts as a 'resemblance' between perceived qualities and 
commensurate perceptions. 50 Consequently, for Bergson, 'the movements of matter are very 
clear, regarded as images, and ... there Is no need to look in movement for anything more than 
what we see in it' (MM, 23). We need only perceive the actions and reactions evident in images 
to grasp relations between material objects. 
Theories of perception fall Into error, Deleuze contends, whenever they overlook the 
correspondence between one's bodily perceptive apparatus and 'the side of being that 
manifests itself to us in the first place' (B, 34). The ontolOgicW similarity between external 
objects and one's body undercuts any possibility of their differing In Wind and any need for 
attribution to the body of such enigmatic properties as thought. As images, the body and Its 
component parts cannot contaln images (C1,68). There Is no difference in ldnd--and thus no 
difference relevant for transcendental empiricism-between the body and the world of objects 
(B, 25). 
Bergson's ontology of Images has two Important Implications for Delauze's study of the 
subject. First, the emphasis on relations between moving Images afflows Deleuze to conceive 
natural perception independently of static points of reference. In contrast to phenomenology, 
for example, Bergsonian perception and movement do not Imply the activity of a subject. 51 For 
Bergson, objects qi1a Images are 'luminous' by themselves without anything-consciousness, 
for example-Aluminating them (Ci, 6o-1). Second, Bergson's theory clears the way for a 
Deleuzian theory of perception as direct, placing us In an unmediated relationship with matter 
(8,25). If materiality is always characterized by movement and spatial attributes, then PerCOP- 
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tion takes the form of materiality or, more accurately, of material affects. 
Bergson specifies movement as the transcendental condition of perception. At one 
level, this is because he understands matter as just 'atoms in motion' (MM, 35). At another, he 
is interested in the directly perceptible aspects of movement; with a body's motion in being first 
here, upon the desk, and then there, upon the floor. In order to comprehend both levels, one 
must conceive of movement of (within') and between bodies. 
For Deleuze and Bergson, the nature of stimulation itself Is physical, relying on shared 
attributes of materiality. Not only do sensations have spatial characteristics ('the itch is there'; 'I 
felt the mosquito land here, on my arm; Bergson's example of a localized pain caused by a pin 
prick [MM, 53]), they also are constituted by movements. In other words, the world of con- - 
sciousness is reconciled with that of sensation by means of movement. According to Bergson, 
perception involves a continuity of successive vibrations being sensed, localized and 'taken up' 
by the perceptive apparatus of the nervous system (MM, 31,203; rFW 106). Conceived In this 
way, the distinction between the world of 'external' objects and one's physical awareness of 
them is a difference purely of degree (MM, 202). 
Deleuze understands the stimulation of the nervous system as involving 'the operation 
of contracting trillions of vibrations onto a receptive surface' or 'a series of micro-movements on 
an Immobilised plate of nerve' (B, 74; C1,87). He believes that when we perceive, we contract 
vibrations or'elementary shocld into a felt quality. Since both the process of contraction and 
the vibrations themselves are fundamentally material, the range of perceptible Images Is limited 
by the Capacity to receive movement (B, 87). (Doleuze's Bergsonlan physicalism is supported 
by developments In science. Recent accounts of cherno-reception In taste and smell, somatic 
reception In touch, and photoreception and transduction in sight support the suggestion that 
interaction between bodies must be Idnetic. ) 52 
Although objects cannot be perceived apart from physical, vibratory Movements 
affecUng the nervous system, It is erroneous to suppose that there is some unchanging material 
element from which perceived qualities originate (C1,59). As Deleuze writes: 'there Is nothing 
moved which is distinct from the received movement. Every thing, that is to say every Image, Is 
Indistinguishable from Its actions and reactions' (C1,58). Objects can only be perceived as 
Images, and images are founded In stimulation, and thus In movement. Perception Is not 
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merely a surface affect on bodies, however. It involves 'external images reaching the organs of 
sense, modifying the nerves, propagating their Influence in the brain! (MU, 40). 5* Subsequent to 
disturbance of the nerves, movement is passed as a 'current of molecular changes to the brain 
which, as the centre of affection, enables the 'extension' of perception Into the determination of 
reactions (C9 47). The effects of perception move between 'layers' of nerves and thence to the 
brain, so that, as Bergson puts it: 'everything is changed In the Interior movements of perceptive 
centres. But everything is also changed in Nmy perception". My perception Is, then, a function 
of these molecular movements; It depends upon them' (M)W, 22). 
Bergson's great Innovation Is establishing perception as a direct and unmediated 
trawMisskv7 made possible by the likeness of bodies in kind, rather than as a 'translation! or 
Interpretation of stimuli. The vibration of nerves can orgy be distinguished from cerebral 
vibrations by the degree of movement rather than the kind. As such, perception remains firmly 
on the line of materiality. At no point do vibrations'spiritualize Into consciousness!, changing by 
some 'Miraculous power Into conscious representations (MM, 2"0). As Deleuze points out: 
'external images act on me, transmit movement to me, and I return movement how could 
images be In my consciousness since I am myself image, that Is, movement? And can I even, 
at this level, speak of "ego*, of eye, or brain and of body? Only for simple convenience' (CY, 
58). At this stage of Delauze's transcendental empiricism, any theoretical alliance between the 
two lines Is subordinated by the attribute of movement to the line of materiality. 
The model of pure perception advanced so far constitutes an openness by human 
bodies to all stimuli, Implying that every micro-movement encountered must also be perceived. 
But If this were really the case, we conceivably would be so overwhelmed by Images as to be 
unable to act or respond at all, 'descending', as Bergson puts It, 'to the condition of a material 
object' (MM, 49). But the intuited subject is clearly mobile and responsive, Implying some 
'filtering out of actual perceptions from the range of possible ones. 
Because humans are embodied, pure perception is Impossible without affection, but 
these two must not be confused. The difference between them, the measure of what Is actually 
'absorbed', Is real perception, which excludes whatever Is not of 'interest' to us. Rather than an 
additive process (adding consciousness or reality to micro-MOVOMGnts, perhaps), perception Is 
a subtractive one, a selective reduction from the range of stimull to just those of Immediate 
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importance for the organism (8,24-5). So, as Bergson puts it, 'while perception measures the 
reflecting power of the body, affection measures its power to absorb', and the question 
becomes bow it Is limited, since it should be the irwge of the whole, and is in fact reduced to 
the in7gge of that which interests you'(MM, 56,40). 
From the commonality of movement to all images, Deleuze deduces that there can be 
no difference In kind between the brain and other states of matter (B, 64). The brain is always 
on the line of materiality, sharing characteristics of movement and spatiality. As such, it is 
unable to add anything to perception: it cannot manufacture representations of objects, for 
example, or add consciousness to matter. But this Is not to say that the brain cannot serve as a 
location for activity. Bergson contends that the brain is the site of subtraction from our affection 
of whatever Is of no interest. He argues that 'in normal psychological life' there is 'a constant 
effort of the mind to limit its horizon, to turn away from what it has a material Interest In not 
seeing', and 'the brain seems to have been constructed with a view to this work of selection! 
(CM, 137). It receives vibrations from the exterior senses and acts as a 'filter, excluding 
vibrations which need not elicit a physical response (unessential and distracting images), 
allowing one to not react to particular stimuli. Thus Deleuze depicts the brain as a kind of 'gap' 
between vibratory stimulation and dynamic response, an 'intervar that excludes vibrations and 
'complicates the relationship between a received movement (excitation) and an executed 
movement (response), (a 24). 
Having established the brain as interval, Deieuze considers next the kind of activity 
within It, beginning with the relationship between sensory sUmulation and bodily response. 
According to Deleuze and Bergson, perception Is always oriented towards the practical. life of 
action rather than pure knowledge, and the only movements actually perceived are those 
relevant to one's bodily actions. " For Bergson, 'my perception displays, in the midst of the 
image world, ... the eventual or possible actions of my body', so that actual perception can 
be 
defined as Me aggregate of imVes... refeffed to Me eventual acift of one partIcular knage, 
my body'(MM, 22). 
But 'relevance' here must be understood in several distinct ways: the location of objects 
Is always perceived In terms of the position of one's body, as the central image; the only stimuli 
of 'interest' are those adequate to the receptive capacity of the body, ' andý muli are either 
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perceived or filtered out according to the possible reactions of the body-the greater the body's 
power of action, the wider the field of perception (MM, 31-2,56). The dynamic of stimulation Is 
the transmission of movements from the general realm of images towards one particular Image, 
In terms of which it is assessed as useful (and perceived) or not (and filtered out by the brain). 
With a bodily response, the dynamic is transposed: movement begins with the central Image 
and Is transmitted 'outwards, towards external ones. In either case, the Image of one! s own 
body is privileged. 
Yet BergsorYs emphasis In his account of perception upon the body and bodily utility Is 
open to question. Alan Lacey challenges it thus: 'granted that human needs range widely, over 
the intellectual, aesthetic, etc., do we not perceive many things In which we have no Interest ' 
and which suggest no possible action to us? '5" There are three possible responses. The first is 
to agree that Bergson has overstated the Importance of bodily actons, and to limit commensu- 
rately the application of his theory. The second, suggested by Lacey, is to suppose that 
Bergson does not mean that perception is defined in terms of action, but that It Is only possible 
to perceive what can be acted upon-the present-whilst memories are preserved in the paSL58 
There is little in Bergson's texts to support this reading. 
The third response Is the one adopted by Deleuze. In Cinelm 2, he contends that we 
should read Bergson on the usefulness or'utility' of stimulations very broadly Indeed. Deleuze 
holds that 'what it is in our Interests to perceive' is determined with regard to 'our economic 
interests, Ideological beliefs and psychological demands' (C: 9 20). These three constituents 
provide for a vast range of 'Interests' and, consequently, a wide range of perceptions. "" 
Unfortunately Deleuze does not expand on this point, and one can only guess at how he might 
have related it to Humean social and economic imperatives on the one hand, and Bergsonlan 
mechanisms on the other. 
Bodily responses are determined by Interests and utility rather than accident Even 
though reactions are unforeseen, however, they cannot be 'the work of chance'. Rather, the 
determination of appropriate bodily responses relies upon conditioning by whatever has proved 
useful In the past, and thus upon memory (MM, 65). According to Deleuze, such a memory 
would be 'a motor tendency which would be 'sufficient to define a recognition that Is purely 
automatic, without the intervention of recollections (or, if you prefer, an Instantaneous Memory 
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consisting entirely in motor mechanisms)' (8,67). The determination of responses cannot be 
conscious because the interaction between one's body and external objects is purely material. 
It requires, instead a Wind of 'material memory' or 'conditioned bodily tendency' that operates as 
a reflex and ensures the adjustment of bodily motor mechanisms to material circumstances 
through the selection of an appropriate response in the light of past experience (C: Z 47)! " 
For Bergson, 'habit memory' is this means by which stimulus and response are 
mutually implicated in their interval Instant. It is 
fixed in the organism ... which ensure[s] the appropriate reply to various possible demands. This memory enables us to adapt ourselves to the present situation; through 
it the actions to which we are subject prolong themselves into reactions that are 
sometimes accomplished, sometimes merely nascent, but always more or less appro- 
priate. Habit rather than memory, it acts our past experience but does not call up its 
image. (UM, 151) 
Bergson does not consider habit memory to be memory in the full sense because it has to do 
just with matter. As a purely habitual motor response, habit memory lacks any conscious 
aspect. If it is 'memory' at all, this is only because it prolongs the useful effect of past Images 
Into the present without sustaining the images themselves (MM, 82). The only limit to the 
selection of an appropriate response Is the range of possible bodily movements. This Is 
precisely the mechanism that Deleuze thinks constitutes the sensory-motor recognition enabling 
the instantaneous determination of utility and thus the scope of actual perception (g 67,71; C: z 
44). 
In Difference anclRepefflion, Deleuze provides an interesting contrast between 
Bergson's habit memory and Hume's theory of habit. Recall that, for Hume, habit is'a species 
of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able 
either to produce or to prevent', given its Impetus by experience (EHU, 46-7). Much the same 
could be said of Bergsonian habit memory. But whereas Bergson writes about stimulation, 
movement and images, Hume merely refers to the given qua given; and where Bergson writes 
of bodily responses, Hume considers the mind's affection. Consequently, whereas Hume 
understands the mechanism of habit in purely psychological terms, Bergson considers it to have 
a material dimension., " 
For Deleuze, Bergson's understanding of habit has to do with a 'closed repetition, ... A 
AA A' whereas Hume's invokes an 'open! one, 'a repetition of cases such as AB AB AB AB' 
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(DR 72). In the latter, difference occurs between the terms (in the expectation of the Inevitable 
consequence of a causal relationship coupled with the experience of a cause), whereas the 
former invokes difference only 'in the contraction of the elements In general' (DR 72). In other 
words, for Hume, the constitutive difference between one cause and effect relationship and 
another is the particularity of the mental process that runs from A, to an expectation of B (on the 
weight of evidence of the conjunction of ABs experienced in the past), to B. Difference Is 
constituted by the movements Involved in a psychological process, and relies upon memory. 
By contrast, for Bergson, a stimulation A leads automatically to some response, which 
will not even be recognized as B, but simply acted (MM, 167). Every new response constitutes 
difference, whilst referring only to habit memory and not to any conscious activity: only 
materiality and its characteristic movement constitute habit. Although habit memory relates 
previous responses to each new stimulus by means of the assessment of utility and the brain's 
selectivity, each stimulation of the nervous system Is nonetheless distinct from what has gone 
before at the level of materiaNy, and habit memory Is restricted necessarily to this level. 
Bergson would agree with Deleuze's Hume that 'we should call 11pasr not only that 
which has been, but also that which determines, acts, prompts, and carries a certain weight, 
but he would not agree that we always are aware of the means by which this weight Is 
exercised (in our expectations, for instance)(ES, 95). When Deleuze argued that, for Hume, 
habit had no need of memory, he might have had in mind a Bergsonlan resolution to Hume's 
inadequate account of habit. Only by Invoking an automatic and unconscious memory can 
Deleuze's down-playing of memory be reconciled with Hume's belief that causation relies upon 
constant conjunction and expectation. 
In Bergson's theory of movement and perception, Deleuze finds a way of reconciling 
private mental states with the disposition of publicly accessible material objects. By focusing on 
the dynamism of this Interaction, Bergson contends: 'what was Immobile and frozen In our 
perception Is warmed and set In motion. Everything comes to life around us, everything is 
revivified In us! (MM, 157). Whereas Hume's subject only emerges once the given Is exposed to 
the dynamics of Imagination, for Deleuze's Bergson the given Is dynamic In the first Instance: 
movement Is given in perception. Consequently, the subject must be understood as beginning 
with movement, rather than as a product of Its reconstitution. This Inherent dynamism, and the 
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role of the brain as an Interval, will be crucial to Deleuze's account of both the activity of the 
other line of development, pure subjectivity, to which I turn next, and the productive potential of 
interaction between the two lines. 
IS. THE DYNAmics OF PURE MEMORY 
Being distinct from consciousness, the line of materiality cannot account for the 
temporality of durdo. But one of its characteristics forms the starting point for Deleuze's study 
of the line of pure subjectivity. For Deleuze, Bergson's philosophical aim is to begin 'from the 
body or moving thing to which our natural perception attaches movement as if it were a vehicle' 
and then to reveal consciousness Win reality only a movement of movements' (C1,23). 
Dynamism is not introduced between discrete mental images, but is present at the origin of 
images, in perception. Only by realizing that movement Is Innate to both mental states and 
material ones is it possible to conceive correctly of the interaction between them. Or again, only 
by approaching the theorization of inner time with an appreciation of the preservation of 
movement in perception is it possible to grasp properly the nature of consciousness. 
In fact, as Deleuze points out in his works on cinema, images are defined by their 
animation. If movement is taken from the moving body, there Is no longer a distinction between 
Image and object, so that 'we find ourselves ... faced with the exposition of a world where 
IMAGE=MOVEMEN-r (cl, 58). Moreover, according to Deleuze, consciousness multiplies the 
movement 'inherited' from perception, so that movement is a mobile section of duration, but 
duration is not a mobility of static sections (Cf, 8). 60 
For Deleuze's Bergson, consciousness Is a product of 'pure' or 'true' memory, the 
mechanism that makes possible the preservation of movement essential to the flow of mental - 
states. Studying pure memory situates Delouze upon the line of pure subjectivity because, 
rather ftm being 'weakened perception' or 'nascent sensations, for example (characterizations 
which Bergson thinks typify the view of most psychologists), pure memory is entirely distinct in 
theory from materiality (AAM, 13, %40). 
Bergson believes that pure memory stores every conscious event in its particularity and 
detail. Being 'coextensive with consciousness', it 'retains and ranges alongside of each other all 
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our states in the order in which they occur, leaving to each fact its place and ... marking its 
date, truly moving in the past and not ... in an ever renewed present' 
(UM, 151). In other 
words, the perceptions of actual existence are duplicated by a virtual existence, virtual Images 
with the potential for becoming conscious, actual ones. Thus every lived moment Is both actual 
and virtual, with perception on one side and memory on the other; an ever-growing mass of 
recollections, commensurate with an ever-increasing range of perceptions. 8' 
Taking his lead from Bergson, Deleuze contends that the virtual is defined by its 
potential for becoming conscious (CM, 91-106; AW, 28,163,319). Rather than merely 
simulating the real (as In 'virtual reality' media), or being abstract or modelled upon the real, the 
virtual has the reality of its potential, which, for Bergson, Is not 'fixed' (a capacity awaiting one- 
off realization), but determined just by the circumstances of its actualization. In the words of 
Steven Maras, this potential 'is not a lack awaiting realization, or the acquisition of existence, but 
presupposes and shapes the real'! 2 Indeed Deleuze's and Bergson's use of the word 'Virtual' 
rather than 'possible! represents the difference in Wind between simple realization and actualiza- 
bon, which is discussed below. In short, the possible bwomes real, whereas the virtual always 
'possesses! the reality of its potential (DR, 211). 
For Deleuze, the nature of the Interpenetration of moments Is clear (remembering that In 
the context of durde, 'moments' and 'Instants! are purely theoretical constructs): past and 
present do not denote successive moments, but coexIstentones. In the process of duplication, 
the virtual Image is defined by the present of which it is past, rather than In accordance with 
some new present in relation to which it is just relafive4e past (A 7 1; M 79). The common 
tendency to conceive of the past as 'caught' between the old present that it once was and the 
present In relation to which it Is now past contains two false beliefs: that the past Is constituted 
only after having been present, and that it Is reconstituted by the now present whose past it now- 
is (A 58). These errors lead one to think in terms of 'cessatlon', 'replacement' and 'reconstitu- 
bon' even though such notions are Inconsistent with the intuited awareness of time as a flow. 
Instead, on Deleuze's account, pure memory Is formed simultaneously with each new Instant so 
that a moment of the past relates just to the moment that is its corresponding present. 
(Moreover, Deleuze argues In Proist and Slýrns that if each present moment coexists with a past 
one, as this account demands, and if that past moment coexists with its past moment, then the 
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past as a whole must coexist with the prosent. )83 
Deleuze observes that, as a collection of purely kitual images, memory has no 
psychological existence, but is instead a purely ontological element, an 'extra-psychological' 
and eternal 'past in general' (A 55-7). This claim can be used to explain Hume's failure to 
provide an adequate theory of time. His introspective methodology limited him to study of the 
conscious realm whereas, for Deleuze's Bergson, the power of the past qua past is only 
locatable in ontology. Since this raWm Is beyond the reach of a psychology of affections, 
Hume's approach is constrained. 64 
Deleuze's reading of this point also can be used to counter Merleau-Ponty's famed 
critique of Bergson. Some Deleuze scholars have rejected Merleau-POnty's appraisal Out Of 
hand because it is suffused by phenomenology and the presumption of a pre-eAstent subject. 
Boundas, for Instance, writes simply that 'the objections of Sartre and Medeau-POntY are too 
much Involved in the phenomenology of consciousness and subjectivity to be of much use to a 
theory of real time. " 
Merleau-Ponty reads Bergson as claiming that the past is always present In consdow- 
ne. -; A " he attacks this position on the grounds that 'no preservation ... can make conscious- 
ness of the past understandable'. Memories do not 'refer to the past' or 'point to the past', but 
are only memories as such in the present, so that every memory 'is a fresh perception. Even If 
we read Bergson as claiming that perceptions are preserved in the unconscious, Medeau-Ponty 
contends, then a preserved memory qua memory persists only in the present, when It is 
'reproduced'. According to him, 'reproduction presupposes re-cognition, and cannot be 
understood as such unless I have ... a sort of direct contact with the past', which 
he considers 
Bergson's theory to lack" 
As Boundas suggests, Merleau-Ponty's account Is Indeed riddled Wth references to a- 
pre-eAstent subject which possesses and re-cognizes memories, contacts the past and so on. 
But I believe that Deleuze's reading can help to disclose Important points In the positions of 
both Bergson and his critic. For Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty is right to say that memories qUa 
recollections are only memories in the present. But because of the relationship Intuited between 
ontology and psychology, Deleuze is able to argue that memories d7uavirtual images are 
preserved in the non-conscious realm of the virtual: a preserved memory persists In the past but 
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recollections exist In the present. Furthermore, as I will show below, there Is for Deleuze's 
Bergson a means of 'direct contact with the past'. Rather than presupposing recognition, 
however, It presumes just a non-consclous principle of utility and an instantaneous mechanism. 
In effect, Deleuze counters Merleau-Ponty by bringing together two disparate phases of 
Bergson's corpus. Bergson's early works pursue a wholly psychological conception of duration, 
whereas later ones present durde as the foundation for a complex and multi-layered ontology, of 
which psychology Is but one barely privileged example. By deploying resources from both 
fields, Deleuze is better able to answer Merleau-Ponty's criticisms, which are directed at 
Bergson's psychology. 
As a collection of virtual images, pure memory is not preserved in space or matter, and 
nothing can be lost from it It cannot be a product or attribute of the brain because It is 
ontologically and logically Independent of the line of materiality. Deleuze reminds us that pure 
memory Is 'on' the line of pure subjectivity, to that It would be 'absurd' (or, at least, contrary to 
division by Intuition) to mix the two lines by conceiving of the brain as a 'reservole of recollec- 
tions (8,54). Pure memory Is distinct from the body, protected from physical weakness and 
Illness. Loss of memories is not a loss of 'contents' from pure memory, but merely a break- 
down of the mechanisms enabling recafl. " 
Since memory is temporal and purely ontological, lrecolleaibn... Is preserved In fteff 
rather than In something of another kind (CZ 80). " Specifically, on Deleuze's rendition of 
Bergson's model, pure memory stores the virtual images of memory on various 'levels', 'planee, 
or'sheets'. However, Deleuze insists, 
it Is not a case of one region containing particular elements Of the past, particular 
recollections, in opposition to another region which contains other recollections. It Is a 
case of there being distinct levels, each one of which contains the whole of our past, 
but In a more or less contracted state. It Is in this sense that one can speak of the 
regions of Being itself, the ontological regions of the past 'in general', all coexisting, all 
'repeating' one another. (8,61) 
In other words, pure memory cannot be diVided into levels according to the presence or 
otherwise of particular virtual Images, since every level contains the totality of the experienced 
past The contents of every plane are repeated on every other one, thereby coexisting on 
various levels of the temporal Being of pure memory. Even this coexistence and totality of 
levels Is purely virtual, so the totality of the set of virtualities constitutes the Virtual whole of pure 
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memory (B, 93). 
Although each level contains the whole of one's past, the past is stored: 'in a more or 
less contracted state, around certain variable dominant recollections. The extent of the 
contraction ... expresses the difference between one level and another' (B, 64). That is, the 
distribution of images upon any plane is relative to some particular virtual image, the one from 
which all others on the plane derive their meaning and history. The 'distance' of each particular 
memory from the dominant one expresses this relativity as an 'expansion' or 'contractiorf so 
that, on every level, degrees of expansion and contraction coexist (AR 60,86). One might 
suppose (although neither Deleuze nor Bergson states it clearly) that there are as many levels 
as there are dominant memories. Each former present is a dominant memory on ft ow7 plane, 
as the element that particularizes all aspects of the plane. 80 
Although the various levels of pure memory possew functional similarities that enable 
them to form a virtual whole, we should also note the sites of difference implicit within memory. 
There are differences between levels (with respect to dominant defining images), on each 
particular level (between memories arranged In terms of dominant images, evident In relative 
degrees of expansion and contraction), and in the constitution of every level (such that the 
virtual whole is always changing with the accumulation of now experiences on now planes). The 
only constants In pure memory are difference, Virtuality, and theoretical function. 
As pure virtuality, the past cannot be experienced and thus cannot coincide with 
consciousness. As Deleuze puts it In Merence and RepehWon, we cannot say of the past that 
It was because, as a virtuality, 'it does not exist, but it Insists, it consists, it is' (DR 82). The 
past has ceased to act, but It has not ceased to be. But although the past coexists with each 
present, it cannot, in virtual form, cowthWe the present (g 61). The present is necessarily 
actual, and it is ontologicaily unfeasible for a virtuality to form an actuality without simultaneously - 
changing form (C: Z 78-9). 
Nevertheless, pure memory can be revealed to consciousness. In Bergson's words, 
consciousness 'has but to remove an obstacle, to withdraw a veil, In order that all that it 
contains ... may be revealed. ""' On Deleuze's account, this revelation takes the form of an 
'actualization' of relevant virtual images, a concept rarely mentioned in Bergson's texts but 
central for Deleuze. It is the means by which the virtual becomes conscious without assuming a 
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particular, final and preordained 'position' in consciousness. Colwell gives an excellent 
definition: actualization isthe process in which the virtual differentiates itself In the active 
#71 creation of something new, an actual that does not resemble the virtual from which it arose. 
In our case, actualization entails a change of kind from virtual image to actual recollection Image 
by which it takes on psychological significance. 
The contrast between actualization, on the one hand, and realization and concretization, 
on the other, Is Instructive. These latter are cases where the possible becomes 'its' correspond- 
ing reality in a single, non-repeatable operation. But as we saw earlier, the Virtual Is always 
already fully real, 'possessing' the reality of its potential. Furthermore, there Is no foreordained 
'location' In consciousness for the recovered Image: Its place is determined by wholly contin- 
gent circumstances. As Deleuze points out In Proust Md SignA even the apparent Identity 
between a present memory and the memory as It was In 'its' past present Is actually a vehicle 
for revealing the particularity of circumstances surrounding each one, and thus for disclosing 
differences between theM. 72 
In Deleuze's Bergsonian model of memory, actuialization is the recall of particular virtual 
Images to consciousness. In this process, virtual Images become actual ones of a kind that 
Deleuze calls 'recollection Images! (indeed a recollection Is actualized o/Yywhen it becomes an 
Image) (A 63). Consequently: 'the past is not to be confused with the mental Wdstence of 
recollection images which actualize it In us. It Is preserved In time: it Is the virtual element into 
which we penetrate to look for the "pure recollection" which will become actual in a "recollection 
Image"' (C2,98). In other words, pure recollection is always Virtual and the recollection hWe Is 
the form In Mich it becomes-actual In relation to some present. 
Since only the present Is actual within consciousness, actualization Involves Images 
which were virtual and 'hidden' taldng on a psychological significance (B, 55-7). Only with 
actualization, Deleu`ze Insists, does psychology 'open on to ontology, (8,63). The psychology 
of the present, In its very momentariness, Interacts with ontology In the constitution of the 
present. Delouze's theory of memory-functions-which ties to explain this connection between 
ontology and psychology-has important implications for his theory of Inner time, and it Is to this 
theory that I turn now. 
As with Deleuze's account of pure perception, his theory of the Operations of memory 
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begins with the need for a bodily response to some stimulus: actualization occurs whenever a 
present perception necessitates reference to the past. (As with habit memory, 'need' and 
$response' must be read very broadly. ) Specifically, in order that a recollection reappear In 
consciousness, it must be brought from pure memory to the point where action Is to occur (MM, 
153). Thus perception and recollection are mutually Implicated in the selection of an appropri- 
ate memory: recollection Is actualized because of stimulus provided by a perception, and the 
consequent recollection image is extended into a bodily response. In Deleuze's terms, 
recollection enters into a kind of 'circuit' with the present, the recollection Image referring to the 
perception-image and vice versa (8,66). 
There is, then, a kind of material interplay between Deleuze's two lines of development, 
even though its effect is different on each. For Bergson, this is wholly consistent with the 
human Individual's being embodied. He claims thatwhatever Idea we may frame of conscious- 
ness In itself ... , we cannot deny that, in a being which has bodily functions, the chief office of 
consciousness is to preside over action and to enlighten choice' (MM, 141). Memory rather 
than mere habit is the means of enlightenment, for even though the mutual implication of 
perception and recollection implies that habit memory and pure memory might also be 
Interconnected, and despite Bergson's assertion that they provide each other a 'mutual support', 
the two are nonetheless of different kinds and must not be conflated (MM, 152). " 
The physical requirement to which conscious intervention responds also determines the 
particular recollection Image. On Bergson's account, the process of actualization Is determined 
by a principle of utility in respect of present perceptions and circumstances, its Primary task 
being to evoke past perceptions analogous to present ones, to recall what preceded and 
followed from them, and so to suggest the most useful response (MA4,140-1,228). The brain, 
on Delouze's account the gap between stimulus and response, provides the Interval within - 
which this conscious reflection occurs (B, 52-3). The lines of materiality and pure subjectivity 
both operate within this gap, but whereas the 'choice' of the former is more bodily reflex, that of 
the latter is properly a choice of the appropdate memory. 
Bergson contends that associationism misunderstands this process by assuming that all 
possible memories carry the same degree of applicability to any current perception. Conse- 
quently, he Insists, it is unable to explain how a recollection 'clings to the perception which 
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evokes it' or 'by what caprice a particular recollection is chosen among the thousand others 
which similarity or contiguity might equally well attach to the present perception' (MM, 241). As 
we saw-and as Deleuze emphasized-Hume acknowledges the importance of utility in his 
associationism, but fails to provide adequate explanations of either its interaction with habit or 
the psychological mechanism by which the correct habit Is invoked consistently. A deeper 
account of memory might have allowed Hume to have explained better the consistency of one's 
actions and the Importance of repeated experiences. 
Deleuze Identifies two aspects of memory which perform the tasks of locating and 
recalling the appropriate virtual Images. The first of these, 'recollection memory, is the means 
by which memory is aocessed and the most appropriate virtual Image located. Memory cannot 
be located in the present, In consciousness, so we must try to locate a memory image properly 
In memoly (in the past), 'where it Is In itself , as Deleuze remarks, 'and not in ourselves! 
(9 56). 
Since psychological effects cannot rely upon other psychological effects for their power, they 
must rest Instead upon stored memory at the level of pure ontology. 
Consequently, for Deleuze's Bergson, the appeal to recollection is'a genuine leap' 
into the past (B, 56). In other words, it is a psychological movement into ontology in an effort to 
actualize the appropriate memory (B, 66; CLI 80). One cannot make conscious the Past as 
pure virtuality, but must place oneself Into the past and consider It as if It were present. But 
this does not mean that the process of remembering is subject to wifful manipulation, a kind of 
voluntarism. The 'leap' signals instead an Involuntary memory of the kind explored by Delauze 
In Proust and Slj7ns: to remember Is to make the leap, and we remember 'automatically, In 
response to contingent conditions. 
But the process Is more subtle than this. If with Deleuze we chameterize pure memory 
as a virtual whole of numerous 'planes!, then one might either leap to the appropriate plane and 
discover the requisite Image or else not find it 'because it is on a different sheet ... belonging to 
a different age' (C. V, 123). Deleuze and Bergson agree that although one sometimes strains to 
access the past, one more usually encounters the appropriate level spontaneously! 4 Neither 
specifies clearly what happens If one doesn't, although Deleuze hints that one must start over, 
seeking it on another level, whereas Bergson contends that one must continue the process by 
in on 'a certain region of the past--e work of adjustment, something like the focusing of 
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a camera! (B, 62; MM, 134). The leap into ontology is not always a single movement, then, but 
sometimes a process of working towards the plane and image of maximal utility. 
As a leap from a particular present into the past in general, recollection memory is the 
means of linking psychology with ontology, or the present state of consciousness with the order 
of Being of what already has been experienced. It is troubling that Deleuze provides so little 
detail on this enigmatic proposal. On a charitable reading, one might argue that Deleuzes 
position is simply beyond the expressive capacity of language. Less charitably, however, one 
might wonder whether the attempt to tie ontology and psychology in this way is a 'step too far' 
for Deleuze. Perhaps it is for this reason that commentators by-and-large have neglected this 
aspect of Delauze's Bergsonism. I shall adopt the more charitable approach, recognizing 
nonetheless that this Is an under-developed aspect of Deleuze's account. 
For Deleuze, the leap is omnidirectional--frorn the particular to the univers6--so that 
recollection memory is'odented and dilated toward the past' (B, 52). Contraction memory, 
however, begins In the past (on the plane located by recollection memory) and contracts 
towards its future, the experienced present., It Is the means for adapting the past precisely to 
the present so as to maximize its utility (A 70). Since it is not possible to make actual or 'CaJI to 
consciousness! a single memory from out of Its plane (that Is, apart from its place In one's 
whole past or history), this kind of memory must 'contract' the plane around the privileged 
Image. Thus contraction provides a context for the recalled image and brings to consciousness 
a plane of memory in maximally contracted form (8,74; M 82). 
There Is no future 'awaiting' this movement, nor a previously constituted present that 
becomes past by some other mechanism, but only the constitution of the present immanent 
within the conditioning of a response. It Is as though pure memory 'presses itself forward', 
towards a future that is experienced as the present. Thus recollection introduces difference Into 
the present by constituting the moment as a newly actualized image. " 
Deleuze contends therefore that 'the sign of the present is a paswgo to the limit, a 
maximal contraction which comes to sanction the choice of a particular level as such, which Is 
In itself contracted or relaxed among an Infinity of other possible levels! (Dlt 83). The Passage 
of the appropriate plane through the various degrees of contraction cannot surpass the moment 
at which a bodily response Is required; actuajizaton must always be completed in the present 
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Earlier, I quoted Boundas's ready dismissal of Sartre's critique of Bergson, which is 
directed explicitly at the latter's account of the relationship between past and present. For 
Sartre, Bergson conceives the 'profound self as 'constantly contemporary with the conscious- 
ness which I have of it', but in such a way that Bergson cannot explain how the past can be 
'rebom' so as to 'become active' and 'exist fhr us'. In other words, Sartre does not think that 
Bergson explains adequately how inactive, non-conscious memories might be made conscious 
again, without their having either a 'force of their own' or a subject of which they are part. 
There are, Sartre claims, no 'bridges' between past and conscious present, and he Insists that 
Bergson ought to have started instead from one's existence In the present and then explained 
how the past might be made present to one's self, rather than trying to bring the past Into the 
present. " 
It seems to me too easy to dismiss this charge--as Boundas does- as being too 
heavily tarred with the phenomenologists brush (although he Is fight to claim this of such 
Sartrean statements as '"my" past Is first of all mind), and more Instructive to turn Instead to 
Deleuze's account of Bergson. 77 For Deleuze, recall is a matter neither of voluntarism nor the 
self-realization of virtual images, but of the activity of non-conscious mechanisms under the 
force of a practical Imperative to bodily action. Past and present are indeed distinguished, as 
Sartre would have it, but not separated absolutely: they are each aspects of intuited dirde. By 
forming the 'bridge' between past and present, Deleuze's notions of the 'leap' Into the past qua 
virtuality and of the mechanisms of subsequent actualization, deflect Sartre's critique without 
presupposing a pre-existent concrete self or principle of unity. 
Deleuze's Bergsonian theory of recall seems rather vague In parts. His account of 
actualization is short, and full of under-developed concepts like 'contraction', 'relaxation' 
and-most noticeably-the 'leap' Into the past. Perhaps this Is due to BergsofWsm 's being a 
report of Bergson's own intuitive studies, communicated using imagery and metaphor which do 
not lend themselves to argument In the traditional sense (even if Deleuze was inclined towards 
such an approach). 78 More positively, Deleuze's account of pure memory and recall specifies a 
psychological mechanism which provides: a (complex yet rather mysterious) connection 
between the virtual and the actual; a means for productive alliance between the mutually 
Implicated ontology of images and the line of pure subjectivity; a further Instance of the 
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Importance of dynamism to 'inner life', and, as the last Sections will show, a basis for constitut. 
Ing the temporaRyof durde. 
16. TEMPORALITY OF THE PRESENT 
As Deleuze writes, 'it is recollections of memory that link the instants to each other and 
interpolate the past in the presenf (, R 25). In the actualization of a particular virtual image, the 
past 'connects with' and Influences the present of which one Is conscious. , Memory-and not 
perception, the cogftq or awareness of one's embodiment-defines consciousness. Thus, as 
Goodchild points out, our habits, beliefs, values, conventions, codes and expectations cannot 
be objective and impersonal, but must always relate entrely to memory. 79 
Deleuze studies In some detail the constitution of the flow of mental states and Its 
reliance upon memory, locating connections which lay concealed within Bergson's texts. His 
principal line of arguments begins with this observaton: 
We have seen that pure recollection was contemporaneous with the present that It W 
beaa Recollection, in the course of actualizing itself, thus tends to be actualized in an 
Image that is itself contemporaneous to this present. Now it Is obvious that such a 
recollection image ... would be completely useless since it would simply result 
in 
doubling the perception-image. Recollection must be embodied, not In terms of ft own 
Present (with which it is contemporaneous), but in terms of a now present, in relation to 
which it is now past. This condition is normally reafted by the very nature Of the 
present, which constantly passes by, moving forward and hollowing out an interval. 
71) 
Being Virtual, every memory relates to the present it was when actual. But if the virtual image 
was actualized In terms of this previous relationship (as with realization), It would be Inapplicable 
to the selection of a response to a present perception. With the recollection and contraction 
functions, however, a relationship Is established between the virtual Image and the present In 
terms of which it Is recalled. Thus the recollection Image Is determined by the relationship 
between its virtual form and the actuality of the present stimulation. 
Consequently, as Boundas puts it, 'memory, through an active synthesis of time which 
belongs to It, represents the old present, qua old, In the actual present, In which case the past 
cowdsts with every now present In relation to which it is past'80 Memory re-presents a previous 
present as the present memory or recollection Image, thereby bringing to consciousness what Is 
already past. But the recollection Image Is precisely what constitutes the new present, and it 
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Invokes the past as the present from which it is ontologically distinguishable. A particular past 
is placed in contact with the present and becomes the actual, present (recollection) Image. 
Deleuze's account of the line of materiality revealed that the brain forms the Interval 
between stimulus and response. But now we find that because the recollection Image is 
actualized so as to enable the selection of an appropriate response to a stimulus, it, too, must 
be recalled to the brain. Deleuze refers to this when he writes that the recollection image 
'makes full use of the gap, it assumes it because it lodges itself there, but it Is of a different 
nature' (C2,47). As the precondition for the temporality of consciousness and the determina- 
tion of responses, pure memory actualizes the recollection Image In the present, in the brain. (it 
is not the activityof pure memory that occurs in the brain, however, since only the actualized 
recollection image really fills the interval [C2,47]. ) Pure memory bridges the Interval by 
'blending the past with the present' and 'fulfils' it by relating stimulus to response. 01 Therefore, 
Deleuze writes, 'with recollection Images, a whole new sense of subjectivity appears': the 
temporal character of the subject (M 47). 
Bergsonlan intuition revealed that It Is always a mistake to try to account for actualiza- 
ton in terms of a series of points in time, When Deleuze says that the present Is the most 
contracted form of the past, he cannot mean that it really is a point in time, a point at which 
contraction-thus actualizabon-4s complete, over and above previous instants where it was not. 
Bergson's focus upon the immediate awareness of inner time and our relations with the world of 
material stimuli allows a better reading. 
Bergson claims that the present accords precisely with the span of our 'attention! (CM, 
112). So long as consciousness attends to the formulation of a response on the line of pure 
subjectivity, the present persists, even though, on Deleuze's amount, it can persist only as a 
theoretical and Interval moment. There Is no particular, measurable period of time ('duration' In 
the traditional sense) corresponding to the activities of consciousness: the actualization of pure 
memory Is timeless, properly understood, and produces both the most contracted form of the 
past and the forward-most point of the past's pressing towards the Immediate future (that Is, 
towards a response, an action). " Thus Bergson gives a sense to Deleuze's assertion that 'the 
present is not, rather it Is pure becoming' (fit 55). 
Introducing the dynamism of the present, Bergson contends that: 
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inner duration is the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the past into the 
present, whether the present distinctly contains the ever-growing image of the past, or 
whether, by its continual changing of quality, it attests rather the ever increasingly heavy 
burden dragged along behind one the older one grows. Without that survival of the 
past in the present there would be no duration but only instantaneity. (CM, 179) 
Deleuze's accounts of inner time and the two aspects of memory enable him to flesh out the 
nature of the prolonging of the past and the contribution of the past to the present. Specifically: 
the past Is Implicated in the present that is the future of what is past, a relationship actualized by 
contraction memory; the present demands the past In the determination of an appropriate 
response, where recollection memory seeks out the appropriate level, and; the future-signified 
by bodily responses, actions-mis only possible because of the ongoing constitution of presents 
consequent to the other processes. The two functions of pure memory produce what Deleuze 
calls an 'active synthesis': recollection memory Implicates the general past In the constitution of 
the particular present, and contraction memory actualizes some particular level of the past In the 
present (DR, 82). 63 
As both Boundas and Goodchild point out, Deleuze's success In specifying precisely 
the nature of the conjunction of moments rests upon his moving freely between a psychological 
theory of 'temporal awareness' and an ontological theory of time. " But, Deleuze reminds us, 
any claim that the constitution of dur6e necesaftates a theoretical movement between the two Is 
contrary to Bergson's later focus upon ontology (9 34). (That Delauze finds a link at all 
between Bergson's ontology and the immediacy of the intuited self helps to rebut Paul 
Douglass' claim that his Bergsonlan ontology 'subtracted the humanity' from Bergsorýs work. )"" 
It seems that with the clarification of the effects of the two aspects of memory, Deleuze 
has attained the point at which the line of pure subjectivity Intersects the line of materiality, the 
point of convergence that he indicated as his theoretical goal. Evidence for the claim Is 
manifold. First, the actualization of virtual Images has to do, in contraction memory, with 
possible bodily actions and, in recollection memory, with activation of pure memory by 
perception. Second, both perception and consciousness Involve a contraction (of sensation 
and memory respectively) and the preservation of movement, motion, change, or becoming 
74). 'What Is the framework common to recollection In the process of actualization (recollection- 
becoming4mage) and the perception-image? ' asks Deleuze. 'This common framework Is 
movement' (A 67). Bodily and conscious activity share dynamism as a precondition, so that 
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movement can serve as a 'medium' between them. Third, the theory of memory Is unthinkable 
without the theory of pure perception. This Is clear from Deleuze's unpacking of the differences 
between habit memory and true memory, and of the role of perception In activating memory In 
the determination of a response. 
But, Deleuze argues, Bergson's dualisms are not the last word In his philosophy (A 22). 
Deleuze must seek out the effects of the similarities and confluences between the two lines of 
development at the poh-7t oftheir recolWlietihn so as to explain the monism apparent to Intuited 
awareness. He must make explicit the implications and effects of the Intersection In terms of the 
whole cafled T, rather than merely identifying Interactions between the two lines. How he does 
so Is the focus of the final Section. 
17. THE SUBJECT AS VIRTUAL WHOLE 
Having followed the lines of materiality and pure subjectivity through a full cycle of 
development, Delauze examines the nature of their coincidence and Intersection. He holds that: 
'the question is not whether the two lines meet and mix together. This mixture [MdAWgel Is our 
experience [exp&bnco itself (B, 26). This point is'a new monism', a product of the inde-pen- 
dent development of each line (8,74). 1 will argue that it is also the moment of the constitution 
of Deleuze's Bergsonlansubject 
Deleuze's study of the dualism of Bergson's theory enables him to grasp the dynamics 
of the coincidence of the lines. On the one hand, memory provides perception with Its 
subjective character. perception would have purely material consequences (reflex responses) 
were it not for pure memory. Deleuze has discovered three ways In which recollection Is a 
precondition for perception: first, it is requisite for constitution of the present In which perception, 
proceeds; second, we perceive precisely what is useful according to recollection Images, and; 
third, as Bergson points out memory 'prolongs a plurality of moments Into each other, 
contracting them into a single intuition' (MM, 218). Perception only has an effect In conscious- 
ness because, by contracting moments together, memory allows the multiplic4 of stimulatory 
vibrations to be given as a unity in the present. 
But on the other hand, perception provides memory a stimulus and content For this 
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reason, Deleuze holds that 'the corporeal attitude really is a condition of the mental attitude' (B, 
69). If the Virtual memory image were to remain virtual, it would be non-conscious and 
powerless. Pure memory must be 'called upon' by present circumstances conveyed by 
perception, according to the mechanisms of body and the line of materiality. Furthermore, 
memory has a content (virtual images) only because of the perception and transference of 
Images by micro-movements. 
The relationship between the two lines is, then, mutually implicative; they form two 
mutually Insufficient theoretical preconditions for actual consciousness. As Delauze presents it, 
quoting Bergson, 'these two acts, perception and recollection, "always interpenetrate each other, 
are always exchanging something of their substance as by a process of endosmosle' so that 
"the two terms which had been separated to begin with cohere closely together"' (Et 26,74 
quoting MM, 67). Although each line is theoretically 'pure', they'mix together' as conscious- 
new, entering Into 'a kind of circud whereby the past, as recollection image, refers to present 
perception, and perception invokes memory (C2,45-6; B. 66). 80 
The effect of the relationship between the lines of materiality and pure subjectivity is the 
constitution of the flow of time intuited as dur6o. Only through their 'circuit' can the interpen- 
strative flow of mental states and inner time be related to both an objective world (via percep- 
tion) and consciousness (via memory). The challenge in developing Deleuze's theory of the 
subject Is to relate the whole called T to this flow, and, according to Delouze, we are already on 
this path when considering interactions between perception and pure memory (, Q 25-6). 
Unfortunately, Deleuze does not follow the path's full length In Bergsonism, although he gives 
many clues as to its direction. 
Deleuze emphasizes that the two lines co-exist in the Interval of the brain, that is, - in the 
I gap' between stimulation and response. This is the point at which they Intersect practically or 
Actually rather than merely theoretically, and where each now present Is constituted either by 
conscious recognition or non-conscious reflex (, Q 52-4). Here, virtual memory images are ý, 
Actualized or reflexes activated in response to perceived stimuli, with the goal of producing an 
appropriate bodily response in the future, the new present constituted by the activity itself. In 
Bergson's words, this interaction involves 'conserving the past and anticipating the future In a 
duration In which past present and future tread one on another, forming an Indivisible continu- 
100 
ity. Such memory, such anticipation are consciousness itself. "' The point of interaction 
between the lines Is precisely the point of interpenetration of images or mental states, and thus 
of the Interpenetration of (purely theoretical) moments of duration. Consequently, for Bergson, 
consciousness characterizes the present, the moment which is always actually liveaý as Intuition 
has revealed. Consciousness, activity and actuality cannot be dkqconnected, yet they are only 
ever connected at the point of Intersection between materiality (perception) and pure subjectivity 
(memory), In actualizing responses. 
For Deleuze's Bergson, the flow of mental states must be understood as a virtual totality 
or virtual whole. Dvrdie constitutes the kind of whole characterized by the flow of memory (itself 
a virtual whole) Into the actualized activity of the present moment, towards a bodily reaction. 
But for Deleuze, the word 'whole' has a particular meaning, referring not to anything actual, but 
to a virtuality comprising real parts that are never totalized (B, 131-2). The virtual whole of 
duration is a whole by virtue of the interconnectedness of its elements, both constitutive 
(memory, perception, brain, body, virtual and actual images, mental states, reflexes) and 
constituted (inner time, flow, experience, consciousness). 
This whole emnot be actual but only ever virtual, since coming in to existence Is not a 
transition from the possibility to the reality of a whole, but the production of something new on 
the basis of relations between existing forces and new circumstances. On this model, there is 
'no longer any coexisting whole; there are merely lines of actualization', each of which repro. 
sents 'an actualization of the whole in one direction' (8,100). The separation is theoretical, but 
actualization Is experienced reality. The functions of each line are only Independent until they 
meet (in the 'space' between a perception indicating a need for action and a 'hesitant action' 
[C1,65]), where their product Is the actualization of a virtual whole in the present. Delsuze 
contends, therefore, that 'subjectivity ... appears as soon as there 
is a gap between a received 
and an executed movement, an action and a reaction, a stimulus and a response, a perception- 
Image and an action-image' (C2,47). As such, the subject cannot be given and then actualized 
retroactively, as it were, but must be actualized In the process of Its coming-to-be-present or, 
more precisely, its becoming-in-the-present; and since durde Is always becoming, subjectivity 
can never be completed. 
Deleuze introduces his point about the productive coexistence of the lines late In 
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Bergsonism, when discussing the notion of universal memory and the existence of multiple 
durations. Its full implications for a theory of the subject only become evident when read in 
conjunction with an earlier claim that: 'the subjective, or duration, is the vftual To be more 
precise, it Is the virtual in so far as it is actualized, in the course of being actualized' (8,42). To 
spell out these implications Is to summarize Deleuze's argument The virtual whole of dirge, a 
product of Interactions between the lines of materiality and pure subjectivity, actualized as the 
experienced present, constitutes the 'subjective' In Deleuze's sense of 'the subjecVs Immediately 
experienced reality'. So by bringing together his discussion of the constitution of dur6ewlth his 
claim that durde is the lived reality of the whole called 'I', the nature of this reality can be traced 
to conditions operative on each of the two lines and their effects at the point of their Intersec- 
tion. As Deleuze puts it, 'the only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped at Its 
foundation' (C2,82). Thus subjectivity necessarily is a flow, an ongoing process of actualiza- 
ton, and 'the subject' is the intuitable unity--the virtual whole-of this flow. Hence, according to 
Deleuze and Guattaril in the context of a later work, Kftt Is Philosophy, 'the actual Is not what 
we are but, rather, what we become, what we are In the process of becoming.... The present, 
on the contrary, is what we are and, thereby, what already we are ceasing to be. '" 
The virtual whole of duration can be called 'the subject' and Identified as 'I' without 
sacrificing philosophical precision, but only on condition that the two terms are understood to 
relate to dur6e and not a determinate and complete particular. It is better to refer to 'the 
subject' here to emphasize that this virtual whole Is a product of the lines of materiality and pure 
subjectMY. Whereas use of the term In respect of Deleuze's Hume was liable to mistake, 
detracting from the dynamism of activity that constituted the subject as an Indeterminate fiction, 
In Bergsonism this dynamism is always Implied by the lines and their characteristic movements. 
Deleuze has emphasized the movement and change on each of the lines, and its 
importance extends to the experienced effects of their intersecton. With respect to the 
Immediate awareness of movement, Bergson writes that 'I pass from state to state' and 'I say ... 
that I change, but the change seems to me to reside In the passage from one state to the next'; 
with respect to the kWNve location of movement, he contends that 'what characterises the 
person Is In our view the cont6nufly of movement of its inner life. '80 In so far as Inner life Is 
temporal, dartie is intuited as a continuity of movement. But for Deleuze it is not just that one Is 
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aware of changing 'sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas, as Bergson puts it, but that a whole 
complex of dynamic effects and interactions stands behind it. "O Specifically, movement, change 
or becoming is inherent within the generation and modification of stimuli, in the flow of mental 
states, responses, anticipations and expectations, in waiting and experience, in the constitution 
of the instant, in the actualization of the virtual past and the transition from stimulation to 
response. Durde Is but the psychological reality corresponding to a range of constitutive 
changes on multiple theoretical 'levels' identifiable by intuftion. 01 As Deleuze puts it in the work 
on Hume, 'subjectivity Is In fact a process, and ... an inventory must be made of the diverse 
moments of the process. To speak like Bergson, let us say that the subject Is an Imprint, or an 
impression, left by principles' (ES, 113). For the Deleuze of Bergsmlsm the principles of the 
subject are all the aspects of perception and recollection. 
The Implications of this dynamism for Deleuze's conception of the subject are profound. 
It means that 'it is we who are internal to time': as a virtuality in the process of becoming actual, 
the subject Is constituted In the unfolding of presents (M 82). It means, too, that there can be 
no static or stable subject to serve as a precondition for possible experience, since Inner time is 
the means by which a subject always differs 'now' from 'then' (8,31 ). 92 In other words, there is 
no medial, privileged, static and identifiable something, a closed whole or'thread' upon which 
mental states are 'strung, authorities granted, and determinations made. " Over lived time there 
Is a progressively greater depth of memory and breadth of experience, so that, although 
circumstances might remain ostensibly the same, they cannot act upon the same 1. As D. N. 
Rodowick puts It so well, 'time cannot be reconciled with Identity ... In the form of the selfsame. 
The formula of Ego=Ego has been replaced with I is an other. " 
Deleuze contends that, when thinVing about any whole, the Inclination is to asst me that 
it exists because change has ceased and a stable state been achieved, in which case move- 
ment can occur only when the whole is neither given nor giveable. But his Bergsonism reveals 
an alternative conception: If the whole is not giveable, this is because It preserves dynamism by 
being open, dynamic and productive (C1,10). In this case, the subject Is an open (virtual) 
whole defined by relations between objectivity and subjectivity, matter and memory, perception 
and recollection, action and response, influenced anew by each now stimulus. As such, 
Deleuze conceives of 'the finality of the living being' in terms of its being 'essentially open onto 
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a totality [the experienceable world] that is itself open': for Deleuze, change is both the universal 
aspect of relations between wholes and the defining aspect of particular wholes (A 105, C1, 
11). Thus, for Deleuze as for Bergson, 'for a conscious being, to exist is to change'. " 
Consequently, whenever one considers oneself In terms of duration ('from the Inside', 
as Deleuze puts it, as with intuition) one becomes aware of oneself as a whole that Is open and 
changing: mental states are unified but always becoming different, forming a 'multplicity' (Cl, 
65,7,9). " The subject is not a whole despite changing, and nor can a subject be 'added to' 
and thus changed. Instead, the subject Is a whole by vilftle of dýanging, where change Is 
understood in terms of 'its' specific actualization; that Is, temporally rather than spatially. To 
make claims about future (or possible) states of the whole called 'I' under such circumstances Is 
merely to speculate, and thus to introduce imprecision, and it is for this reason, I suggest, that 
Deleuze abandons his habit in Etnpiridsm and Subjec#Wyof writing about the 1, and focuses 
Instead upon durde as the awareness of selfhood. 
The reader of Bergsonism and Deleuze's texts on cinema ought to bear In mind that 
Bergson recast his position on the nature of the subject time and again over the course of his 
long career, and Deleuze rarely notes these vicissitudes. In several texts, Bergson Insinuates a 
belief in the existence of a stafic self: he sometimes uses 'I' to refer to a basis for common 
experiences, and regularly refers to 'the self, 'the soul' and even 'the fundamental self without 
attending to the implications of these terms. 97 Although Deleuze Wns his readers that there 
are points In Bergson's texts (especially r1me and Free W//) where he seems to assume the 
existence of 'a conscious and enduring subject confused with duration as psychological 
experience', he puts this down to careless expression (g 48). Deleuze prefers to focus on 
quotes that imply that Bergson's position is clear-cut and fully amenable to his own interpreta- 
ton. 
On my reading, Deleuze's Bergsonlan theory of the subject Is weakened by its failure to 
reckon with another characteristic revealed by intuition. Specifically, the subject Is IndAddilfited 
by its dynamism: T refers to a paakularwhole. This implies the need for a theory of Individuat- 
Ing difference, a theory lacking In Sergsonlkm and Deleuze's other essays on Bergson. In fact, 
Deleuze will not attend to this Issue in depth until he writes Difference and RepefiYon and 7he 
Loglo of Sense, at which times he reconfigures the formula 'I Is an other' by focusing on the 
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specificity and continual repetition of the processes of subject-formation. 
Nonetheless, Bergson enables Deleuze to surpass the theory of the subject advanced 
in ElnPiMcism and SubjecUpity. Whereas Hume's thought provided Deleuze with a model of the 
subject consequent to an underlying dynamism and contrary to visions of permanence and 
Identity, Bergson allowed him to detail this dynamism. By adopting Bergson's Intuition as his 
method, Deleuze Is able to pursue the conditions of actual experience according to the natural 
divisions of consciousness. 
Specifically, Intuition reveals the experienced reality of the subjective whole to be 
temporal, typified by the continual Interpenetration and 'natural indivisibility' of conscious 
states. 0 By stipulating the nature of the given, Deleuze's Bergson locates the origin of the 
subjects dynamism, reaching beyond subjective effects to the world of objects qua Images. 
Deleuze subsequently covers a great deal of theoretical ground: by theorizing the continuity of 
consciousness In terms of pure memory, he explains habit and the preserved Influence of the 
past; by focusing on the process of actualization in terms of different Winds of functions-the two 
lines of development-he overcomes difficulties implicit in discriminating kinds of ideas accord- 
ing to mere degree (vivacity); by studying the nature of 'internal' change, he is able to think 'I' In 
terms of becoming and open systems, whereas, for Hume, the '1' is preserved just because 
constitutive processes are repeated. 
The Deleuze of Bergsonhw7 and Cinenn would agree with the Deleuze of Empkicim 
and Subjectiv* that 'the subject Is defined by the movement through which It is developed [do 
Se d6velopper sokmdmef and 'is that which develops itself [ce que se d6veloppef (ES, 85). 
The diversity and change evident In the moments of the life of a subject must not be subjugated 
by theory to a unity external to ft. Instead, using transcendental empiricism, Deleuze Is able to 
theorize this movement with greater precision. Every Interaction and activity creates another 
difference, so that the subject &change. Chapter 3 will examine Deleuze's account of the 
manner In which this change becomes continual and Individual. 
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3 
Repefitfon, Difference, and the Becoming of the Subject 
ThO greatness of a philosophy is measured by the nature of the events to which its 
concepts summon us or that it enables as to release in concepts. 
-Deleuze and Guattaril 
1 S. FROM 13ERGSON To DELEUZE: CONTINUITY AND PARTICULARITY 
Deleuze's studies of Hume and Bergson adopt different philosophical 'methods' in pursuit of a 
precise theorization of the subject. Despite marked differences, these methods share a point of 
inauguration: claims to an immediate acquaintance with one's self as a particular individual 
nameable as T. Using Humean introspection, Deleuze accountssimultaneously for the 
appare nt particularity and continuity of this awareness, and for Its dynamism (or 'flow'). He 
argues that relations between atomistic ideas are dynamic but regular, stabilized by the 
pradcalities of social life and various regulative fictions. One of these is belief in a static self, 
where the similarity of experienced instances is mistaken for identity. 
Bergsonian intuition also deals with a psychologiceJ dynamism underlying awareness of 
self, but in a different way. It finds the origin of movement outside the psychological realm, in 
the world of matter. Each moment of human consciousness is constituted by Interactions 
between psychic mechanisms and material objects. The former are described in Deleuzes 
account of 'the line of pure subjectivity', whilst the letter invoke a 'line of materiality' incorporat- 
ing the world at large, the human body, and a pragmatic need for bodily responses to imposed 
circumstances. Subjectivity is a pure effect of interaction between these lines, and the dynamic 
subject is a virtual whole constituted continuously at the point of their intersection. 
But the concepts and voices of these two philosophers have contributed to' Deleuze's 
study not just In a positive sense. They have also limited it, despite Deleuze's Inventive 
readings and extensive modifications. Introspection and intuition condition the Wind of account 
found in Deleuze's historical works, and contribute their own 'blind spots' as part and parcel of 
the methodological pluralism inherent in his transcendental empiricism. 
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Both Einpiriclsm and Subjec&hy and awysonisIn lead Deleuze to theorize the subject 
In terms of change, difference, and becoming. In the former text, he finds that discrete ideas 
must be reconciled with the dynamism of Imaginative affects by means of passional 'movement, 
such that 'the subject Is defined by the movement through which it is developed' (ES, 85). In 
the latter, the particularity of instantaneous interactions between lines of subjectivity am 
materlaJity can be reconciled with the flow of dur6e only by deeming contlnuovs the consttution 
of successive presents. In each case, the nature of the dynamism Irrvoked Is particular to the 
method and system: changes within the Humean Imagination are specific to the conditions and 
presuppositions of the 'psychology of affects' whereas the dynamism of durde is distinctively the 
product of Bergsonian dualism. 
The 'blind spots' In these characterizations become evident in the light of Deleuze's 
later works, where it becomes clear that in two Important respects they prohibit his provision of 
a sufficient account of the subject's dynamism. First, neither of the earlier texts provides a 
sufficiently precise account of how this dynamism, having undercut traditional notions of 
personal Identity, can be reconciled with the fact of saying T and meaning distinctively one's 
self at any and every moment of one's life. What does it MOM for the singular T to refer 
meaningfully to a Humean fiction or a Bergsonlan becoming-other? EInphicARM and Subjea! WY 
showed each association of Ideas to be discrete, constituted by particular passions, Impres- 
sions, applications of general rules, and contingent eircumstan6es. Sergsonlsm demonstrated 
that the flow of Inner life rests ultimately upon a succession of constitutive events. Although 
Bergsonlan intuition provides assurance that moments merge such that their continuity Is not 
quantitative (a discrete multiplicity of points) but qualitative (an imbrication of moments), 
Delauze's Bergson provides an account just of the moments and riot of the merging. ' Conse- 
quently, Delauze and Guattarl write that 'when Bergson says that there Is always time between 
two Instants, however close to each other they may be, he has still not left the domain of 
furcUons and Introduces only a little of the lived'? For the constitutive function to live, the 
closeness would be a mergence or coalescence. 
Second, neither work explains In depth how the particularity of distinguishing circum- 
stances, functions, movements and so on relates to the particularity of the dynamic subject; to 
just oneself and not others. One is left to ponder, in other words, just how the various Mnds of 
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factors common to all human consciousnesses (and I shall often refer to this list in what 
follows)-thoughts, impressions, perceptions, stimuli, responses, moments, images, processes, 
events, memories, situations, llnes, regions, planes, spans of attention, chance circumstances, 
virtualities and affectivities-have a particularizing effect or range of effects in terms of just a 
single consciousness. Or again, how might Deleuze move from a theory about human 
Individuals to a theory of the individual human? 
One might reply, of course, that the mere presence of such factors delineates a specific 
conscious immediacy; that the set of individuating elements describes a differentiated con- 
sciousness necessarily. But there are a number of objections to this claim. Most significantly, 
as Roderick Chisholm famously contends, it does riot account for the fact that whenever one 
uses the term T the reference is a// of oneselland the intention Is one's own 'essencee. 4 In 
Deleuze's theory, dynamism of consciousness is essential to one's subjectivity (notvAthstanding 
disquiet about terms like 'essence'). A mere set of elements neither possesses the requisite 
dynamism nor accounts for dynamic effects consequent to their being 'situated' In conscious- 
ness: for Deleuze, their being in consciousness Is less Important than their effects as conscious 
activity. 
This Chapter deals with the challenges of these two questions, using Deleuzian 
resources to explain how the dynamism and individuating differences inherent in the Humean 
and Bergsonian models might be reconciled with the continuity and particularity of the subject 
nameable asT. Rather than reverting to a founding Idenbty in terms of which difference can be 
re-presented ( ýi suplvme seff or a supelior 1'[LS, 106]), it locates a dynamic means of relating 
inherently particular and momentary states of subjectivity to one another and to the dynamic 
self. 
In locating and deploying these resources, the Chapter will venture deeper Into 
Dolouze's metaphysics, having noted with him that 'individuals and persons (personnes] are, in 
themselves, ontological propositions' (LS, 118). Commentators have barely touched upon the 
correlation between Deleuze's metaphysics and deficiencies in his historical works, and have 
still less frequently deployed theories of difference and becoming to surmount such weak- 
nesses. 5 This is especially surprising given the opportunities provided by Deleuze's styles and 
creative exegeses. His adoption of multiple methods constitutes an experimental pluralism 
108 
leading inevitably to radically varied visions of the subject, each of which turns nonetheless 
upon such crucial concepts as difference and becoming. Conversely, accounts of the subject In 
afference and Repetition and The Logk of Sense are sketchy, but assume deeper and concrete 
meanings in the light of some of Deleuze's historical essays. 
Answers to the questions of unity and continuity are found in a range of Deleuze's 
works (including those written with Guattari). The most explicit come In his metaphysical 
treatises, the first major works wrritten In Deleuze's own voice: D06rence at r6p&Non (published 
In France in 1968) and Loglque du sens (1969). These texts collect and pursue various of the 
themes introduced in Deleuze's studies of other philosophers, but are chiefly Innovative rather 
than exegetical. The former provides a metaphysics of difference-In-itself and repetition-for-Itself, 
written using constantly changing concepts and Images of thought. Deleuze calls the latter, an 
interpretation of Stoic lehe and the works of Lewis Carroll, a 'logical and psychoanalytic novel'. 
Neither represents itself as a contribution to the evolving theory of the subject developed here 
on Deleuze's behalf. But by using theories of the event, Internal difference, and repetition, In 
conjunction with Deleuze's highly creative interpretation of Nietzsche's etemal return (originally 
delineated in the epochal ffie&sche et la philbsophle [1962]), one is able to complete a precise 
theory of the dynamic subject. 
-I will argue that the two problems are solvable using a single line of argument, hinted at 
in Difference and RepeAtIon., 
That identity not be first that it exist as a principle but as a second principle, as a 
principle become, * that it revolve around the Different such would be the nature of a 
Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having Its own 
concepts, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general 
already understood as Identical. Nietzsche meant nothing more than this by eternal 
return. (DR, 40-1) 
Identity must be always referred to an underlying difference and becoming, rather than vice 
versa. But difference In this sense must have (or be) its own concept, rather than being merely 
what distinguishes Instances. I will argue that by locating and exploiting this concept In terms of 
the processes Involved In subjectivity, It becomes possible to unearth a now and dynamic vision 
of the Individual, 'Contained' within eternal return. It becomes possible to theorize both the 
particularity and continuity of the becoming-subject in the productive time of eternal return; that 
Is, in the repetition of distinguishing differences and distinguishable moments. 
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To this end, first, Sections 19 and 20 introduce Deleuze's concepts of 'internal 
difference' and 'event' as tools for engaging with differences between Individuals of the same 
genre. The former accounts for the particular and contingent circumstances of Bergson's lines 
and Hume's principles, and ensures their productive interaction. The latter establishes every 
moment of subjectivity as unique or'haecceitic, an Individuating moment in a particular life. 
Second, the question of Deleuze's theorization of the continuity and unity of the 
dynamic subject will be broached using his unique Interpretation of Nietzsche's sternal return, 
On this reading, Introduced In Section 21, eternal return Is an ontological device entailing the 
productive recurrence of difference manifested in the lived time of the dynamic subjects 
becoming. In Section 22, eternal return Is used to describe how events cohere over the course 
of a lifetime by means of a shared Internal dynamic. This account subverts the distinction 
between events that was evident In Emplliclsm and Subjectivity and Bergson&m. SectJon23 
discusses the temporality of the dynamic subject In terms of Kant's claim that there Is, In 
models of the subject such as Descartes! s, an unbridgeable 'gap' between I and Self. It argues 
that Deleuze's model of time as a synthesis of continuous becoming surmounts this problem 
without resorting to Kantian models of pure time. 
Third, Section 24 examines Deleuze's account of Individuation and Its correlation with 
the theories of human kind presented In Chapters I and 2. It argues that, in productive 
becoming, sternal return multiplies the differences defining each event. The life of an Individual 
is distinguished according to both the open set of internal and external differences and a 
productive becoming in which moments mutually implicate one another. 
Fourth, In Sections 25 and 26, Deleuze's ethics of the event will be studied In terms of 
his desire for a transmutation of human thinking away from a concentration on unity and Identity 
towards the creation of concepts and Images that recover something of the richness of 
existence. Section 25 will show that this desire Invokes the conundrum of how a passW 
subject might undertake an acfive resistance, and that the answer-founded in Deleuze's 
aesthetics--reveals much about the relationship between the contingency of internal difference 
and the regularity of external difference. As Section 26 explains, the consequent aesthete must 
pass the test of the thought of eterneJ return if It Is to be sufficiently affirmative as to signal a 
transformation from typically human thinking to a new Wind that characterizes the Overman. 
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Finally, in Section 27,1 vvill summarize the key arguments from this Chapter and recap their 
implications for conceptions of the subject. 
19. INTERNAL DIFFERENCE AND CONSTITUTIVE EVENTS 
In an early work on Bergson, Deleuze argues that for philosophy to have a positive and 
precise relationship with reality, it must engage with differences between 'individuals of the 
same genre'. Such differences must be conceived neither as 'simply spatio-temporal' nor as 
$genetic or specific', bLA rather as properly internal to 'the thing [chose ]' itself: 
Without prejudicing what the nature of difference as internal difference is, we already 
know that it exists, it we suppose that there are dhTerences of nature between things ot 
a same genre. Thus, either philosophy proposes this way ... for itself (differences of 
nature In order to arrive at internal difference), or else it will only have a negative and 
generic relation with things, it will end up in the element of [mere] criticism or general- 
ity. 6 
The supposition that there are differences between individuals of the genre 'human' is implicit in 
use of the term T to mean just one's self, and explicit In dir6ds 'internality'. Application of 
Deleuze's dictum to the study of the subject demands exploration of the nature of internal 
difference and how it distinguishes subjects. As such, one is led at once to the problem of 
particularity, outlined above. 
In the same article, Deleuze extends his Bergsonlan emphasis on relationships between 
difference and 'Wind' or 'nature', arguing that 'the articulations of the real give us the difference 
of nature between things! whilst 'the lines of fact show us the thing itself identical to its 
difference, the Internal difference identical to the thing'. 7 Chapters 1 and 2 have concerned the 
former. The principles of human nature and the twofold articulation of durde are distinguishing 
marks of human consciousness in terms of 'difference in general'. Human Individuals differed 
from all else 'not in themselves, but in something else': in the processes that constitute them, 
the principles and lines of development uncovered by Deleuze's Hume and Bergson (DR 30). 
To theorize differences between human individuals, attention must be turned from such 
general constitutive conditions to actual and specific ones implicated in the constitution of any 
consciousness and boooming-subject; that is, to the open set of particularizing elements listed 
in Section 18. In Deleuze's words, 'the individuating difference must not only be conceived 
ill 
within a field of Individuation in general, but must itself be conceived as an individual difference' 
(D14 252). Only when one envisages the Humean principles or Bergsonian lines In terms of the 
uniqueness of circumstances, passions, stimuli and so on has emphasis shifted from external 
difference, the distinctively human lines of development and the location of kinds (or 'genresý), 
to Internal difference, Individuation, and the Individual. In other words, only when 'difference ot 
nature has ftseff become a nature'Is it possible to deal with the particularization of the subject 
and hence with questions of why and how, necessarily, I am I whist always becoming-other. 
Furthermore, only then does it become evident that Internal difference always precedes 
differences of species, genre or part, as we shall see (DAR 38). 
As Frank points out, Deleuze's insistence that difference not only separates but 
establishes continuities Is central to his investigation of whether or riot, wItIrW recourse to a 
transcendental unity or law of subsumption, subjectivity can be explained on the basis of 
differentiation! Only if Deleuze reconciles his generalizable theories of consciousness with an 
account of the Individuation of the subject can he be faithful to transcendental empiricism's 
delineation of every self as both distinctively human and apparently 'unified' and continuous. 
This Section will show that such reconciliation is not merely possible, but implicit to Deleuze's 
account of subjectivity. Whereas Frank argues that Deleuze falls to show how familiarity of 
consciousness with itself can be generated beyond non-ldentity in repetition, I will argue that 
Deleuze shows that Internal difference, the principle of non-identity, is requisite to the repetition 
constitutive of the subject. 
Deleuze's multiplicitous approaches to the philosophy of difference provide numerous 
oways In' to the role of internal difference in constitution of the subject. One might approach It 
via the perspectivism of parts of Difference and Rapefflior; for instance, or from Deleuze's 
reading of the Nietzschean will to power. This Chapter will begin Instead where the previous 
one left off, with the temporal and psychological effects of the Intersection between Bergsonlan 
lines of development It will show that application of Deleuze's concept of the 'event' to the 
study of the moment of Intersection provides means for relating intemal to external difference In 
a manner crucial to understanding the dynamics of the subject. 
In 77ýe Logic of Sense, Deleuze introduces a new nomenclature to describe instanta- 
neous productions intrinsic to the convergence of various Idnds of forces. 'Events' are changes 
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Immanent to a confluence of parts or elements, subsisfing as pure virtualities and distinguishing 
themselves only in the course of their actualization In some body or state (although that from 
which an event distinguishes itself does not disfinguish ibelf). 9 Deleuze characterizes them In 
terms consonant with Stoic lekta: as incorporeal transformations subsisting over and above 
spatio-temporal disclosure, but expressible In language nonetheless. He contends that 'the 
event... expresses what Is happening, without destroying the nature of the thing [obosef (L$ 
277). Events signify the Internal dynamic of Interactions between parficular forces whilst always 
preceding them as virtualities. As such, they are the modes of Individuation of any multiplicity, 
contrastable with traditional conceptions of essence. 
The Incorporeality of the event Is essential to Deleuze's nobon of subject-formation. 
With Guattarl, he writes: 'the event is not the state of affairs. It is actualized In a state of affairs, 
In a body, In a lived, but.... it is the virtual that is distinct from the actual'. " As we saw in 
Chapter 2, the virtual is a real potential: an event is the potential immanent to a particular 
confluence of forces. Take as an example a tree's changing colour In the spring. The event is 
not what evidently occurs--the tree becomes greerv-because this is merely a paWng sufface 
effector 'expression' of an events actualization, and thus of a particular confluence of bodies 
and other events (weather patterns, soil conditions, pigmentation effects, planning permissions, 
... ) (LS, 92). Consequently, on Deleuze's account, we ought not to say 'the tree became green' 
or 'the tree Is now green' (both of which Imply a change in the tree's 'essence), but Instead 'the 
treed-re'ens' By using the inifin6-it-ýe formlo green', we make a dynamic attribution of the 
predicate, an Incorporeality distinct from both the tree and its green-ness which captures 
nonetheless the dynamism of actualization. 'In all cases', Deleuze Insists, 'the predicate Is only 
a relaticm or an event', where 'relations themselves are types of events! and events are 'types of 
relations [between forces]' (LS, 53). " It is not that the tree 'becomes what It Is', but that 'it Is 
what It becomes'. 
The dynamic character of this model has led to criticisms. Aaln Badiou, for example, 
asks how Deleuze can 'extract from the organicist scheme of the Multiple a theory of the 
singular-as-even4 when event means: everything that happens in as much as everything 
happens? ' Instead, Badiou continues, Deleuze ought to have asked, 'What are the conditions Of 
an event for almost nothing to be an event? 02 Badiou is concerned that Deleuze's model 
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deprives the event of a characteristic disruption or rupture, committing him to the view that 
everything Is an event just because everything Is dynamic. But Badiou's objection founders on 
two fronts. First, rather than expelling rupture, Deleuze's theory multiplies it. The event Is not a 
disruption of some continuous state, but rather the state Is constituted by events 'underlying' It, 
which, when actualized, mark every moment of the state as a transformation. As Massumi puts 
it, the event 'has only an abyssal present Infinitely fractured Into past and future': as potential, 
an event is future; as actualized reality, it Is past, and the difference between future and past 
marks a rupture. " 
Second, on Deleuze's model, it is valid to consider events in Badiou's terms--as 
relatively rare transformations-a=f ding to a pafticularplane of conslstenCy, the order In which 
the arrangement of events 'is no longer chaotic, [but] ... consistent or real'. 
"' As Deleuze wTites: 
Wth every-event, there Is indeed the present moment of its actualization ... In which the event Is 
embodied in a state of affairs, an individual, or a person.... But on the other hand, there Is the 
future and the past of the event considered In itself, ... Impersonal and pre-individual' 
(LS, 151). 
A plane defined by a particular concept might be characterized by 'empty periods In which 
nothing happens', punctuated by evident transformations. " Actualized events are changes of 
the kind referred to by Badiou, relative to the plans, but even moments of inactivity are, in terrns 
of a precise philosophy of the event-In-itself, moments of incorporeal potential where the 
confluence of forces dictates no evident transformation. Deleuze's notion of the Incorpmeal 
event captures perfectly the momentary uniqueness of the nexus of forces--whether or not to 
some evident effect--whilst preserving a place for discontinuity In terms of some particular 
concept or plane of consistency. 
In terms of the concepts deployed in Bergsonisln, the moment of Interaction between 
the two lines of development is the 'event' of subject-formation: the constitutive effect immanent 
to their confluence and manifested in every present. (The terms 'event of subjectivity' and 
'subjectivity event(s)' will be used to invoke this moment henceforth. ) Furthermore, this moment 
also Is one of further pmduction, generating yet other relations 'to existence and to timeý 
(specifically, the dynamic nature of the becoming-subject, the temporality of durk and the 
constitution of the present) In a manner typical of Deleuzian events. "' I will show that these 
relations, too, help tie internal to external difference in Deleuze's theory of the subject. 
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In his theory of events, Deleuze is not interested just in such machinations as those 
established in Bwysonlsm, but also in the productive potential dormant within events. 'To think 
is to create, ' writes Deleuze, and he means not merely that 'one thinks and thus creates' but 
that thinking and creating are constituted simultaneously as events of subjectivity (DR 147). " 
Thus the general theory of the event provides a means of access to the Immanent creativity of 
the constitutive thinking-event of subjectivity. 
More specifically, since subjectivity-events; are actualized by both the intersection of the 
lines and the particulars Invoked 'upon' them (situations, regions, planes, spans of attention 
and so on), as Chapter 2 illustrated, the theory of the event provides a means for reconciling 
Internal with external difference at the very instant of the subjects production. Consequently, a 
Deleuzian metaphysics of production makes it possible to decipher the Immanence of the 
subject In terms other than intersection and congruence. 
On the evidence of transcendental empiricism, any suggestion that the event of 
subjectivity serves as a focal point for teleologleal Interactions between the lines of develop- 
ment Is mistaken. As Braidotti points out, for Deleuze, a becoming can never be an unfolding 
of an essence in some teleologically-ordalned process: the event can never be a virtual end- 
point. " Furthermore, as explained in Chapter 2, Deleuze argued that it is impossible for one 
virtuality (the event of subjectivity) to direct or determine the outcome of others (the genealogy 
of each line of development). The event Is always Immanent to Its conditions, and thus free 
from predetermination and exact repetition. 
Neither should one Interpret the event of subjectivity as though it represents a means 
towards, or kind of, coincidence along the length (that Is, throughout the development) of the 
lines. In Differeme and RepeMon, Deleuze asks rhetorically, 'when we speak of communication 
between heterogeneous systems, of coupling and resonance, does this not Imply a minimum of - 
resemblance between the series, and an identity In the agent which brings about communica- 
tion? ' (D14 119) His categorical reply Is that It does not, much less that a theory of the event 
could explain such an affinity. The lines are distinguishable and 'contain' productive potential 
precisely because they are of different kinds, have distinct natural articulations, and are free 
from determinate structures. 
In that case, one might ponder how it is that the lines interact at all, and how they 
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intersect so as to produce the event of subjectivity, evident in dur6e. For the moment, it is 
possible just to sketch the beginning of Deleuze's answer, although a deeper account will come 
later, when further theoretical resources are traced upon the theory of the event. Delouze 
declares that any wholly original production (like the dynamic subject) is constituted by 
'difference in the sedes' and by 'differences of difference in the communication between series' 
(D, 3 299). The meaning of the former is clear from gergsonlsrn whilst the latter Invokes internal 
difference: events are actualized at the point of convergence of forces and, given the Impossibil- 
ity of their exact replication, such convergence demands a difference between forces (or lines). 
Furthermore, Deleuze argues, 'communication' between series is possible only under the 
influence of a shared unthought and non-conscious characteristic; a means of reconciliation 
which falls outside creative consciousness and which Deleuze calls a 'dark precursor'. Such a 
characteristic will always be 'the disparate, the difference In itself of the difference between 
series! (DR 120). But this is precisely internal difference: Deleuze is saying that Interaction 
between lines will rest finally upon the unthought which differentiates each line from others. 
Thus there are not three distinct aspects to production of the subject, as Deleuze's statement 
above would suggest (difference in series, difference between sedes, communication between 
sedes), but just two: external differences of the kind dealt with in previous chapters, and Internal 
differences which both distinguish events and act as catalysts for the productive intersection of 
Was or lines. 
This interpretation has significant implications in terms of those internal differences 
(listed in Section 18) that define Bergson's lines of development. Most Importantly. sublectivity 
Is wholly contingent and immanent in yet anothersense, hinted at In Chapters 1 and 2, but as 
yet merely implicit In such notions as 'circumstance' and 'stimulus': the particularity of the 
dynamic subject is contingent not just upon the intersection of lines of development defined by 
difference-in-general, but upon the even 'deepee contingency of the particulars defining each 
line. Specifically, these non-conscious facets of pure subjectivity and materiality serve both to 
differentiate the lines and bring them Into 'communication'. 19 For this reason, Deleuze holds that 
'thought thinks only on the basis of the unconscious' (DR, 199). To claim that subjectivity Is 
coincident to the more functioning of the lines would be to ignore the particularity of the 
moments of their development (internal difference) and the precondition for their Interaction 
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(internal difference again, but as dark precursor). 
Deleuze Is sure that once multiple series come into contact, the constitution of dynamic 
effects is assured: 
Once communication between heterogenous series is established, all sorts of conse- 
quences follow within the system. Something 'passes' between the borders, events 
explode, phenomena flash.... Spatio-temporal dynamisms fill the system, expressing 
simultaneously the resonance of the coupled series and the amplitude of the forced 
movement which exceeds them. The system is populated by subjects ... [which are] indistinguishable from the contemplation of couplings and resonances. (DR, 118) 
The dynamism of such Interactions is precisely what undercuts notions of a'well-constituted 
subject endowed with Independence and activit)( in favour of what Deleuze calls'the system of 
a dissolved self (DI? 118,78). Even more explicitly, Deleuze states that 'the subject's whats 
missing from events': events are not related to a subject, but rather the becomIng-subject is 
consbtuted by events as pure effect (N, 146). 
Consequently, even this preliminary study of the 'event' and its Implications reinforces 
Deleuze's claim that 'the self does not undergo modifications, It is Itself a modification' (DR, 79). 
By revealing the nature of the relationship between Internal and external difference, the theory of 
the event underscores the contingency and particularity of the constitutive moment of subjectiv- 
ity as a unique creatiolZ leaving us in a better position to relate subjectivity generally to 
individual consciousness. If the particularity of subjectivity is located In the event (in terms of 
Immanence and contingency) and the event Is determined by the particular unthought condi- 
tons of its emanation (circumstances of each line, the dark precursor), then resolution of the 
problems of individuality and continuity requires an account of the means by which Internal 
difference is preserved In the event-becoming-continuity. Moreover, In the light of Bergsonism 
any adequate account must deal with the difference of every event from every other and firoln 
ftseff, describing a continuity of difference as time rather than a continuity of the same 'within' 
time. 
20. INDIVIDUATION AND HAECCErry 
In a work that influenced Deleuze heavily, Gilbert Simondon contends: 'we cannot have 
either an immediate or a mediated knovAedge of indiViduation, but only one that is a process 
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parallel to the process with which we are already familiar. We cannot know individuadon in the 
common sense of the phrase; we can only individuate, individuate ourselves and in ourselVeS. 40 
It is not possible to intuit or introspect all the aspects of becoming-other (which would require 
accessing the unthought), but only to build an account of the process beginning from aware- 
ness of one's continuously changing existence; such is the lesson of Deleuze's transcendental 
empiricism. As shown in Chapters I and 2, neither is it possible to 'think away' the dynamism 
of the process of becoming-other (the human individual is no mere organization of parts [LAR 
247]) or to found the account upon a pre-existent individuality. Rather, one must think as 
becoming or creativity alongside the intuitively accessible Immediacy of becoming. Conse- 
quently, to use terms originating from transcendental empiricism's Bergsonian echo of 
Simondon, Deleuze must establish the individuating nature of the becoming entailed by 
subjectivity-events. 
To show how he does so is the aim of this Section, bearing in mind that although 
Deleuzian events are alvvaysindividuating'or'particularizing', they do not constitute the human 
individual in the circumstances of their production. For Deleuze, individuation 'properly 
precedes... every element of the constituted individual', and the becoming entailed by the 
constitutive event of subjectivity Is the means of becoming4ndividual of the dynamic subject 
(DR, 38,276). As such, the particularity of events alone does not answer the questions of 
continuity and Individuaility. As Deleuze and Guattarl point oA 'you are ... a set of 
nonsubjectified affects! having 'the individuality of a day, a season, a Iffe (regardless of its 
duration)'. " Every event is individuated in and as a moment, whereas the I is individuated over 
the course of a lifetime, over countess constitutive events and their moments. In other words, 
the individuation of a particular dynamic subject involves 'fluid fields! of events: today's 
experiences, memories of childhood play, anticipations of tomorrows glories or failures, and the - 
numerous conjunctions and Interrelations of such fields according to principles of external 
difference. ' To theorize the productivity of events in terms of subjectivity, one therefore must 
locate a means for reconciling Individuation at the level of the event and the moment with that at 
the level of continuous experience and what Todd May calls 'a unified duration encompassing 
everything that passes'. " 
Moreover, Deleuze insists that individuation precedes the determination and makes it 
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possible, so that the means of reconciliation also Is essential to understanding properly the 
mechanisms outlined In Chapters 1 and 2 as those of distinctively human consciousness (DR 
152). The terms T and 'self become relevant to human thought only when the dynamics to 
which they refer obtain their 'content' in the form of concrete Instances of Internal difference. In 
Deleuze's words, 'Individuality is not a characteristic of the Self but, on the contrary, forms and 
sustains the system of the dissolved Self (DR 254). As such, T and 'self' do not refer 
aboriginally to human individuals, but rather assume this referent In the course of the unfolding 
of circumstances and events; that is, in the Individuation of processes of external difference. 
Thus, in becoming-subject: 'what cannot be replaced Is individuation itself. Beyond the self 
[[moi] and the I [Je] we find not the impersonal [17mpersonne4 but the individual and its factors, 
Individuation and Its fields! (DI? 258). Only in the course of Individuation, In the distinctive 
InterwtIon of internal with external difference, does the becoming-subject become-human and, 
simultaneously, become-other such as to undo more traditional notions of I and Self (DR 277). 24 
In the previous Section and Chapters, I argued that, in three respects, every event of 
subjectivity Is a unique confluence of forces. First, no event is ever constituted by a preliminary 
or precedent unity between the lines of its production, being instead the primitive effect or 
change generated at the moment of their Intersection. Second, the event is produced neither In 
the image of some model nor as a representative copy or likeness of a more fundamental 
reality, being, rather, d wholly immanent original and creative production, Third, as pure effect, 
the event has no goal. In each of these respects, every event is distinct and unique, disparate 
by virtue of its internal difference. Each is, then, 'individual' In the usual sense. 
Consequently, it is pointless to study the subject's becoming In terms of such traditional 
philosophical notions as copy, resemblance, design, aim or unification. Another kind of concept 
Is necessary, one which supplants reports of hierarchy with, first, echoes of immanence and 
internal difference and, second, the necessity of the event of subjectivity for the becoming- 
subject uncovered by intuition. Deleuze uses the terms 'haecceity' and 'pre-Individual singular- 
Ity' in just such a sense, characterizing them as individuated, usually non-material entities on a 
virtual 'plane of consistency' defined by some particular concept; a product of the movement 
and rest of Intersecting lines or 'heterogeneous series'. (The relationship between plane and 
concept is neither omni-directional nor omd-temporal, however, but a field presupposed by the 
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concept so that the plane Is always already inaugurated within the concept, or immanent to It. ) 
Haecceities might be conceived, then, as unique points emanating from dynamic Interactions 
between forces upon such a theoretical 'plane', and differences between them can be drawn 
out of a minimal resemblance by means of comparison. ' 
Consider the plane of consistency defined by the concept 'becoming, so crucial to 
Deleuze's accounts of the subject, where points are situated according to temporal relationships 
between actualizations of various kinds of entities. On this plane, no haecceity is Immanent to 
something other than itself. Each is situated 'in its own place' according to the concept. In 
respect of the becoming of subjectivity, 
such a plane Is, perhaps, a radical empiricism: it does not present a flux of the lived 
that is immanent to a subject and individualized In that which belongs to a self.... The 
event does not relate the lived to a transcendent subject=Self, but, on the contrary, Is 
related to the immanent survey of a field without subject. " 
Subjectivity-events, considered as haecceities, occur upon the plane of becoming wherever 
Bergsonian lines of development intersect, without necessitating a pre-existent subject 'within 
which' they occur. Moreover, as set out in Chapter 2, no haecceity is ever a static universal 
(Iorm', 'substance', 'person' or 'subject'), but only ever a transitory 'happening'. -" As such, a 
haecceity has no beginning or end, but only a time of production, of effect, of individuation. 
Thus, consonant with Deleuze's account of durde, individuation over the course of a lifetime is 
not a process of 'stringing various finite moments together, but of relating multitudinous effects 
in the real time of their production. 
A life is individuated neither by some inner principle of unity nor by the presence of a 
self-same subject, but only by the differences inherent in the becoming of every subjectivity- 
event constituting it. (This point will be explored In greater depth In later sections. ) As a unique 
point, every event of a life is distinguished necessarily from events defining other lives and 
Inanimate forms of existence. That events cannot be aspects of more than one life is a point 
reflected in Deleuze's conception of events as haecceities, and explicable in terms of his 
Bergsonlan account of subjectivity-events as ever-new moments of production. But only with 
reference to the role of internal differences can the origin of this particularity be theorized and 
located in intoractions between the dynamic subject and the world of objects (D9 70-2). 
Deleuze explicitly uses his notion of haecceities when discussing subjectivity and its 
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relation to the dynamic subject, knowing subject, Self (Moi) and I (de). 26 In 7he Logic ot 
Sense, he spells out his conception of the relationship between constitutive events-qua, 
haecceities and the becoming-subject which, until this point in his corpus, had been merely 
inferrable from the apparent alliance between internal and external difference: 
Far from being Individual [individuelles] or personal [persofm&4, singuladties preside 
over the genesis of individuals [individusi and persons [personnes]; they are distributed 
in a 'potential' which admits neither Self nor 1, but which produces them by actualizing 
or realizing itself, although the figures of this actualization do not at all resembl 
,a 
the 
realized potential. Only a theory of singular points is capable of transcending the 
synthesis of the person and the analysis of the individual as these are (or are made) in 
consciousness [consciencel. (LS, 103) 
The dynamic-subject Is an effect of the actualization of constitutive events, as deduced in 
Section 19. It is pointless to seek a 'resemblance' between individual events and human 
individuals, but profitable to study the correlation between them In terms of difference and 
production. Only in these terms will it be possible to reconcile haecceftic moments with the 
time of subjectivity qua flux (as in Hume) or flow (Bergson). 
Furthermore, Deleuze argues that the field of pre-individual singularities 'cannot be 
determined as that of a consciousness' because 'a consciousness Is nothing without a synthesis 
of unification' (LS, 102). But there is no such synthesis pre-eAstent on the plane of becoming. 
This'field' Is, then, 'an unconscious surface' rather than a conscious one. Bearing In mind 
Deleuze's rejection of the possibility of a transcendental subject or pre-e)dstent self, it Is futile to 
pursue a conceptual consistency in terms other than becoming, the temporality of creation that 
defines the plane. 
This Section has located In Deleuze's theory of haecceitles the theoretical means for 
assimilating individuation of events (thus internal difference) with subjectivity-events In terms 
both of particularity and temporality (and thus In terms of the two problems framing this 
Chapter). The next challenge Is to deploy it in theorizing the derivation of Individuals from the 
field of pre-Individuall singuladties; that Is, to ascertain how'the Individual Is always an Individual 
In general, born... from a singularity which extends itself over a line of ordinary points' (LS, 
116). The question must be: how does every haecceity relate sufficiently 'close to, another that 
subjectivity Is intuited as ceaseless and continuous rather than staccato and discontinuous?; or 
again, how might the nature of the temporality of subjectivity be reconciled with the productive 
r- ---N difference which founds it? ( to this task, we must bear in mind that the becoming- 
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subject is but one Idnd of 'indiVidual-in-general'. Deleuze's metaphysics and ethics provide no 
justification for privileging the human individual and consciousness over non-conscious 
Individuals. On the contrary, the world 'already envelops an infinite system of singularities 
selected through convergence', and the finite Idnds of convergence uncovered in Deleuze's 
studies of Hume and Bergson are but particular instances [LS, 109]. )29 
21. DELEUZE's ETERNAL RETURN 
In 77)e Logic of Sense, Deleuze provides a clue as to his conception of the nature and 
means of unification. He writes enigmatically that pro-individual singularitles 'possess a mobile, 
immanent principle of auto-unification through a nomadic distliNgon radically distinct from 
fixed and sedentary distributions as conditions of the syntheses of consciousness' (LS, 102). 
This principle is 'always mobile and displaced to the extent that a paradoxical element traverses 
the series [from which they derive] and makes them resonate' (LS, 103). Although Deleuze 
does not name it, clearly he means the 'dark precursoe. or internal difference; the unthought 
characteristic that brings series' into relation. 
However, simply rearranging pre-individual singularities on another plane of consis- 
tency-this time denoted by the concept 'internal difference' rather than boooming-does not 
bring us closer the goal of relating them in the real time of production. The full implications of 
the concept of Internal difference become clear only in the light of Deleuze's subsequent claim 
that the subject can be conceived in relation to aI conNnuum or circle of corrvergences' (UR 
113). Bearing in mind that transcendental empiricism discounts the possibilities of convergence 
upon a point (be it a superior concept, principle or goal) or subsumption h7to a continuum 
(transcendental subject or SeIQ, one must interpret Deleuze's claim In a particular way; reading 
'continuum' as an allusion to temporal flow and 'circle of convergencee as referting to either the 
Intersection of the lines of development or the consequent event of subjeefivity (in either case, 
to the unification of haeoceities). In the light of this interpretation, Delouze's assertions In The 
Loglo of Sense take on great import for a theory of the subject: the unification of pro-Individual 
singularities must now be envisaged as immanent to their constitution and consequent to a 
I paradoAcal process, founded in internal difference, which at once derives from the production 
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of singularities and also envelops them. ý 
Deleuze provides precisely the device necessary to explain these Interactions In his 
Interpretation of Nietzsche's eternal return, which he deploys In both Nie&sche and Philosophy 
and Marence and Repefifion to theorize the relationship between multiple singularities in the 
constitution of bodies, be they material, psychic, biological or soclWO This Section, and those 
following, will show how it is relevant, too, to constitution of the becoming-subject, the psycho- 
logical 'body' exhibiting (but not possessing) the problematic attributes'continuity' and 
'individuality', enveloping and connecting singularities, without operating apart from, 'upon', or 
'above' them. 
Deleuze develops a unique reading of eternal recurrence, Ignoring the problematic 
character of Nietzsche's descriptions of it and quoting very selectively from Nietzsche's texts. 
This approach has led to criticisms. For example, Berrid Magnus complains that Deleuze fails 
to discriminate between Nietzsche's published works and the Nachla4 apparently regarding 
the use of unpublished notes as unproblematic. Henry Staten accuses Deleuze of being , 
Inattentive to the texture of Nietzsche's texts and reading Nietzsche 'simply In order to extract a 
philosophical doctrine'. James Winchester and Michael Roth both protest that Deleuze fells to - 
reconcile successfully a radically pluralist reading of Nietzsche on forces with what they contend 
31 Is a device ensuring the return of the same forces. 
These complaints would be more weighty were they not instances of 'reading past' 
Deleuze. Aýident In his renditions of Hume and Bergson, and as he declares In Nego&tlons, 
Deleuze Is a wilfully creative Interpreter (N, 6). - His readings are not meant to be systematic 
renderings of the original texts (a possibility precisely contrary to Deleuze's theory of the 
rhizomabc development of concepts), but creative and revolutionary outgrowths. Deleuze's 
rendition of eternal return reflects his own emphases and interests, turned In fresh contexts to 
his own ends, and moving beyond even Nietzsche's multitudinous versions. Moreover, Deleuze 
Is convinced that In order to properly understand eternal return, one must read Nietzsche's 
commentaries on the doctrine creatively, displacing the 'manifest content' In favour of 'the latent 
content situated a thousand feet beloW (DR, 264). For Deleuze, this 'manifest content' Is at 
once metaphysical, temporal, and ethical. 
Karl Jaspers noted that, - even though the eternal return is the 'decisive point In 
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32 Nietzsche's philosophy, it has been largely avoided by commentators. On the occasions that 
it has been tackled directly, eternal return is usually presented as a mechanistic eternal 
recurrence of the same, a view apparently derived from the cyclical hypothesis of time enter- 
tained by the Ancient Greeks and replaced by Newtonian notions of linear time. ' Given 
Nietzsche's conception of the state of humanity, this reading entails the depressing prospect of 
the return, over and over again, of the human spirit of ressentiment and the tendency to reactive 
formations of unity and Identity. 
Deleuze considers such interpretations to be completely wrong-headed, claiming that 
eternal return 
does not presuppose the One, the Same, the Equal or equilibrium. It is not a return of 
the All. It Is not a return of the Same, nor a return to the Same. It thus has nothing In 
common with so-called ancient thought, with the thought of a cycle which makes All 
come again, which passes through a state of equilibrium, which leads the AJI back to 
the One, and which comes back to the Sarno. (DR 283) 
According to Deleuze, Nietzsche in no way privileges sameness and unity, whether on his own 
terms or as an Inheritance from philosophical tradition. Rather, Nietzsche's eternal return has to 
do with a cycle of becoming anew, and not with becoming again As such, it seems congruous 
with such original productions as subjectivity-events: indeed Deleuze tells us that eternal return 
is 'the theory of pure events' (LS, 178). 
Deleuze seldom provides overt justifications of his readings of other thinkers. But In 
this case he is careful to ally his reading with Nietzsche's, even though it is distinctive. He - 
explains, first, that to ascribe to Nietzsche a mechanism for the return of the Same Is contrary to 
his fundamental ant-Platonism. Nietzsche was opposed to aJI notions of self-Identity and 
essence, of being-same and being-equal, and the idea of a cyclical return to and through the 
same states would be anathema to him. Whenever eternal recurrence is read as the return of 
some self-identical particular, this particular invokes what Deleuze terms'the identity of the One - 
as a pdnclple'. for Wthout this principle the function of 'retuming' has no subject (DR 125-6). 
Uke Deleuze, Nietzsche finds no place for such a principle In the metaphysics of change. For 
the One to truly be one, it could not have 'left Itself in order to retum, for the leaving precludes 
Its being a self-same Instance (DR 126). Consequently, eternal recurrence cannot be said ot 
'4 the same (DR 300). 3 
Second, at about the same time as Nietzsche developed the notion of sternal recur- 
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rence and Introduced it as an origineJ creation, he criticized explicitly the Greek hypothesis of 
cyclical temporality and returning, and opposed his invention to it (D, 3 6). Deleuze asks, 'how 
could such a connoisseur of the Greeks be justified in regarding his own thought as prodigious 
and new, If he were content to formulate that ancient platitude, that generality regarding nature 
well known to the Ancients? ' (DR 6)35 Third, Deleuze explains, the Ancients 'only approximately 
and half-believed' In their version, which 'was not so much an eternal return as a system of 
partial cycles' founded In empirical observations of earthly and celestial bodies (DR, 242). 
Nietzsche's version of eternal return, by contrast, is a system of complete and Interrelated 
cycles (though not perfectly'circular' ones), derived from profound metaphysical and ethical 
hypotheses and other promises. 
Fourth, Deleuze holds the traditional interpretation of eternal return to have Ignored 
crucial passages from Nietzsche's texts, especially Mus Spoke Zarathustra Referring to a 
decisive portion of this work, Deleuze asks: 
why ... does Zarathustra become angry and suffer such a terrible nightmare when the dwarf says: 'All truth is crooked, time itself is a circle'? As he explains later in interpret- 
Ing his nightmare: he fears that eternal return means the return of Everything, of the 
Same and the Similar.... That is why Zarathustra denies that time is a circle, and replies 
to the dwarf 'Spirit of Gravity, do not simplify matters too muchl' (DR 298) 
The dwarfs Interpretation Is 'too easy' precisely because it views the eternaJ return in the 
manner of a cyclical mechanism; as the return of the same realities over and over again. 
On Deleuze's behalf, we might add that there are resonances of his Interpretation In 
Nietzsche's terminology. Nietzsche uses interchangeably the expressions 'return' tWlederkunft) 
and 'recurrence' tMederkehr). But the two have quite different meanings. Whereas 'return' 
suggests a movement that 'goes back to the same, 'recurrence' Implies a new occurrence or 
beginning. Clearly Deleuze aligns himself with the latter. Furthermore, the component 
expression usually translated as 'the same' comes from the German das GMAýhe even though, 
as Joan Stambaugh points out, the meaning of the term lies somewhere between 'the same' 
and 'the simila00 
This protracted meditation on Deleuze's side of the dispute with the traditional reading 
of eternal return is not mere capriciousness. Each justification of Deleuze's rendition Is 
concurrently a partial explanation of it. Rather than presupposing a return of the same, Deleuze 
insists that eternal return can be said ordyof a production without identity, resemblance or 
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equality (DR, 241). It cannot involve the return of either a self-same agent or a necessary 
condition for recurrence, but Instead it 'repudiates these and expels them with all Its centrifugal 
force' (DR 90). The very action of recurring, of beginning again under new conditions, means 
that there can be no return of the same. Repetition can be merely representedas equivalence. 
In fact, each recurrence Is a recurrence of the new, so that eternal return expels even 'my own 
coherence, my own identity, the Identity of the self (DR 91). As with the haecceity Implicated 
in (or as) every event of subjectivity, any process that Invokes movement (becoming-different), 
secures necessarily the exclusion of self-identity. 
What 'returns' is Instead an original production according to the particularity of the 
conditions of creation. Applying this notion to subjectivity, every event or moment-the 'same' 
event In respect of external difference; that Is, with respect to the genre of human conscious- 
ness-As distinguishable according to its unique set of characteristics, forces, or Internal 
differences. We are reminded of Deleuze's assertion that 'the self does not undergo modifica- 
tions, it Is itself a modification-this term designating precisely the difference drawn' (DR, 79). 1 
Will contend that, by substituting the haeccelty of each productive moment of subjectivity 'into' 
the Nietzschean model of returning, it becomes possible to explain both the dynamic subject 
qua continuous becoming and the particularity and unification of this becoming. In other 
words, using eternal return as an ontological device, one can theorize the becoming-subject In 
terms of the difference and time of a life. 
22. UNITY, CONTINUITY, AND THE ETERNAL RETURN OF 13ECOMING 
On Deleuze's interpretation, eternal return does not apply Windividuals, persons, and 
worlds', but is the return 'of pure events which the Instant ... goes on dividing into already past 
and yet to come. Nothng other than the Event subsists! (IS. 176). Each moment of eternal 
recurrence, like each event of subjectivIty, Is a new production, so that previous moments and 
states are already past whilst the future is the promise of now events. What Is more, 'taken In 
Its strict sense, each thing exists orgy In returning' (DAR 67). Each movement through a 'cycle' 
of becoming Is creative and productive rather than repetitive. As such, in Deleuze's words, 
'repetition Is truly that which disguises Itself in constituting itself, that which constitutes itself only 
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by disguising itself' (D/Z 17). Repetition is always disguised in its uniqueness, in the haecceity 
of its moments, but unique and productive moments are the very 'essence' of repetition. 
The implications for Deleuze's theory of the subject become clear upon considering 
eternal return as the return of this distinguishing difference between moments. Eternal return 
never means continuation, perpetuation or prolongation, nor even the discontinuous 
return of something which would at least be able to be prolonged in a partial cycle (an 
identity, an 1, a Self) but, on the contrary, the reprise of pre-individual singularities 
which, in order that it can be grasped as repetition, presupposes the dissolution of all 
prior identities. (D/Z 201-2) 
Every repetition, every event of subjectivity, is a haecceity. As such, each repetition of the 
moment of subjectivity is a repetition of difference. In respect of distinguishing (internal) 
differences, it is not. the same subjectivity which returns (in contrast to repeated external 
differences, which define a genre), but a different one. Eternal return is the production of 
difference in repetition, and the recurrence of some particular kWof event infers the production 
of difference between instances (DR 41-2). Thus internal differences between specific events 
constitute what Deleuze calls the 'interior of repetition', the particularity of the inevitable 
becoming-different entailed by eternal return qua production. In Deleuze's words, 'if [internal] 
difference is the in-itself, then repetition in the eternal return is the for-itself of difference' (DR 
25,125). 
Now it is apparent that the language of external difference employed In Chapters 1 and 
2 Is insufficient for the study of indMiduality and continuity. To say, for example, that Ideas are 
'related continuously' or that lines of development 'continually intersect is to conceal the 
specificity of the relation or Intersection; In other words, to disguise the difference inherent In 
'continuously' or'continually' (or'agairY, or'once more'). Every moment of eternal return 
Invokes both the difference of the moment of becoming anddifferences, 'internal' to that 
moment; those forces or circumstances which define the moment as unique. The salm 
principle of human nature, the same line of development the same mechanism, the same 
effect-each of these terms conceals a 'returning of that which returns', a returning of difference. 
In fact, the resemblances allowing us to postulate 'lines, 'Idnds! and 'principles! at all are only 
ever what Deleuze calls 'functional effects of that difference which alone is originary within the 
system' (DR, 125). 
In so far as it Is accurate to attribute a 'subject' to eternal recurrence, it is the different 
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rather than the same; 'difference is the new: 'when the names of pause and rest are carried 
away by the verbs of pure becoming and slide into the language of events, all identity disap- 
pears from the self, the world, and God' (DR, 126,136; LS, 3). Or again, if we Insist on thinWing 
eternal return in terms of circular movement, Deleuze contends, then we must envision 
difference 'at the centre' and 'the eternal passage through ... divergent series! as the circumfer- 
ence (DR 125,300). The centre of the circle moves from one cycle to the next--so that the 
static subject is displaced from its privileged position--and the 'circumference' Is described by 
always-already individuated points of intersecfion. 
With eternal return, Deleuze's account of the subject moves from the general claim 
(exemplified by the readings of Hume and Bergson) that the subject Is a modification or 
dynamic effect to one in which difference 'founds' modification. It is not only external difference 
that undercuts the possibility of identity, however both external and Internal difference are 
Implicated. The next task is to isolate the means by which eternal return achieves the envelop- 
ment of haecceities such as to explain the continuity and Individuality of the dynamic subject. 
Another facet of Deleuze's rendition of eternal return-becoming, its nature and time-will be of 
assistance. 
TaWng his lead from early notes in Nietzsche's Mehl= and other texts, Deleuze uses 
the term 'becoming' (devenir) to describe the continual production of difference immanent within 
the constitution of events. 37 In the becoming of eternal return, difference 'unfolds as pure 
movement' (DR 24). Thus becoming is the 'pure movemenf evident in changes between 
particular events over the course of a productive 'cycle'. Inverting this characterization, Deleuze 
writes that 'return (revenir) Is the being of becoming itself, the being which Is affirmed In 
becoming' (NP, 24). That is, the returning of difference, the most 'stable' element of becoming, 
Is what remains In each'moment after becoming Is (theoretically) subtracted such that 'returning 
constitutes the only Same of that which becomes! (DR 41). (As Keith Ansell-Pearson expresses 
It, 'to use the form of paradox we could say that the eternal return le the same of the different, 
*is` the one of the multiple, "is* the resemblant of that which returns, etc. ')38 In short, eternal 
recurrence Is the constant in the multiplication of difference, even ftugh its constancy Is in 
every respect dynamic. (As for Nietzsche's own texts, one can talk of being, but only in respect 
of 'being created' and thus of 'becoming different. )39 
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Consistent with the continuity of eternal return and the nature of events, becoming is 
not the phase between beginning- and end-points of a cycle, nor a range of 'supposedly fixed 
terrns through which that which becomes passes' (DR, 261). Rather than a product final or 
interim, becoming is the very dynamism of eternal recurrence which, in Deleuze and Guattari's 
words, is 'not defined by points that it connects, or by points that compose it [events of 
subjectivity, for example]; on the contrary, it passes between points, having 'neither beginning 
nor end, departure nor arrival, origin nor destination.... A line of becoming has only a middle. '40 
Thus the theory of becoming represents a radicaftation of the lessons of Elnpiridsm and 
Sub); 9c#Wty. * becoming Is a line of 'and' situated between heterogeneous terms, invoking the 
terms 'themselves' in the course of connecting or unifying them. ' 
Given these characteristics, the usefulness of the becoming of etemeJ return as a tool 
for theorizing subjectivity becomes apparent. In Empkidsm aj7d Subjec#W. the in-between 
was too well defined, the end-points (ideas) acting as points of delineation. In Bwysonlsm, the 
in-between prevented moments from being sufficiently close to one another, creating a 
succession rather than a perfect flow. But the 'location' and dynamism of Deleuze's 
Nietzschean concept of becoming makes it ideal for theorizing the consolidation of events, 
being neither merely an attribute of, nor an intermediary between events, but rather a character- 
Istic of the very production of events. For Delauze and Guattari, it Is not the case that time 
exists between one event and another, but that every event Is 8 'meanwhile' which 'belongs to 
becoming. '42 In Its movement eternal return produces events qua haecceitles: each event is 
unique, but'shares! its having become-different in the course of its production. Thus eternal 
return simultaneously differentiates events (in terms of the relationships between internal and 
external difference) &7dunifies them (in terms of becoming, its Internal dynamic). The becom- 
ing entailed by the production of haecceities forms concurrently a continuity between events. In - 
other words, the means of relating moments Is Immanent to their production, so that haecceities 
are unified in the dynarnic of subjectivity'itself. 
In DIY&vnce and Repefition, Deleuze translates this conclusion Into the language of 
difference-in-itself 'the eternal return has no other sense but this: ... the assignation of difference 
as the origin, which then relates different to different in order to make It (or them) return as 
such! (D9 125). IntemaJ and external differences are at the 'origin' of the event of subjectivity, 
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and the becoming entailed by continual return of the event is the means of their union. But, 
because the affinity between becoming and any event is always determined by the speefflWyof 
internal and external differences, the nature of this relationship is as yet ambiguous. The 
remainder of this Section will set out the Implications of this indeterminacy for the dynamic- 
subject, and Section 23 will define it in terms of the temporality of becoming. 
Given that events have no beginning- or end-point, their relationship with becoming Is 
neither one of 'joining' nor one in which haecceity is the 'end' of one productive process, to be 
supplanted or supplemented by the next. Rather, as Deleuze puts it, events are 'superficially 
condensed' in the course of their production (LS, 178). That Is, they are unified in their very 
becoming. It Is not just that eternal return 'envelops' them within an order of becoming, but that 
becoming is the dynamism moving 'through' every event. Each haecceity is simultaneously 
start-point, end-point and mid-point of the ongoing cycle of production. Given the open set of 
contingent circumstances (internal differences), eternal return must pass through and generate 
one event before the next one(s) and after the previous one(s). Thus the nature of the 
becoming of eternal return is temporal, and every event of subjectivity is implicated In every 
other over the course of a lifetime, in terms of both difference anct becoming. (Of course, 
Delauze's Hume and Bergson have described the psychological dimensions of this metaphysic. ) 
This impacts significantly on Deleuze's conception of the dynamic subject. As Deleuze 
puts it, "one, repeats eternally, but "one" now refers to the world of Impersonal Individualities 
and pre-individual singularitlee (DR, 299). Or again, 'the true Subject of eternal return is the 
intensity and singularity' and 'as soon as the singularity is apprehended as pre-Individual, 
outside the identity of the self, ... it communicates with all the other singularities, without ceasing 
to form dislunctions, with them' (LS, 300). Here, communication takes the form of becoming, 
and disjunction the form of difference. Under these conditions, 
each dissolved self returns through itself only by passing Into the others.... Intensity, 
being already difference In itself, opens onto disjoint or divergent series. But since the 
series are not subject to the condition of the identity of a concept In general, no more 
than the entity Which traverses them is subject to the Identity of a self as Individual, the 
disjunctions stay disjunctions. Their synthesis, however, is no longer exclusive or 
negative, and they take on ... an affirmative sense by means of which the mobile entity 
passes through all the disjoint series. (LS, 299-300) 
This dense passage requires clarification. Deleuze means that ffie subject Is'one' only In the 
course of its becoming-other; In the continuous production and unification of new and disparate 
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moments. These moments are individuated as haecceities, but defined by the terms of the 
series from which they arise (lines of production, principles of human nature). As such, they are 
productsof the conUnual productiverim (eternal return) of external differences, particukv&ed 
by Internal difference upon these series, and unMed by becoming-different, the endogenously 
generated being of eternal return. The intensity defining the productive threshold of the event is 
thus the point at which, simultaneously, the dynamic subject is produced and becomes different 
from'itself. 43 
In this sense, the importance of difference to Delauzes notion of the subject is 
escalated, undermining absolutely a model founded upon identity. If 'identity' is still attributable 
to the dynamic subject it takes on a new meaning. As Deleuze writes in Merence and 
Repefflion. "returnIng Is ... the only identity, but identity as a secondary power, 
the identity of 
difference, the identical which belongs to the different, or turns around the different. Such an 
identity ... is determined as "repetition". Repetition in the eternW return, therefore, consists 
in 
conceiving the same on the basis of the different (DR 41). The 'identity' of the dynamic 
subject refers merely to the unity of its moments, and thus to difference and becoming. 
23. ETERNAL RETURN AND THE TEMPORALITY OF THE FRACTURED 
If the dynamic subject is unified in terms of difference and becoming, and if the 
relationship between difference and becoming is necessarily temporal (due to their parts in the 
eternal return of production), then an explanation of the temporality of the becoming- b- SU 
ject-the determination of the relationship between becoming and event In its own #Me-4s 
crucial. This Section argues that, in his studies of the temporality of the subject and the 
relationship of T to self, Deleuze augments his account of Bergsonlan dWe with a greater 
theoretical complexity and an interesting perspective on the history of the philosophy of the 
subject to which he is responding and contributing. It shows that Deleuze uses Rimbaud's 
phrase 'I is an othe? as a motif for two crucial and distinct aspects of the continual becoming- 
other of the subject. 
We have seen that that which returns in eternal return, becoming, as the means of 
unificabon of successive events of subjectivity, is necessarily temporal. As such, the dynamic 
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subject is a temporal unfolding of relations and differences. Moreover, as shown in Chapter 2, 
according to Deleuze's Bergson, the present constitutes temporality for consciousness as the 
moment of constitution of the becoming-subject. Just as eternal return serves as an integrative 
device for events, so too it integrates 'presents' in the flow of becoming of which one is 
Intuitively aware. The precise nature of Deleuze's conception of the relationship in the present 
between I and becoming-subject therefore has vast significance. 
In Kantý; C; r19ca1PhAbsqo17yand DhYarence and Repetition, Deleuze argues that when 
Kant discriminates in Oitique of Pure Reason between I and Subject, he makes an important 
point against Descartes! s Identity-based model of the self. With Descartes, the definitive subject 
Is Identified by the self-conscious I of the cogito eýgo sum and this I subsequently becomes the 
basis of all predication and the credibility of experience. Kant accepts that the subject as I Is 
the formal and logicafly necessary condition of experience, but, on the grounds that existence 
cannot be proved by means of consciousness alone, he does not consider this to have 
established the subject as an existent In other words, Kant accepts the cogito ('I th! nW) as the 
ultimate but unknowable condition belonging to and preceding every experience, but not the 
ergo sum Cl am') understood as a substantial and existing subject. 44 
Kant's position leads him to distinguish two senses of the 'I think' (although the terms of 
his distinction vary from text to text). He worites, 'that I am conscious of myself is a thought that 
already contains a two-fold L'45 On the one hand, the cogito as thinking-I Is always immediatety 
self-present as the thought of itself; this Is the 'I as subject. On the other hand, there Is a self 
that the thinking-I knows, the 'I as object'. Whilst the former Is determined in the very process 
of thinking, the status of the latter is not so clear. Deleuze contends: 
if it Is true that the / thit* is a determination, it implies in this respect an indeterminate 
existence flam). But nothing so far tells us under what form this existence is deter- 
mined by the / ffiink- it Is determinable only In time, under the form of time, thus as the 
existence of a phenomena], receptive and changing self. I cannot therefore constitute 
myself as a unique and active subject, but as a passive self which represents to Itself 
only the activity of its own thought; that Is to say, the /, as an Other which affects it. I 
am separated from myself by the form of time, and nevertheless I am one, because the 
/necessarily affects this form by caning out its synthesis and because the Self is 
necessarily affected as content in this form.... It Is like a double diversion of the I and 
the Self in the time which relates them to each other, stitches them together. " 
The I as object is not determined as existing purely by the self-presence of the 'I thinW. In fact, 
on Deleuze's reading, Kant complains that Descartes does not detail how the undetermined is 
132 
I 
determinable at all (DR, 85-6). For such determination, there must be a Separation between 1 
thinW and 'I am', such that the former posits the latter as an object (what Kant calls a'psycho- 
logical I' which underlies 'all perceptions and their connection, whose apprehension is the way 
the subject is affected'). 47 This determination is only possible in a temporal form where the two 
moments of the reflection of I upon self are distributed such that each subsists non-simulta- 
neously with the other (DR, 86). Thus time is the means of distinguishing the two aspects of the 
Interiority of the 6og1to, as the Internal difference of the subject as it were. Whereas 'Descartes 
could draw his conclusion only by expelling time, by reducing the Cogito [as a unity] to an 
Instant', Delauze argues, in reality, 'it is not the other which Is another 1, but the I which is an 
other, fractured I' (DR, 86,26 1). 48 
With the I 'fractured' by time, Kant's argument subverts the Cartesian case where I 
equals existent self. As Deleuze puts it, 'the I and the Self are ... separated by a line of time 
which relates them to each other, but under the condition of a fundamental difference. '49 He 
and Guattarl identify two implications. First, one's undetermined existence can be determined 
wMin Alne only as a passive, receptive and phenomenal subject, an 'affectable, modifiable, and 
variable self subject to determination by the 'I thinW. 50 The I takes the passive subject as the 
object of awareness, conceiving before and after'images! of itself becoming, the contrast 
between them re-presenting the becoming rather than presencing ft. Second, and conse- 
quently, the 'spontaneity' of which one is aware in the 'I think! cannot be an attribute of a 
'substantial and spontaneous being' but only 'the affection of a passive self which experiences 
its own thought ... being exercised in ft and upon It but not by W (DR, 86). '1 am therefore 
determined as a passive self that necessarily represents its own thinking activity to itself as an 
Other that affects it. This is not another subject but rather the subject who becomes an other. 's' 
Thus the becoming-subject Is always a temporal subject, irreducibly divided. 
Uke Kant's 'fractured' subject, Deleuze's dynamic subject subverts the notion of 
foundational Identity. But as we saw in Chapter 2, the historical works in which his model Is 
proposed and developed do not introduce a division between active I and passive self. Rather, 
I #e) Is employed as the direct and Immediate correlate of Self (mop and subject (subjeo as 
though there is no fracture but just such theoretical chaflenges-met admirably by Deleuze--as 
determining the means of 'direct access, to one's self and relating I to the multiple moments Of 
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becoming-subject. It Is not just that, for Deleuze, the 'I think' ('I Introspect, 'I intuit', 'I expect' 
and the like) cannot 'gaze upon' an identifiable subject, but that the time of production of 
becoming-subject and Its correlative T somehow subverts the notion of a fracture. But how 
might Deleuze justify this position against Kant? How might he Vindicate having not theorized 
subjectivity in terms of a fracture in the time of production? The balance of this Section will 
argue that I and dynamic subject are reconciled by the nature of the time of creation in the 
productive moment of eternal return. 
Deleuze follows Kant in seeking after the nature of the time distinguishing 'between the 
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act of the I and the ego to which this act is attributed'. Clearly it is not durde, the time of Inner 
life, for this is the time of just the active element, the 'I think'. Rather, it Is the pure and empty 
form of time corresponding to the becoming of subjectivity 'itself, the time of the unfolding of 
events of all kinds, whether these be intuitions, memories, bodily responses, constitutive events 
of subjectivity, or correlations of I with Subject (DR, 65). This Is the time of the unfolding or 
becoming of any-event-whatever; 'for Kant, it is a quesfion of the form of time In generaJ.... a 
line, a pure straight line', the undeviating and enduring form of all that moves and changes, 
such that all motion is in time but not of it. " Obversely, for Deleuze, time must be conceived in 
terms of movement and change. 
Uke other theorists with sophisticated models of time (Leibniz, Kant and Bergson, for 
example), Deleuze's conception varies dramatically across his corpus. In DWerence and 
Repefidol; time Is explicated in terms of various kinds of synthesis, forming a catalogue of 
revisions to his theories. (The Nietzschean model of time introduced In Merence and 
Repetifion Is not revised significantly in subsequent works. ) It corresponds with the various 
kinds of relations distinguished by Deleuze between past, present and future, syntheses which 
constitute the experienceable present In time, the moment of subjectivity which alone exists. 
(As he reminds us, 'synthesis constitutes time as a living present and the past and the future as 
dimensions of this present [DR 761. ) These models provide deeper Insights Into Deleuze! s 
conception of the temporality of I and Subject. 
The first synthesis Identified by Deleuze is the time of habit the passive founding 
(fondation) of time by the constitution of a passing present as a contraction of former presents 
(DR 79)'. It Is formulated In response to the problem of how moments succeed one another, 
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encapsulated in such questions as 'how will I relate this event to what has gone before? ' and 
'how might the present be understood as succeeding the past? '54 In this synthesis, Deleuze 
contends, instances of productive repetition are experienced as disparate but, In the transac- 
tions of imagination or in non-conscious ('autornatic') responses, they are drawn together into a 
single Instance In accordance with some 'resonance' (utility, for example). The new present is 
assumed to cause the present to pass. 
This synthesis aligns with Deleuze's Humean model of causation and expectation In 
imagination and with his Bergsonian account of body memory. It relates just to the non- 
conscious, to functions of the becoming-subject rather than 1, and leads to the paradox that 
time must be constituted in the process of contraction, even though this process must be 
conceived separately from time, somehow passing in the time constituted (DR 79). This 
incongruous implication indicates to Deleuze that the model is insufficiently precise and 
comprehensive. On Niet2whe and Philosophy, he outlines a relatively unsophisticated alterna- 
tive to this contractile model. There he claims that sternal return Is a simple synthesis of time; a 
coexistence of past, present and future in the single moment of returning that allows time to 
pass [NP, 48,55]. ) 
The second synthesis deals with the problem of 'how the present will pass into the 
past'. 55 Deleuzes response is set out in Bergsonism and Proist and SIýFns in the course of 
establishing what he calls later the foundation #Wetwnt) of time as virtuality. Chapter 2 
showed that Deleuze's Bergson believes that the present passes in the course of its constitution 
on some plans of memory, as a virtuality corresponding to the actual present that it was In the 
past. Memory enables the present to pass by providing it a new form. 
Under this model, there is an ontological and psychological breach between present 
and past. T pertains always to the present, the moment of thought and utterance that gives the - 
past its meaning In terms of recall to the present, whilst the becoming-subject Is related to both 
present and past by the mechanisms of external difference. Bergsonlan Intuition, which claims 
access to the Immediacy of both I andsubject, aligns the two, whereas a focus upon the 
ontological breach would otherwise discriminate between them. 
In Merence and Repetitiol; In a chapter entitled 'Repetition In Itself', Deleuze sketches 
a sophisticated model of time which moves his theory of the subject beyond the Kantian 
135 
'fracture'. Whereas the first two syntheses overlook or underplay the 'becoming-ness' of 
existence, the forward thrust of the constitution of the subject, this third model invokes a 
dynamic of the future In order to theorize planning, expectation, the pragmatic employment of 
consistencies, waiting, the desire for particular outcomes, and so on. For this later Deleuze, 
time must be conceived in terms of the affinity between events and the relationship of 
becoming-different behmen moments, rather than the passing and replacement of presents. 
This third synthesis dissociates Deleuze's theory from the Kantian fracture by introducing an 
immediate correlation between I and subject. 
In 777e Logic of Sense, Deleuze writes: 'insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does 
not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future. It pertains 
to the essence of becoming to move and to pull in both directions at once' (LS, 1). Again, in A 
7housandPlateauA Deleuze and Guattad assert: 'becoming cannot be conceptualized In terms 
of past and future.... Every becoming Is a block of coe)dstence. " For Deleuze, becoming must 
be conceived in terms neither of a 'deeper' or transcendental time nor a kind of 'temporal 
backdrop' against which change occurs. Becoming-different & its own time, the real time In 
which changes occur. This time which does not change but in which all changes unfold Is not 
a Kantian a pffoli form dependent upon attributes of a particular kind of consciousness. 
Rather, it is the time of production, founded In singularity, event, difference and becoming, and 
consequent to relations between Internal and external differences. Since, for Deleuze, both I 
and self are dynamic (as insisted upon In his works on Hume and Bergson), they must both be 
situated in the real time of their creation according to the mechanisms of external difference. 
The question yet to be answered Is whether the Kantian fracture persists In time conceived In 
this way. " 
Deleuze's third synthesis is effected by eternal return. Rather than presuming a present- 
and a past which somehow must be related, it tacIdes instead the question 'what Is the time In 
which becoming becomesr As we have seen, in eternal return, the present Is merely the 
productive moment of becoming, the moment correlating to the productive threshold of forces 
and thus to any event whatever. As such, It represents the disjunction between a past In which 
forces have had some effect and a future In which new arrangements of forces will constitute 
new events. The futurity of becoming is constituted not just in the confinufty of eternal return, 
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but in the present moments being a precedent for future ones: future arrays of forces cannot 
exclude the effects of passing presents but must relate to them in terms of external difference. 
This synthesis does not invoke a contraction of moments or a means by which the 
present is forced to pass, but the production of new moments in the direction of becoming- 
different from past arrangements of forces: the Alture, For this reason, Deleuze calls eternal 
return 'a belief In the future' which 'affects only the new' in the process of becoming or 
'metamorphosis! (DR, 90). Or as Boundas puts It, 'pure repetition of pure difference disturbs 
the repetitions of habit and the repetitions of memory, since the linear succession of lived 
presents and the circular recognition of revolving pasts are now replaced by the eternal return of 
[differentiation]. '" Deleuzes earlier emphasis on lived moments Is displaced by a focus upon 
the temporality of productive repetition, and thus upon the relations between internal and 
external differences Implicated as the time of production. The consequences for the subject are 
profound. If becoming Is the pure and Impersonal time that divides the becoming-subject from 
Its past and future Incarnations, then it provides an opportunity for challenging the constraints of 
life in the time of identity and unity: it is time for the dynamic subjects liberation. " 
For Deleuze, the pure and empty 'form' of time is the time of production, an 'open and 
changing totalitl(, so that eternal return Is the time 'within which' time Itself unfolds (C2,238). 
Uke Kant's model of time, it Is not an empirical concept, universal object or subject of thought, 
It does not contain empirical content and Is not finite. But whereas Kantian time is a 'form of 
Intuition' and a condition for the possibility of synthetic knowledge, Deleuze's time of eternal 
return Is always an '6nfounding' fý6defwnt), purely Immanent to production: if becoming Is 
constitutive of events, then 'time must be called the event of events! (LS, 276). It Is an open set 
of moments related one to another merely In the process of becoming. Indeed the expression 
'pure and empty form of time' only has meaning if interpreted as 'the ever-expanding set of 
unified moments of production, expressed In every present. Time does not 'pass! but 'be- 
comes!; the past does not pass to be replaced by a new present, but rather the present 
becomes past, present and future In the milieu of productive differences. James Leigh puts it 
well: 'if there were ever such a thing as pure present without its synthetic relationship with both 
past and future, time would stop. But time does not stop, and we can no more think a moment 
of pure present than we can a moment of pure being. '" 
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The characteristics differentiating Delouze's conception of time from Kant's are crucial to 
understanding why the theory of the subject developed here does not Incorporate a 'fracture' 
between I and Subject. But first I must deal with the plausible claim that this question Is moot 
because Deleuze has avoided the possibility of the 'fracture' by unifying In sternal return the 
kinds of synthesis that would otherwise lead to it. 
Recafl that the time of eternal return 'contains' such productions as derive from the first 
two syntheses: the founding of time (the living present) and the foundation of time (virtual past). 
(Jean-Michel Salansids gives an interesting but simplistic characterization of this Implicative 
relationship, arguing that Deleuze's third synthesis Is a 'good' one replacing the two 'bad' ones 
of habiNs and pure past. )" In other words, eternal return Is the time 'in which' external 
differences constitute temporal effects, or a'dimension of actual Intensities! in which disparate 
62 virtualities become actual. As shown in Sections 20 and 22, eternal return of the moment of 
subjectivity necessarily implicates, for example, the recall of the purely virtual past Into the 
present (into actuality), and the expectations founded upon past outcomes. Deleuze thus 
attests that we are led by the study of prod uction 'within' eternal return 'to other syntheses as 
though to other witnesses, thereby leading Into the domain of another nature In which there Is 
no longer either self or I In the traditional sense, and In which ... we encounter the chaotic realm 
of individuation' (the productive effects of interactions between Internal and external differ- 
ences)(DiR 258). In order to give the lie to the objection, one need only distinguish between 
eternal return and these other 'witnesses' or secondary syntheses. Deleuze's version of 'the 
pure and empty form of time-becoming per se-4s, at the level of external differences, 
manifestly distinct from the temporalities of particular productions. 
In fact, conceived In terms of eternal return, these other syntheses are not temporal at 
all. Symptoms of this are found In the absence of a workable account of time In respect of 
Hume's principles, and the status of durge as pure effect in Bergsonjsrn subordinated in its 
production to various psychological and ontological mechanisms. The time of becoming allows 
Deleuze to move beyond what Boundas, calls Bergson, s mythification of the old present' which 
invokes a correlation of past to present moments that borders on 'the reintroduction of 
identity'. 83 The repetitions of eternal return overturn those of Humean habit and Bergsonlan 
memory by Introducing a movement towards the future. Only the act of creation recurs. 
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Furthermore, the first two syntheses accord past, present and future the status of cardinal 
points, despite an inherent dynamism. Each is implicated 'in' (or'with') the others only in the 
time of eternal return. , In either case, contrary to the objection considered above, it Is not simply 
by vnffj4ng the times of all distinct productions that Deleuze does away with the problem. 
Deleuze's model of the pure and empty form of time explains why the 'fracture' between 
I and subject does not arise in his accounts of the subject. For there to be a 'fracture' at all, 
there must first be some coherence between the two, otherwise they are utterly disconnected. 
Since the fracture in the cogito can arise only in terms of the pure and empty form of time, this 
coherence must also arise in time thus conceived. But, for Deleuze, these terms (like all unities 
founded in events) are situated just in the real time of their own production-the time of eternal 
return-rather than In a pro-eAstent form of time. Each has its own line of becoming and plane 
of creation, and these are distinguishable just in terms of the universality of becoming. There Is 
no universal 'backdrop, against which their relationship can be assessed in temporal terms, nor 
any basis for assessing relative 'speed'. To appropriate words from Deleuze's'study of the 
Winds of temporal synthesis, there is no founding or foundational time within which the two 
terms can be made static and hence contrasted and related, but only the unfbunding time of 
ongoing production In which they are necessarily segregated from each other, fr I om themselves, 
and from other unified aspects of subjectivity. Therefore there is no cleavage 'in' or 'by' time, 
but only a distinction between times, a continuous distinguishability in terms of the eternal return 
of subjectivity-everiM 
We have seen already that T refers for Deleuze to a single effect of the becoming 
subject located by Introspective or intuitive effort, rather than some foundational, self-present 
entity. This is what Frank calls 'inter-referentiality' between the two, where I reffects subject 
despite the disparate time of 'its' production. " It is not that there Is a temporal cleavage In the 
relationship between the terms, but that the 'relating process! Is its own time, the time of its 
production, supplementing times of the fictional 1, the becoming-subject, the unfolding of a 
lifetime, and so on. If the I always designates the past In terms of memories, as argued in 
Chapter 2, and if the becoming-subject is at once both a product of past events and a 'pressing 
Into the future', then the process whereby the former refers to the latter constitutes a time of 
reference In the present that incorporates both past and future. Strangely, then, far from being 
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either a temporal unification or division, the affiliation between the two terms actually mumplies 
4. ý_ kii I 1W. 
Even though the later Deleuze fails to make his conception of the relationship between I 
and subject explicit, there is significant evidence that he favours this kind of argument. In 
Dfference and Repetifiot4 he writes: 'what the self has become equal to Is the unequal In Itself. 
In this manner, the I which is fractured according to the order of time and the Self which Is 
divided according to the temporal series correspond and find a common descendent In the man 
without name, without family, without qualities, without self or I' (DR, 90). In terms of Its 
essential dynamism, the self or subject is always becoming-other than itself. The I ls'fractured' 
in a sense different from Kant's: it is always re-fractured by the present In that it, too, always 
becomes-other, but because of its foundation in the past. 85 We are left with a self that 'still 
retains some resemblance In its matter' (according to external difference) and an I which 'retains 
an identity, however attenuated' (DR 258). Their common descendant is the temporality of 
external differences which constitute It. Only when this vision is 'filled out' by particularity, by 
Internal differences, does it take on a name, as a particular self or I with 'Its' own time. 
This Section has argued that Deleuze's interpretation of Kant's critique of the unity 
supposed by Descartes In his cogito could credibly be considered as a challenge to Deleuze's 
theory. But by enunciating Dellouzes own conceptions of time, and relating them to eternal 
return as the time of production, it becomes possible to consider T and 'subject' in a new light. 
Far from representing a 'breach' or 'fracture', the relationship between them In terms of time Is 
just a reflection of the distinguishability of all aspects of the Deleuzian subject, operating In 'its! 
own time and according to a distinct Idnd of Interaction between operative Internal and external 
d ifferences. ' For this reason, the meaning of the I's 'referring to' the subject-ft serving as the 
referent-has been left deliberately ambiguous: each sense ascribed to the term will have its 
own time. This is to say neither that the two terms are unrelatable, nor that they must be uniW 
to make sense of their relationship, but that every kind of relationship between them Is ascrlb- 
able to the time of eternal return. As such, I and subject are merely non-ldentical 'folds' which 
mirror one another In the unfolding temporality of becoming. 
Consequent to this analysis, Deleuzes use of the phrase 'I is an othee takes on OL 
different meaning from the one that he locates In Kant. For the Deleuze of Difference and 
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Repetition, it enacts a fundamental idea in the philosophy of difference: that identity is always 
divided from itself by the time of repetitive production, the impersonal form of time, the time of 
eternal return. There can never be a self-identical subject because every aspect of subjectivity 
has its own time of development. The temporality of human existence is but the accompank 
ment of the subject's becoming, change, deterritorialization and Individualization. It is to the last 
of these functions, the second aspect of the becoming-subject, the 'one' or T qua particular, 
that I turn next. 
24. INDIVIDUATION AND THE ETERNAL RETURN OF DIFFERENCES 
In explaining the continuity of subjectivity, I have had cause to mention the roles of 
internal and external difference. In particular, Section 19 showed that Humean and Bergsonian 
versions of external difference mark off one cycle of returning from another, and that internal 
differences invoked in the course of each cycle differentiate events (remembering that such 
demarcations are always virtual rather than actual, for to take them as actual would mean 
reverting towards Deleuze's Humean model of a relatively stable imagination). This Section will 
explicate the roles of internal and external difference in terms of the second matter focusing the 
Chapter: individuality. It will show that eternal return preserves and multiplies these differences, 
so that every dynamic subject is distinguished by the open set of differences and the line of 
becoming through which the subject develops. It will consequently fill out the claim in Section 
20 that the subjectivity-event is genuinely 'haecceitic' (to coin a neologism). 
Simondon, to whom Deleuze registers a debt in 7he Logic of Sense, points out that In a 
dynamic system, 'a relation does not spring up between two terms that are already separate 
individuals, rather, it is an aspect of the interwlpesonanceof a sy$tem of individilatio1z'" The 
becoming-subject is such a dynamic system. A subject cannot be determined as an individual 
by somehow connecting pro-existent events (as for Hume), but only by a process of individua- 
ton Inherent to the ongoing production of events. In other words. like unification, individuation 
Is immanent rather than subsequent to the constitution of pre-individual singularities. With 
respect to Deleuze's eternal return, this means that individuation does not tollowthe constitution 
of multiple haecceities, but Is inherentto their becoming and production. 
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Neither may individuation be theorized In terms of the becoming-subject's having 
already become. As Simondon puts it, 7nstead of grasping indlkidwfionusing ffie Individuated 
belng as a slarting point, *v rnust grasp the individuated being from the We *point of 
preindividual being ý7 Individuation of the becoming-subject can be described only by setting 
aside the notion of a subject and examining the productive process instead. In other words, 
one must deal with Individuating and immanent effects in terms of haecceities or events rather 
than the virtual whole that they generate. Deleuze agrees with such an approach, having time 
and again rejected any claim that Individuation of self might be re-cognized by self (NP, 39,41- 
2,80; DR. 85-6). 
Frank criticizes Deleuze for not dealing in Doerence &7d RepetWon with the intricacies 
of the constitution of a pre-reflective consciousness and their Implications for Individuality. 
According to Frank, Deleuze's focus upon 'pre-conscious! Internal difference Is an error because 
it diverts him from considering or proposing models of the subject which are consistent with his 
rejection of familiarity-with-self and his commitment instead to the non-identity of repetition! e 
Frank fails to appreciate, however, that by the time Deleuze wrote Merence and Repeffliol% he 
had already provided the Winds of account that Frank is after. This is not to say that the links to 
Empirkism and Subjectlv*and Bergsonism and their discernment of the relevant external 
differences are obvious, but just that Frank's criticisms are unjustified. 
Individuation of the subject turns for Deleuze upon the particularity and productive 
dynamic of the becoming Of sublectivity-events. Bearing in mind that every event Is itself 
'individual', there is particular importance In Deleuze! s assertion that 'we do not raise contrary 
qualities to infinity In order to affirm their identity; we raise each event to the power of the 
eternal return in order that the Individual, born of that which comes to pass, 'affirm her distance 
with respect to every other event' (LS, 178). In the light of Deleuze's conceptions of the 
ongoing constitution of the dynamic subject, it would be a mistake to read 'the individual' here 
as referring to a pro-existent subject Deleuze means instead that we shall only find the 
distinguishing particularity of the virtual whole of an Individual life by studying the continual 
production in whch specificity is generated, and not by comparing every quality with every 
other In terms of some superior concept. Just as for the unification of the becoming-subject, 
the theorization of individuation (and thus determination of the I as a definitive particular) rests 
142 
upon the dynamics of production and difference. 
Events are not individuated by external differences alone. Although Deleuze claims for 
dynamic subjects a shared nature founded in such external differences as psychological 
tendencies and memory functions, these proclivities do not 'contain' the conditions of their own 
specificity. They depict but minimal similarities between Instances of the genre, whilst Deleuze's 
study of difference and repetition reveals that, 'however slmllthe Internal difference between ... 
two series, the one story does not reproduce the other', so that 'resemblance and Identity are 
only functional effects of that difference which alone Is originary within the system' (DR, 125). 
Deleuze claims that events are specified In the first place by Internal differences intrinsic to their 
prod uction-pre-individual, haecceitic singularities-which, in the case of the dynamic subject, 
Invokes unthought conditions such as those noted in Section 18, and the 'dark precursor' which 
Initiates the Intersection of lines of development (DR 126). In other words, Individuation of 
subjectivity-events is always a product of the differences which simultaneously distinguish and 
unite lines of development. 
Deleuze characterizes internal differences as the 'fringe of Indetermination' of Individu- 
als; the uncertain conditions which differentiate between Kind and Instance-of-ldnd and give the 
principles of human nature a 'content'. Rather than signalling that a self or an I Is Incomplete, 
the unthought Is always an Indefinite condition of the possibility of the subject's becoming (DR, 
258). 
The event of subjectivity is conceived properly, then, as a moment In which difference is 
multiplied (two lines of external difference meet, each line having engaged a set of Internal 
differences; every moment of intersection is unique) and defined (as the effect of a particular set 
of differences; a particular effect at a particular moment). It Is unique In terms of both the 
Internal differences leading to it and the particularity of the interactions constituting it, reflecting 
human nature's always-new 'relationship' with contingent circumstances. Every instance of the 
productive effect of external difference (the lines of becoming), and every interaction between 
Internal differences and these lines, constitutes a propagation of haecceitic points, the propaga- 
tion 'itself (the being of this becoming) constituting the Individuality of each moment or event In 
the life of a becoming-subject. 8' 
Now, for the Deleuze of Difference and Repetltiol% following Simondon, Individuation Is 
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of the first order of importance, the primary and principal philosophical fact. As outlined in 
Sections 19 and 20, the determination of kind or nature of which individuals are instances is a 
second order issue. The specificity of haecceities (thus the interplay between internal and 
external differences) is the chief fact of production. As such, Deleuze's theories of individuation 
evidence a change from his focus in Empiridsm and SubjectivIty and Bergsonism upon the 
explication of human nature, towards one guided by the metaphysics of difference. Thus he 
writes that 'opposition, resemblwce, idenfity and even alWogy are only effects produced by... 
presentations of difference, rather than being conditions which subordinate difference and make 
it something represented': internal difference precedes external difference, and Internal and 
external differences together precede the determination of kinds (M 145). 
One might wonder what led Deleuze to change his focus. The answer, It seems to me, 
Is his study of time or, more precisely, the temporality of production 'within which' operate the 
principles, lines and analogies discovered in Deleuze's earlier works. (As such, BerpsolVsnis 
stress on dvr& and kind represents something of a turning point. ) The dynamic subject Is not 
defined in a moment in a single event, but over the course of a lifetime, a series of events 
distinguishable in terms of internal and external differences but unified in the time of their 
production: eternal return. As Deleuze puts it, 'things are reduced to the difference which 
fragments them, and to all the differences which are implicated in it and through which they 
pass' (DR, 67). But rather than claiming the role of individuation for each event considered 
separately, 'we call individuating factors the ensemble of ... enveloping and enveloped 
intensities, of these individuating and individual differences which ceaselessly Interpenetrate one 
another throughout the fields of individuation' (italics added)(Dlý 254). Deleuze finds that 
'Individuation is mobile, strangely supple, fortuitous and endowed with fringes and margins; all 
because the intensities which contribute to it communicate with each other, envelop other 
Intensities and are In turn enveloped' (DR, 257). In order to think individuality, therefore, one 
must recall 'the multiple, mobile and communicating character of Individuality', the continual 
exchanges between a structure built upon difference and the processes of envelopment 
entailed by eternal return (DR 254). " 
If the difference which individuates the course of a life is doubled In every event of 
subjectivity, it Is multiplied still further In the repetitive production of eternal return. As Simondon 
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puts it, 'any process, and any relation within a process, Is an individuation that doubles the 
preindividual being', so that all of the processes invoked In the lifetime of a dynamic subject 
multiply the pre-individual being constituted by events . 
71 The connectivity of events, their 
envelopment in the time of becoming according to the being of becoming, Individuates every 
open set of events as a pafficular continuity. It Is not just that every event differs from every 
other event, but that the time of production of every open set of events also differs from every 
other one, constituting a kind of internal difference that distinguishes times of becoming and 
processes as well as events. 
In as much as subjectivity is a continuity of effects, then, it is individuated as a particular 
flow of becoming or envelopment. A Deleuzian characterization of Simondon's contention that 
life Is 'a perpetual individuation' would invoke eternal return: only difference returns, but the 
process of returning constitutes difference as a particular time of returning, a temporally 
individuated continuity of events or open whole of effects. " Because such temporality Is 
Immanent to the productive inter-relationships between the internal and external differences 
characterizing it, it Is sufficient to determine 'its! becoming-subject as a particular, a chaobc web 
of relationships and their effects which, arising in eternal return, has neither beginning nor end 
(LS, 264). 
As with unification, the process of individuation is non-teleological. There Is nothing 
about events or their envelopment in the time of production that signifies or invokes what 
becomes. - Similarly, too, Individuation Is immanent rather than transcendent to the production of 
particular open sets of conjoined events. Each becoming-subject is a wholly unique production, 
an instance of the Deleuzian 'simulacrum' whereby notions of original and model, copy and 
reproduction, are redundant, and Platonic conceptions of resemblance and Identity are 
displaced. The 'human Individual' qua particular becoming-subject is conceived as simulacrurn - 
In telms of the distinctiveness of repetitive becoming: 
The simulacrum functions in such a way that a certain resemblance Is necessarily 
thrown back onto its basic series and a certain identity necessarily projected on the 
forced movement. Thus, the eternal return is, in fact, the Same and the Similar, but 
only insofar as they are simulated, produced by the simulacrum.... It does not presup- 
pose the Same and the Similar, on the contrary, it constitutes the only Same-the Same 
of that which differs, and the only resemblance--the resemblance of the unmatched. It 
Is the unique phantasm of all simulacra (the Being of all beings). (LS, 265) 
This quote helps clarify Deleuzes conception of the relationship between the human Individual 
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and the genre 'human'. For Deleuze, as we have seen, human kind Is defined and determined 
by individuation and thus by typical patterns of interaction between internal and external 
difference. These interactions are always haecceitic, or Instantaneous and unique, their effects 
particular and immanent. As such, In Deleuze's words, 'the same and the similar no longer 
have an essence except as... expressing the functioning of the simulacrum' (LS, 262). 
Furthermore, for Deleuze, the simulacrum of the kind 'becoming-subject' Is a temporal produc- 
tion of which the subjectivity-event is the 'foundational' (though timeless) unit A 'profound link' 
between eternal return and simulacrum comes into view (LS, 164). Eternal return ensures that 
'every thing, animal or being assumes the status of simulacrum', the 'superior form' that entails 
not just the product, but the processes of production and the differences and interactions 
Inherent In them (D14 67). The dynamic subject qua simulacrum Is individuated In the unifying 
productions of eternal return. Far from presupposing a sameness In the image of which it 
works, however, eternal return is the time of Individuation, endowing such terms as'external 
difference', 'human nature', 'principles! and 'lines of development'-terms which conceal 
differences under a cloak of similarity--with particular content. Thus Deleuze's theory of the 
temporality of production ties his Interest in external difference and kind to his meditations on 
internal difference and the individual. 
The implications of Deleuze's conception of the human Individual as simulacrurn are 
even broader than this, for It also helps to clarify his conception of the meaning of T. The 
Individual nameable as T Is never a stable or completed subject or self, but a particular and 
original continuity of effects immanent within the complex of differences. Deleuze states that 
'just as singularity as differential determination is pre-individual, so is Individuation as Individuat- 
Ing difference an ante-I or ante-self , and that I and Self are 'undermined by the fields of 
individuation which work beneath them' (DR, 277,152). The former point was borne out in 
Sections 19 and 20: difference determines each subjectivity-event as haecceity, such that 'every 
thing ... must see Its own Identity swallowed up in difference, each being no more than a 
difference between differences! (DR, 56). In this Section, I have scrutinized the latter, and 
argued that, for Deleuze, Individuation, being a flow and time of becoming in eternal return 
which Invokes internal &7dexternal differences, means that 'I' and 'subject always Indicate the 
subversion of traditional notions of Identity in favour of_dynaMiC forms: 
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the differences included within the I and the Self are ... borne by individuals: neverthe- less, they are not individual or individuating to the extent that they are understood in 
relation to this identity in the I and this resemblance in the Self. By contrast, every 
individuating factor is already difference and difference of difference. (DR, 257) 
Once the concepts of self and I are given precise meanings in terms of the immanence of 
productive effects, it becomes evident that the dynamic subject cannot equate with a static self 
identifiable as 1, nor even a plural or multiple self, and that the subject is instead properly 
multiplicitous (DR, 78-9). 73 As Deleuze puts it, consistent with Simondon's assertions noted 
above, 'individuality is not a characteristic of the Self but, on the contrary, forms and sustains 
the system of the dissolved Self (DR, 254). The differences and processes that establish 
individuality give rise, too, in the same time (of eternal return), to the dynamic subject. 
These processes also are the means by which underlying differences are reconcilable 
with the 1. In the context of a study In the Deleuzian spirit of Nietzsche's will to power, Alphonso 
Ungis provides a theoretical vision useful for defining T: 
what makes this life ... my life, a life in its own right, something individual and Identifi- 
able, is not the fact that It has an inner principle of unity, issuing from the identity-pole 
of a self-sovereign ego; it is rather that this life, this force, marks a difference in the field 
of forces. It is only conceived In a field of force, and it is Itself something by marking a 
difference in that field, by forcefully maintaining a line of tension in that field. 74 
The field of forces relevant to production of the Deleuzian subject is precisely the set of 
differences and becomings Invoked in eternal return. Theorization of subjective Individuality 
must be conducted In terms of multiple subjectivity-events, the mobility of their production in 
eternal return, and the communication of the lines of development of which they are effects, and 
thus In terms of multiplicitous external differences defining the lines and internal differences 
invoked in each cycle of eternal return and in the dark precursor. If repetition is always effected 
by an order of difference, and if the order of difference invokes both internal and external 
differences, then the repetitive production of haecceitic events Is effected in the Interplay of both 
kinds of differences (DR, 25). 
The term 'I' has as a referent, then, the multiplicity of ever-changing, ever-multiplying 
differences, effects and events. Specifically, it refers to the past and present moments of the 
becoming of the individuated dynamic subject, to all aspects of the thought and unthought 
invoked in and by eternal return, andto the eternal return itself, as a process, time and open set 
of differences. But this broad description disguises the concrete meaning attached to T in its 
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every use. After all, individuation is a lived process and, as Deleuze writes, 'where one no 
longer says 1, individuation also ceases, and where individuation ceases, so too does all 
possible singularity' (DR, 276). To cease saying 1, to cease marVing the distinctively human 
individuation that Is one's own, is to Ignore the Idnds of coherence towards which Deleuze 
pointed In Empftfsm and Subjeakityand Bergson&a; the concord in social Interactions, 
words and memories which are always reflected uniquely In one's life. 
I have argued that eternal return provides means for surmounting the dilemmas of 
continuity and individuality used to frame this Chapter. With respect to unification, events are 
related by eternal return in a kind of envelopment consequent to the nature of becoming; the 
subject is a virtual whole by virtue of the movement behwen events. Any becoming-subject Is 
'the same' over time by virtue of 'the repetition In the eternal return of that which differs! (DR 
301). Thus, finally, it rests upon the sameness of production. This Is not to say that the same 
subject returns, but that returning Is the same of the dynamic subject. With respect to individua- 
tion, the continuity of any becoming of eternal return is differentiated by the complex of 
differences operating within its continwus productions. Only eternal recurrence Individuates, the 
production of difference both In the moment or event of subjectivity andover the course of a 
lifetime. Finally, however, both continuity and Individuality rest upon the particular nature of 
constitutive events, accenting the importance of Deleuze's two historical studies whilst concur- 
rently diverging from them. 
25. TRANSMUTATION OF THE UNTHOUGHT: AN ETHICS OF THE EVENT 
Eternal return annuls the possibility of identity, introducing to e)dstence the dynamism of 
becoming in the temporality of relations between differences. As such, it ensures the ever- 
renewed creativity of human life encapsulated by the becoming-subject. But, as evident in 
Hume's fictions and the 'difficulty' of Bergson's Intuition, the human tendency Is to not think In 
these terms. Human individuals tend to conceive of themselves in terms of a theoretical 
Identity, such that T is presupposed to refer to an unchanging essence. 
In EMPArid9m and Subjectivity, Deleuze's account of the manner in which one comes to 
believe in the stability and unity of the subject is heavily dependent upon particular aspects of 
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Hume's theory. Nonetheless Deleuze's later accounts of the process-most notably in DhYer- 
once and Repetition, 7he Logic of Sense and Fo"uffi-contain echoes of these early argu- 
ments. Deleuze claims that the tendency to think of oneself in terms of identity is consequent to 
social, economic and political institutions (notably language, work, State, family, religion, 
production, the marketplace, morality, and certain forms of art) as well as philosophical ones 
that he finds in Plato, Descartes, Kant, and Hegel. 
The former set of Influences and their effects are subjected to close and sustained 
scrutiny In An#-OedipLýg where Deleuze and Guattarl argue that there Is no reason to suppose 
that such forces are 'initially human' ones. They claim Instead that forces enter Into dominating 
relations with the external differences defining the human genre by means of capacities and 
mechanisms internal to the forces themselves. '" 
Time and again Deleuze returns to the influence of various philosophical positions upon 
human thinking. For him, philosophy is an important kind of production which helps to form 
dominant Images of thought. He claims that, considered as a kind of Production, 'philosophical 
discourse has always been essentially related to law, institutions, and contracts-which, taken 
together, constitute the subject matter of sovereignty. '" In thinkers that he establishes as 
philosophical 'enemies!, beleuze finds a tendency to dignify 'common sense' and 'good sense' 
as ultimate and necessary grounds for all thought. The former'subsumes under itself the 
various faculties of the soul' (a sensus comlnunis) and 'the given diversity' of perception, and 
founds itself in epistemological and/or ontological unity such that 'one and the same self 
perceives, imagines, remembers, knows, etc. ' (LS, 78) This model, once it is related to such 
notions as truth and representation (collectively, 'good sense') becomes the 'implicit presuppo- 
sition' of 'conceptual philosophical thought', and 'it Is In tems of this image that everybody 
knows and is presumed to know what it means to think' (DR, 131). Thus, for example, for 
Descartes, common sense and the Cogito are taken to be of the essence of 'determinations of 
pure thought, expressing the unity of all the faculties and the possibility of their relation to any 
object of thought (DR, 132,133). 
For Deleuze, the influence of social and philosophical pressures is substantial Indeed. 
They promote unity as the orthodox Image of thought, the unthought ground that makes 
thinking possible and by which it must be judged or measured, supporting these claims with 
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detailed but 'puerile' accounts of, say, misrecognition and error (DR, 131,158). 77 The notion of 
unity Is fabricated by thought but, once constructed, it is Imagined to be a necessary precondl- 
ton for thinking such that, as Goodchild puts it, 'one has already oriented oneself Vvithin such 
an image of thought in order to find the image. o7a 
For such orthodoxy, the unified 'I think' is an essential precondition for the operation of 
the faculties, so that even though 'both the I and the Self each begin with differences! (as we 
have seen), 'difference Is crucified' (DR 138,257). It becomes habitual to Interpret the 
Immanence of conscious activity as though attributable to a substantial unifying principle. " As 
Deleuze and Guattari put it, 'thought cannot stop itseff from interpreting immanence as 
Immanent to something, the great Object of contemplation, the Subject of reflection', so that the 
Incompossibility of the given is unified and attributed to an unchanging Subject or Self (italics 
added). 80 
As such, Instead of conceiving of oneself as a creative capacity for becoming and 
change, the human tendency is to think of oneself merely as an empirically verifiable instance of 
the universal concept of 'the human individual', 'self' or 'subject, defined by consciousness, will, 
memory, a quest for knowledge and so on, differing from other Individuals In terms of just the 
particularity of one's Instantiation. In other words, one tends to conceive of oneself first as a 
human Mng rather than an Instance of becoming, not realizing that Individualization precedes 
the determination of kind and that, as Deleuze puts it, 'Being Is said In a single and same sense 
of everything of which it Is said, but that of which it Is said differs; it Is said of difference itself 
(DR 36). We fail to realize that 'it Is not we who are univocal In a Being which is not; It Is we 
and our Individuality which remains equivocal In and for a unlvocal Being'; that human being is 
a being of eternal return, of variation, dynamic and unique psychology and 'experientiality', of 
processes and movements (DR 30). Thus, for Deleuze, the characteristic attitude of individuals - 
Is not merely an unfortunate psychological trait, but the one that typifies all humans. 
Deleuze shares with three of the thinkers most influential on his development- 
Nietzsche, Bergson and Foucault-the belief that the tendency to think of oneself in terms of 
unity, passivity, stability and identity is mistaken, 'base!, 'stupid', and in need of change. For 
Nietzsche, it Is always a mistake to posit a 'pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject' in 
the manner of philosophical idealism. The idea of the 'soul' as 'a "being"' and as 'something 
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that is not process but enduring substance' is, he contends, a useless piece of 'ancient 
mythology'. If being human means thinking such fictions, then Vt Is not a question of Imn at all- 
he is to be overcome'ý' 
According to Deleuze, Foucault saw Nietzsche's as a first attempt at the dissolution of 
the Western concept of 'man' (sic), and he conducts a critique of the static and autonomous 
subject along Nietzschean lines. On Deleuze's reading of Foucault, 'there never "remalne 
anything of the subject, since he Is to be created on each occasion, like a focal point of 
resistance, on the basis of the folds which subjectivize knowledge and bend each power. ' 82 
Each change in the constitution of forces or relations between forces undercuts the notion of a 
stable subject. 
Chapter 2 showed how Bergson's studies of consciousness subvert necessarily the 
notion of a stable subject But, on Deleuzes reading, Bergson also champions the 
transformatory role of philosophy In moving beyond the typically human: 
Bergson is not one of those philosophers who ascribes a properly human wisdom am 
equilibrium to philosophy. To open us up to the inhuman and the superhuman... to go 
beyond the human condition: This is the meaning of philosophy, in so far as our 
condition condemns us ... to be badly analyzed composites ourselves. 
(B, 28) 
In other words, if human thought is typified by a conception of oneself as a foundational unity, 
then Bergson's study of the becoming of the subject is meant as a basis for moving beyond the 
distinctively human to the non-human, embracing the creative possibilities of existence. 
Deleuze takes on the task of destroying the 'Image of thought which presupposes Itself 
and the genesis of the act of thinking In thought itself (DR, 139). Philosophy must affirm life as 
difference and becoming, enhancing creative power and potentiality rather than diminishing it In 
a process of subsumption. It must resist the tendency to think In terms of unity, favouring what 
Deleuze terms'a larger, more active, more affirmative life, a life that is richer In possibilities!, an 
awakening of the forces of life, the differences that define us-83 If the unthought Image of 
thought can be transformed, then there exists the power to recast life by revealing new ways of 
thinking and now modes of existence. 
But to achieve his goal, Deleuze first must find a way of solving a conundrum: If the 
image of unity Is unthought and generated by a complex of social and philosophical Influences, 
how might he facilitate Its transformation using just the resources Of philosophy? In other 
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words, how might the influence of a differentiated complex of forces be replaced by the 
philosophy of difference championed by Nietzsche, Bergson, Foucault and Deleuze? His 
answer, evident in all his later texts, is to use thinking as a catalyst to unleash difference as an 
unthought force upon the unthought, exposing the current orthodoxy to Its 'Intimate enemy' (LS, 
139-40). To think of difference is consciously to introduce into one's life the difference 
constituted by the thought. 
The formulae proposed by the philosophers of difference for achieving the transforma- 
tion are eclectic. Deleuze's own model adopts resources from all three of the others, and also 
from Spinoza. 84 The final sections of this Chapter will outline and argue for his proposal. 
. Deleuze and the other philosophers of difference agree that ontology ensures change In 
the nature of human existence regardless of how, or whether, it is thought. Each in his own 
way shows that the canon of the static subject delivered to us by philosophical modernity is 
anything but a metaphysical necessity. But on another level they agree, too, that there is value 
In resisting the reduction of thnidng to a process governed by unity. As Deleuze puts it, if 
human thought imprisons the becoming of the human and creative life, then the human 
individual must 'liberate life' by exposing unity to the 'abyss' of difference. 85 By thinidng and 
living differently, one regains something of the concrete richness of experience and Its continual 
dynamism, variety and intensity, not just for the individual in his or her time, but also for a 
'people yet to come', for whom the unthought Image of thInIdng might be made different. 
Bergson expresses this hope explicitly, writing that the affirmation of universal becoming means: 
everything comes to life around us; everything is revivified In us. A great Impulse 
carries beings and things along. We feel ourselves uplifted, carried away, bome along 
by ft. We are more fully alive and this increase of life brings With it the conviction that 
grave philosophical enigmas can be resolved ... since they arise 
from a frozen vision of 
the real and are only the translation, in terms of thought, of a certain artificial weakening 
of our vitality. ' 
For Bergson, then, there are philosophical as well as eAstential advantages. Similarly, Foucault 
argues that 'one must give rise to thought as intensive irregularity-disintegration of the subject' 
In order to achieve a1iberation of man'. And for Nietzsche, such a'reversal of Platonism' will 
free humans from the heavy burden of original sin and the stigma of being but poor copies of 
God. 47 
For Deleuze, resistance to the diminished life of the unified subject entails necessarily a 
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new 'style of life. Following Foucault, he takes this to mean that it Is an ethics whereby the 
constitution of a mode of existence Is an 'ethos' or way of expressing the world as becoming. 
He does not mean that an affirmative life must accord with a moral code, a set of restraining 
rules (which Is, Deleuze agrees with Foucault, a matter of knowledge and power), but rather 
with optional rules that help to assess what one thinks, does and says. Deleuze claims that'it's 
the styles of life Involved in everything that makes us this or that' (N, 114,100). Rather than 
being assessed In terms of content, the concepts and images in one's thinking must be 
appraised with an eye to the way in which they are thought and lived. Thus Deleuze relates 
ethics to the aesthetics or art of living and dying. (Despite Deleuze's sometimes disjointed and 
sketchy approach to the development of an ethics, some commentators have claimed that it is 
a-perhaps the-pivotal focus of his work. Significantly, Foucault called And-0edipasa book of 
ethics!, although he begged the authors' forgiveness for doing so. )" 
For Deleuze, the alm of affirmative ethics is to live in such a way as to express 'what 
one is': an effect of events, becoming different at every moment and In every Interaction of the 
relevant differences. As Ansell-Pearson puts it, 'in "becoming what one Is' the task Is to become 
the offspring of one's events, not one's actions, since the action Is produced only by the 
offspring of the event. '80 To live in a manner affirming one's being as a becoming Is to break 
with the 'natural' tendency towards unified thinking, and to be reincarnated as a creative product 
of singularities. For Delouze, following Nietzsche, affirmation of dynamism and difference 
means changing one's conception of what It means to be a human individual in such a way that 
difference is freely revealed It requires disclosure of the constitutive role of pro-Individual 
singularities, releasing one's conception of events from the constraints of Being and 'the 
sedentary boundaries of the finite subject'; replacing the subject qua abstract universal with a 
model founded on the impersonal individuating factors of a fluid world, singularity and transition - 
(DIJ 258; LS, 107). In place of a static subject, the individual conceives herself as event such 
that, In Deleuze'a words, 'the event is actualized within her as another individual grafted onto 
her' (LS, 178). To affirm the event of one's becoming is thus to undercut the static subject with 
an immanent distinctive, and momentary singularity, to affirm the-transienCe of one's existence 
and the inevitability and potentiality of always becoming-other. The prospect of transformation 
Is centred upon the world of experience, this world, rather than a transcendent world or world 
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yet to come. 
The affirmation entailed by an ethics of the event has more to do with one's attitude or 
stance towards constitution as a dynamic subject than with the delimitation of the kinds of 
events constituting the subject. It Is, therefore, quite distinct from the project set out in this 
Chapter and the previous ones. To affirm the event, Deleuze claims, Is to become worthyof the 
contingencies constituting it 'to become worthy of what happens to us, and thus to Will and 
release the event, to become the offspring of one's own events, and thereby to be reborn, to 
have one more birth, and to break with one's carnal birth' (LS, 149-50). ExterneJ difference will 
'happen to us; but it is important to 'live up to' the potentiality of external difference. 
The full implications of this claim are only evident in the light of Deleuze's study of the 
relationship between individual and event. Recail that the continuity of events defining the 
human Individual is necessarily virtual, serving as'a "potential" which admits neither Self nor 1, 
but which produces them by actualizing or realizing itself (L6,103). The life of every human 
individual 'contains only virtualities! and 'is made of virtualities, events, singularities, becoming 
actual only when it is 'lived' or given determinate content according to a chance concatenation 
of internal and external differences. " Events 'wait for us and Invite us In'; "my wound existed 
before me; I was bom to embody it*' (LS, 148). 01 Thus, when Deleuze says that 'the subjects 
whaVs missing from events', his meaning is twofold: that events qua virtualities preclude the 
possibility of a static subject, and that the dynamic subject follows from the actualization of 
events. So to affirm the event is not to affirm just the actual event-what has become of a life 
already-but to sanction also the chance nature of a//events qua virtualities, and consequently 
one's existence Into the future, the time of eternal return. Thus, crucially and paradoxically, 
Delauze is advocating an ethics wherein the passive subject (the subject as effect) must actively 
affirm the event as its mode of existence. To affirm life means affirming events-to-come and the - 
chaotic Interaction of 'their' forces, as well as the becoming-subject as the 'quasi-cause of what 
is produced within us' (LS, 148). There is no stronger Indication than this of the pure Imma- 
nence of Deleuze's theory, for only if the processes of affirmation and actualization are 
Immanent to the play of differences constituting them both can this ethics overturn the paradox 
to creative effect. Only in a philosophy of immanence can affirmation-as an actualized product 
of thinking-Ampact upon thought, the latter produced at the same time as the former, and with 
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creative (ethical) effect. 
Clearly Deleuze's is no ordinary ethics. The constitution of a mode of existence 
consistent with the affirmation of the event has to do with thinking, feeling and being; with both 
ontology and psychology (in Deleuze's Humean sense of the word). However the relationship 
between ethics and thew other fields Is indubitably notomni-directional. We have seen already 
that life makes thought active; that contingent circumstances force one to think (we are 
reminded of Hume and social circumstances, and of Bergson and conditions relevant to the 
body). As Deleuze puts it, 'thought has no other reason to function than Its own birth' (C: Z 
165). But, on the other hand, thinking can make a life or mode of existence affirmative by 
Viscovering, InvenNng newpossibilities for Me', such that the thinker 'expresses the noble 
affinity of life and thoughV (NP, 101). Creative thinking entails the thinker, the passive or 
becoming-subject, affirming actively the Interaction of Internal and external differences In the 
productive moment, an act consonant with the very event of subjectivity andone able to 
transform the life of the thinker. 
Such transformative thinking will not be guided by a quest for knowfedge, which favours 
a conservative and ordered lifestyle founded upon regular coherences between ideas and world. 
What Is of interest for Deleuze In encounters between the dynamic subject and the changing 
forces of the world are opportunities for unique relations and new possibilities. Rather than 
merely expressing philosophical, socio-economic and other forces, affirmative thinking also 
must reflect an ethos of creative resistance by substantiating new Interactions between 
becoming-subject and internal differences. To think is always to create anew, such Is the lesson 
of the becoming of the event (DR 147). 02 But this Is no more 'cult of the new: to become fully 
creative-4o transform life-demands that thinking repudiates concepts such as constancy, 
coherence, ordering and subsumption In favour of the dynamism, difference and becoming of 
now complexes of forces. 
The question, however, Is how the esoteric concept of 'affirmation' might be adopted In 
active thinking by an Immanent or passive subject without recourse to a subject-model able 
theoretically to transcend and alter Its own thinking. " In other words, how might one change 
one's thinking from a preoccupation with questions like 'how might I discipline my self? ' to 
affirmations such as 'I'll playl' 
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In Megotl; effons we find a synopsis of the schema delineating Deleuze's responses to 
this question In ffie&sche and Ph(losophy, Difference and Repatffiol% The Loglo of Sense and 
Foucault This schema, which attests to the influence of Nietzsche and Foucault on Deleuze's 
thinking of difference and the subject in the 1970s and 1980s, involves 
bending force, making it Impinge on itself rather than on other forces: a 'fold', In 
Foucault's terms, a force playing on itself. It's a question of 'doubling' the play of 
forces, of a self-relation that allows us to resist, to elude power.... It's no longer a matter 
of determinate forms, as with knowledge, or of constraining rules, as with power it's a 
matter of opgonal rules that make existence a work of art, rules at once ethical and 
aesthetic that constitute ways of existing or styles of life.... It's what Nietzsche discov- 
ered as the will to power operating artistically, Inventing new 'possibilities of life'. (N, 98) 
We have seen already that eternal return is the ontological device that doubles (and further 
multiplies) difference. But it also serves Deleuze as an ethical device, moving study of the 
subject beyond the domain of discriminable relations between becoming-subject and world, and 
Into a realm where rules'are In some sense optional' (N, 113). As the most powerful rule, 
eternal return Is the means for a creative aesthetics of life, engaging both the force of time as 
change and the invention and execution of transformatory thinking. Only with eternail return, 
Deleuze argues, can one actively engage with both these facets of an ethics of the event. 
26. ARTISTtC LIFE AND THE THOUGHT OF ETERNAL RETURN 
The notion of an 'aesthetics of life' brings together Deleuze's conceptions of the active 
will, creative life, and the passive nature of the effects defining a particular life. As such, it 
conjoins his theories of on art, Interrelations between forces, and active willing and thinking. To 
explain the consequences of the fusloM one must turn first to Deleuze's works on Foucault and 
film theory, using these texts to locate means by wKich active transformation might be recon- 
ciled with the passivity of the event. Once this reconciliation is completed, the Import of 
Deleuze's optional ethical rules as means for transformation will become clear. 
In Negothifibm Fouwu& and various conversations with Foucauft, Deleuze displays a 
sympathy for the Foucaultian Inheritance and exercise of the Ancient Greek notion of 'aesthetic 
existence' as a kind of 'doubling or relation with oneself !4 On Deleuze's reading, 'doubling' ' 
has to do, not with replication of the self by the self, but Wth the repetition of events, doubling 
difference again and again in and as the effects of Interaction between those differences 
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inherent in concrete circumstances. (One is reminded of the Wind of doubling that Deleuze 
considers typical of the human genre, discussed In Sections 23 and 24. ) The subject is 
consequently divested of Interiority and identity and transformed into a constant reiteration of 
events, with the ethico-aesthetic focus firmly upon one's life and production rather than a final 
'product' (N, 98-9). 
To live an 'aesthetic existence' is, for Deleuze, echoing Nietzsche, to engage actively 
with the differences and events that constitute one's life, to become an 'artist' and an 'inventor 
of new possibilities of life' (NP, 103). By means of new Images of thought and now expressive 
forms, an artist engages with the world of differences and sots forces in play by 'Inching, 
inducing, preventing, facilitating or obstructing, extending or restricting' (N, 95). 95 Traditional 
rules defining knowledge, truth, unity and incompossibility are wilfully replaced by concepts, 
Images, characters and forms which are valid just in terms of the artist's creative thread (CZ9 
131,145). " It takes the form of deliberate experimentation, the aim of which is to create new 
concepts 'determining' the future of thinking. If thinking Is a play of differences, then to actively 
engage thinking with other differences Is to 'double' them and create new threads across the 
web of forces that constitute a life, and simultaneously to think the subject's becoming. - 
But the question remains of how a thinker might create his or her life without standing 
apart from it, directing it as a product under review. In other words, how might Deleuze 
overcome the paradox of transformation that arises from his theory of Immanence? The answer 
comes In Deleuze's deployment and development of the analogy between life and art. Just as 
an art-work Is both self-contained (or 'internal to itself) and integrated with the circumstances of 
Its production, display and inspection, so artiste life Integrates Its internality and differences with 
the creative terms of its production and engagements. It Is as though an Improvising actor 
simultaneously plays both 'I, the character' and % the actor'. The actor neither stands apart 
from, nor completely identifies with the character, but produces 'it' in the course of a creative 
process. The character is real and becomes Increasingly real the better It Is played but 
nonetheless, qtla character, it Is neither wholly real nor wholly fictional (c: z 151-2). 07 From the 
point of View of the performer who has to make a conscious effort to play the part, the events of 
the chamcter's Ile are 'staged', but always in terms of the actor's own character. Similarly, the 
creative thinker is simultaneously thinker and (in terms of the rules of external difference) , 
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process-of-thinking; not gazing upon the process or directing it, but engaging with it in the 
course of its creation. The 'self =self form is replaced by an inequality founded upon new rules, 
'Thespian rules!, which introduce a new meaning to Rimbaud's I is an othee from the one 
tendered in Difference and Repetition 
in 77ye Logic of Sense, Deleuze relates his actor analogy to his model of temporaffity. 
An actor plays a part only In the present, in the productive moment, whereas the character 
being played also reflects past events and future ones: memories and conditioned responses on 
the one hand, hopes and fears on the other. According to Deleuze, 'the role has the same 
relation to the actor as the future and past have to the Instantaneous present which corresponds 
to them' (LS, 150). In the relationship between actor and character, we find the nature of 
correspondence between each Instant, the course of a lifetime of differences, and the eternity of 
continual production (LS, 147). At every instant, the actor extracts the pure present from the 
events of a lifetime in a disjunction which, in being played, 'affirms the disjunct as such' (L. S, 
178-9). The playing of the character in the present affirms the moment of creation and its 
difference from, and simultaneous accord with, the range of differences defining past and future. 
But there is more to the affirmation of difference as the nature of one's existence than 
just creative thinking. For Deleuze, It is not enough merely to 4=ept one's becoming different 
In the process of thinking. This would be to play the character without reafly committing to the 
performance, or to pay lip-service to a part rather than engaging with it as a life; that Is, to think 
about difference without actively creating it, in a Stoic form of fimor fat! - Instead, Deleuze 
champions the active afflmwtlon of the implications of becoming different as the 'essence' of 
one's existence. Affirmation means actively desiring all of the connotations of the event for the 
passive subject; not ordering the chaos of differences and virtualities comprising a life, but 
affirming their divergence (LS, 264; DR 52). 
Earlier sections have spelled out the range of implications that must be affirmed. First 
one's life is but a continual production of difference, a becoming without Identity, a stable , 
'foundation' or a substantial essence. Second, productive eternal return, 'the theory of pure 
events and their linear and superficial condensation', reveals the necessary implication of all the 
haecceities of one's life in and between all of the others In a temporal continuity. - If one Is truly 
'Individual'-haecceitic--at any one moment, then the life of the individual must be conceived as 
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'passing through all the other individuals implied by the other events' of a lifetime (LS, 178). In 
terms of Deleuze's Thespian ethics, the present event Invokes past and present necessarily, so 
that 'the character is inseparable from a before and an after, but he reunites these in the 
passage from one state to the other' (C2,150). 
The third Implication has so far been described in insufficient depth to do Justice to its 
place in Deleuzes ethics. Specifically, one's life is defined by the range of interactions between 
internal and external difference. External difference is given its 'content' by Internal difference as 
a cMnce concatenaMon of forces that defines every moment of eternal return. To affirm oneself 
as difference and becoming thus is to welcome this accidental destiny, to affirm thinldng as a 
'dice-throw' and an 'experiment in chance', and to desire the serendipity of one's existence. " 
The chance element of internal differences comes from the 'outside', from the unfolding 
future and the world of Bergson' s Images and Hume's impressions, so that, as Deleuze puts it, 
the 'inside' of the subject Is'an operation of the outside'. " (In his essay 'Nomad Thought, 
Deleuze describes Nietzsche's version of this relationship as a 'communion' or 'immediate 
relation' between the 'inner soul of consciousness' and the outside. )** The forces of the 
'outside' impact upon what we think we are and might become. Thus, in every subjectivity- 
event, there is a (yet another) multiplication or 'doubling' of difference In the interchange 
between dynamic-subject and circumstances, so that 'inside' and 'outside' become blurred In 
their inevitable fusion and interaction. In other words, unlike Foucault, Deleuze considers the 
distinction between internal and external difference to subvert itself in the speed and repetitive- 
ness of interactions. '" 
Finally, then, in respect of the third ramification, 'the real difference Is not between the 
inside and the outside ... but is rather at the frontier, the point at which difference Is #ved, 
where 'what happens Inside and outside ... has complex relations of interference and 
Interfac- - 
ing, of syncopated Junctions! (LS, 155). The life of the human individual finally depends upon 
difference doubled and multiplied in the constitution of the event, and It Is a 'human' life just 
because of the range of these fortuitous interactions. Rather than judging them against a 
desired outcome or pre-determined goal, one must embrace their happenstance character as 
the determining aspect of the particularity of one's existence. In the game of chance that Is life, 
each unique coupling of differences Is a point on the die, and the ethical Imperative Is to throw 
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again and again, affirming the necess*of chance in production of the event (DR, 198). 
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As we saw In Chapter 2, this frontier is precisely the 'place' at which thinking occurs, so 
that Deleuze contends: 'only thought finds it possible to afflim aff chance and to fnake chance 
into an object of aftImMofi If one tries to play this game other than in thought, nothing 
happens; and if one tries to produce a result other than the work of art, nothing is produced' 
(LS, 60). Just as creative thinking overturns the Image of subject as a unity, one must also 
affirm the implications of becoming different by thinking them; by welcoming chance and 
becoming, conceiving moments of one's life as Inevitably interconnected-but without reference 
to a substantial subject. Only by thinking the nature of the character precisely can the part be 
played sufficiently well. 
Deleuze believes that there is an imperative available for testing the strength of 
affirmation of one's engagement with difference: the thought of eternal return, which Deleuze 
advances In Nietzsche and PhIlosophy and develops further in DIfference and Repefifiolz Ishall 
here outline it only in brief, but have discussed It elsewhere In depth. '03 Deleuze believes that 
as a thought (rather than as an ontological device), eternal return provides the conscious will 
with a 'practical rule' for engaging with difference. Every thought (and thus every value, , 
meaning, Image and consciously directed action) must accord with the rule: 'whatever you will, 
will it in such a manner that you also will its eternal return' (DR 7). Whatever Is willed in 
accordance with this test Is willed completely and affirmatively, for all time, so that 'all the half- 
desires and hesitant yearnings, the qualified excesses and provisional Indulgences, of a 
cautious and calculating will' are completely eliminated in taking responsibility for one's creative 
thinking and Interpretations; In other words, for one's artistry. The actor commits to- the 
performance foraff time, for all the time of returning, and signals the continual production of 
difference (this instance of willing is distinct from previous ones), the implication of each 
haecceitic moment In all others (to will a thought is to desire It forever), and engagement with 
the chance forces of Internal difference (welcoming both the circumstances of willing and a 
heterogeneous and uncertain future). '" In the process of willing, the subject necessarily 
becomes-other. By placing thought Immediately within the practical realm of changing events, it 
ties the nature of thinking of the becoming-subject to the becoming which it constitutes qufi 
activity. '05 
160 
Deleuze claims that 'if eternal return is the highest, the most intense thought, this Is 
because its own extreme coherence ... excludes the coherence of a thinking subject' (DR, 58). 
The extreme cohesion of differences in the productive and singular repetition of events prohibits 
the static subject If the human tendency is to think in terms of the coherence of such a 
subject, then the transformation consequent to creative thinking and the thought of eternal 
return heralds a new kind of existence. 
Clearly the affirmation of life in terms of the ethic and aesthetic of the event Is not 
indicative of the human genre as it is characterized by Deleuze, Nietzsche et al Rather, such 
thInIdng heralds the 'death' of 'that which is orW-the subject of sameness, Identity, becoming. 
equal and Inertia--4n favour of the haecceitic forces which enhance life (DR 115). '08 'One dies' 
In every moment of eternal return to be replaced by the 'one' of pre-individual singularities; (LS, 
152; DR, 259). 107 Understood as a creative becoming, life simultaneously differs from death 
and, In the Deleuzian sense, affirms it, so that the eternal return actually empowers the 
individual to will its own passing. (Delauze is echoing the distinction in Slanchot between 
personal death on the one hand, and impersonal and Infinitive death on the other, where the 
former relates to the death drive and 'contradiction' of the ego, and the latter to the release of 
singularities from the ego, wherein 'one' never, finally, dies. )1" 
In Deleuze's aesthetic of life, the greatest value attaches to 'the becoming of the real 
character when he himself starts to 'make fiction", when he enters into *the flagrant offence of 
maldng up legends" and so contributes to the Invention of his people' (C: 9 150). The event of 
becoming-subject In accordance with the ontology and ethic of eternal return (the actor's 
committed performance) is, then, a revolutionary moment. It represents a moment in 'the 
Invention of a people' of some now Idnd, the creation of a new genre for which, In Deleuze! s 
words, 'the people no longer exist, or not yef (C2,216,217). 
Deleuze sometimes Identifies the people Invented by the artistic life with Nietzsche's 
LAtvrInenschan, For the Deleuze of Fb"ult, for Instance, the Overman 'is the form that results 
from a now relation between forces' when the human frees life Whin hIM5,61f. "09 It Is the 
dynamic-subject passed Into awareness of the metaphysical implications and ethical demands 
of its own existence qua becoming. In The Logic of Sense, the Overman Is a mode of 
Individuation typified by active life and the thought of Intensity and singularity (LS, 107). It 
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represents a distinct break from such typically human Images of thought as Identity, unity, 
totality and universality. '" Thus, for Deleuze as for Nietzsche in 7hw Spoke Zarathustra, the 
Overman becomes the motif of the meaning and goal of eternal return: the creative Initiative of 
the passive subject coupled with the random events of existence to move beyond human reality 
to 'a new way of feeling, thinking, and above all being (Overman)' (NP, 71). But if one does not 
think creatively and does not adopt an aesthetic ethic, then one is condemned to a human life 
ofunity wherein the richness of experience Is concealed behind Identity, stability and substance, 
and one is doomed to remain but an 'opiphenomenon' of existence (DR, 55). 
Finally, then, art and philosophy converge or become indiscernible In Deleuze's ethics 
of the event. At this point is the simultaneous production of a new Idnd of people and a new 199 
for the individual. "' As in Nietzsche's Bifth of Tragedy, art for Deleuze must be viewed from the 
perspective of life, facilitating a creative transformation of existence and expressing the 
fundamental nature of one's life as eternal return. This art Is, for Deleuze, an aesthetic of 
resistance, expressed wholly in thinking, producing no product but a life which disturbs one's 
reality and morality (LS, 60). It is not, however, an abstract production without rules, but one 
guided by a strict and testable edict of affirmation and creafion, consistent with the temporality 
of the event and the production of the passive subject. This test, instantiated in the thought of 
eternal return, is the means by which the stable, coherent subject is expelled from the economy 
of thinking In favour of a more radical becoming-subject (DR 57). 
The consequent work of art, the creative life of the Overman, is like a painting that 
begins outside its frame and traverses the frame in the course of a continuous reworking of the 
picture. For Deleuze, 'far from being the delimitation of a pictorial surface, the frarrie Immedi- 
ately relates this surface to the outside. "12 To traverse the frontier between 'inner life' and the 
'outside' is, for Deleuze, to affirm the transitory essence of creative and ethical existence. Only - 
by moving outside the frame does one really live the life of the dynamic subject unearthed by 
Deleuze In Hume and Bergson. 
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27. THE SUBJECT OF ETERNAL RETURN 
By focusing upon Deleuze's ontology, Difference and Repetition and The Logic ol 
Sense move the grounds of his thinking of the subject, even though there are few clear 
acknowledgements of this in the text. The subject, psychology and the human Wind of individual 
are just shadowy presences, usually concealed behind Deleuze's elegant accounts of haecceity, 
difference, becoming, and the event. Only by working through ftme key concepts in the terms 
provided by Deleuze's earlier works-supplemented by the few overt references to subjectiv- 
ity-do their Implications for the human dynamic become evident. 
Read in this manner, the Deleuze of the late Sixties emphasizes the importance of the 
concept of difference and the crucial roles of eternal return in the subject's continuous becom- 
Ing-other. The concept of differenco-in-itself helps to explain the roles of contingent circum- 
stances and processes of individuation Without presupposing a founding Identity. As the theory 
of pure events, eternal return affirms Internal and external differences, disparateness, chance, 
becoming and multiplicity as h1herent to constitution of the dynamic subject (DR, 300). Identity 
Is but a'secondary powee, subordinate to difference and repetition. It is not the Individual that 
returns, but events ('mobile Individuating factors! [DR 41]), constituting the individual in the 
process of their becoming (LS, 176). 
In terms of the haecceity of the event, eternal return is the process by which 'thought 
encounters life' and thinking acquires a new Image of itself. Eternal return 'smashes to pieces! 
the illusion that self Is founded upon unity and identity, and ensures exclusion of the notion from 
thought (D)J 89-90). It reveals instead the 'joyful wisdom' of difference operating In events as 
'the secret coherence which establishes itself only by excluding ... the identity of the self, the 
world and God' (DR, 90-1). In other words, eternal return ensures the breakdown or 
'unfounding' of the subjects Identity only to replace it with a shifting 'foundation': the becoming- 
different of events (LS, 263). The mechanism enables Deleuze to conceive of human becoming 
asIndividuation-In-progress. 'I Is another' replaces 'Ego -Ego' without introducing a temporal 
*crack' of the kind that afflicts Descartes' theory. 113 
As a dynamic effect, subjectivity Is always temporal, so that 'we are Internal to time, not 
the other way around' (M 82-3). Eternal return discloses and Imposes the liberating time Of 
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the event, which has neither past nor future except in terms of becoming. Events mark every 
moment of becoming as a present such that chronological time is'overturned by movements' 
(M 129). If indeed 'we are internal to time', it is not time of a 'pure form', but of the continual 
division of returning and the continual returning of division (past/present, self/other, before/after, 
circumstance/effect, ... ). 
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Deleuze derives from this model an ethics that harnesses the creative potential entailed 
by becoming-other In the cause of transforming thought. Difference contains the potential for 
the passive subject's active resistance to images of unity, and affirmation of an uncertain future 
and Immanent otherness. This ethic does not need the human, but Is, rather, the means for 
surpassing the human In favour of the Overman such that, In Deleuze's words, 'there never 
"remaine anything of the subject, since he Is to be created on each occasion, like a focal point 
of resistance'. "" It Involves the creation of different ways of eAsting and thinidng, now images, 
optional rules; In short, life as a work of art, leading inevitably to the death of the unified subject 
(N, 92). This is what Rodowick calls Deleuze's 'utopian aspiration'. 118 
In Deleuze's theory, 'self and 'I' are just indicators of the Idnd of Individuation typical of 
the human genre. They correspond in referring to the process of becoming, but, because of 
their Independent functioning, each has its own time. As Deleuze puts It, Vcan serve as a 
universal principle for recognition and representation' founded in Individuation, whereas'self 
corresponds to a kind evident In pattems of external difference (DR, 151-2). In other words, 'the 
I forms the properly psychic determination of species [thus Invoking Internal difference], while 
the Self forms the psychic organization' (DR, 256-7). In the light of Emplricl&m Nd Subjec#vlty 
and Borgsonism these claims have precise meaning. They refer to the passage of a life, to 
patterns of Interaction between dynamic subject and world so complex that the subject-form as 
traditionally understood clearly is inadequate. 
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Conclusion: Deleaze's Becoming-Subject 
28. MACHINES AND PLANES 
I have argued that there Is a workable and evolving theory of the human subject latent 
within Deleuze's interpretations of Hume and Bergson, and two of his metaphysical treatises. 
But, as noted in the Introduction, not all of Deleuzes works are readily congruous with such a 
reading. Most notably, the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenk written with Guattari, 
and Deleuze's essay 'Immanence: A Ufe ... seem to be at odds with my rendition of Deleuze on 
the subject. I address here the possibility and advisability of constructing a union between the 
two approaches. 
I In the former work, especially An#-Oed1puA cited variously as Deleuze and Guattad's 
'major mature work' and 'unsubstantial prattle', the subject is neviar a central theme. ' But not 
only is Its absence sometimes conspicuous, the authors regularly go out of their way to 
repudiate the concept, favouring freer forms of agency and pra)ds instead. For this Delauze of 
the early- to mid-1970s, human eAstence Is not characterizable by conscious and non-con- 
scious mechanisms and relations of difference, but by a fragmented unconscious and relations 
of non-subjective productive desire. This emphasis mirrors Deleuze's concern with seemingly 
more mailleable relations between personal and politico-economic realms In the aftermath of 
May '68, and leads him to claim that Meiie Is oNy deafre and the soafal and nothIng e/Se ý The 
principal tasks of Anti-Oedipus are to describe the body of desire and formulate means for Its 
escape from rational regulation and socially imposed hierarchical forms. 
The pivotal break from the account proffered in Deleuze's historical works comes with 
the introduction of two now subject-models, the 'desiring-machine' and the 'body-without. 
organs!, which are meant to do away with the subject as a locus of constraint by the forces of 
capitalism and psychiatry. Desiring-machines are neither human Individuals understood In 
terms of utility, consciousness and activity, nor technical machines, but organic expressions of 
unconscious desire; decentred, non-unified and without a fixed Identity. Relations between the 
desiring machine and other existents are described by Deleuze and Guattari in terms of a'body- 
without-organs', a depersonalized and disorganized 'surface' upon which flows of desire are 
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recorded. On this model, the body is not experienced as'one's own', but as an anonymous 
configuration of forces beyond nodal Identity. In both cases, the notion of the subject as an 
Individuated instance of a particular genre vanishes under inherent disorganization and the 
Implicit homogeneity of desire. If there Is still 'something on the order of a subject... on the 
recording surface', as Deleuze and Guattarii claim, then it is merely 'peripheral to the desiring- 
machines'; not an effect proper, but an epiphenomenon. 3 To use Deleuze and Guattad's terms, 
the subject Is 'molae, operating at the level of the whole (on my reading, a passive whole quýa 
effect), whereas the philosophy of desire functions on a 'molecular' level, beyond the reach of 
'repressive' forms of power, authority and law. To think In these terms Is to 'liberate' desire, to 
express it freely as a positive and creative force rather than as an expression of lack. 
- Even this sketch discloses the significant discontinuities between Cepitalism and 
ScMpphrenla and the theory of the subject advanced in Deleuze's earlier works. Deleuze and 
Guattari are attacking not just Freudian psychoanalysis and capitalist institutions of economy 
and law, their ostensive targets, but any attempt to develop conceptual order through the 
imposition of explanatory schemas upon the unconscious realm. Deleuze's disdain for 
philosophical transcendence has spilled over into an attack on all efforts to 'make sense' of the 
expression of unconscious forces, efforts which he now associates with formulation of means for 
their control. As such, Deleuze and Guattarl oppose any theory of the subject disposed towards 
a principle of individuation predicated upon consciousness, utility and/or condistency. 
There are also numerous thematic inconsistencies between the two positions. For 
Instance, in CaPIMASM and SchLrophrelVe., the unconscious realm is afforded an absolute 
privilege over the conscious; pure flows of desire replace flows of mental states and their 
enabling mechanisms; the notion of 'genre' or ldnd becomes highly transitory rather than readily 
Intuitable; social forces are not locatable 'outside' the Individual, influencing subject-formation, 
but are always already incorporated Wthin the desiring-machine (as well as In the 'world' and 
the forces mediating between them); parts are unrelated to wholes, and; pure expressions and 
random interactions supplant intentions, selections and tendencies. 
Despite such conspicuous discontinuities, the sheer audacity, complexity and radicalism 
of Antl-09dipA allied with Deleuze's thematic preoccupations, ensure that there are ways of 
opening up viable lines of connection or continuity. Such a line becomes apparent It Anti- 
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Oedipus is read as a critique of the workings and influences of the economic, judicial, and 
social systems which Deleuze's Hume understands to be essential to stabilization of the 
dynamic subject. Alternatively, An#-Oodpos can be conceived as an account of the social 
unconscious that supplements Deleuze's earlier focus on consciousness, or as a radicalization 
of some of Deleuze's earlier positions or concepts. A number of commentators have adopted 
the latter approach. Goodchild, for Instance, argues that Capitallýqm and Schizophrenle 
represents an extension of Deleuze's Humean scepticism about the possibility of knowledge. 
But whereas Emplficlsm and SubjechWtywas concerned with the mechanisms and dynamism of 
belief-formation, the later works concentrate upon the genesis of thought In terms of its psycho- 
social and ethico-political conditions. - On a similar tack, Bogue argues that unconscious desire 
is a radicalized version of Nietzsche's will to power as Deleuze interprets it In Nietzsche and 
Philosophy. Or again, one could trace an increasingly radical 'decentring' of the subject from 
the stable Humean version of Chapter 1, to the complex of pre-individual events outlined in 
Chapter 3, to a desiring-machne, barely cognizable as a subject at all. On such a reading, the 
dynamism introduced into the subject model by Hume's introspection can be seen as a 
precursor to Capita6m and Schizophrenids obliteration of any possible Identity., 
Finally, one could argue that these two 'phases! of Delsuze's philosophy share an 
underlying politics! Baugh points out that 'Deleuze thinks that there Is a link between transcen- 
dental empiricism's ideal of intuiting empirical actualities. as historically produced "virtual 
multiplicitiee and a political practice which would ... treat Individuals and the differences 
between them in a positive way, in terms of the causal geneses that produced them. 'O Far from 
celebrating marginality, such a position rejects it on the grounds that there can be no universally 
discriminative norm or standard, but orgy singularities bome of contingent circumstances. 
Similarly, In the later works, the philosophy of desire Is meant to overturn determinations of 
marginality and inferiority by eliminating 'fascistic forms of subjectivity'. For Deleuze and 
Guattarl, the subject qua binding Identity follows from the unity of the State: 'first, the objective, 
Imperial collective bond; then all of the forms of subjective personal bonds, finally, the Subject 
that binds Itself. 7 But the desiring machine is anti-conformist, immune to bonds of these kinds 
because It rebels against institutions that operate in the cause of order. Bonds founded upon 
the continuities of desire displace bonds of hierarchy, control and subservience, eliminating the 
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tyranny of marginality at each level. 
It is beyond my scope to expand upon these lines of flight, which are only meant to 
illustrate the potential for finding and exploiting connections in Deleuze's otherwise disparate 
texts. The range of such opportunities is not really so surprising given his conception of 
philosophy. If philosophy is all about fashioning new concepts and images of thought, if each 
of these defines a now plane of theoretical consistency, and if each point on a plane Is 
consistent and connectable with any other In tenns of the origInafing concept, then the 
development of connections across the plane becomes relatively simple. 8 It might even be, as 
Braidotti claims, that Deleuze chooses his concepts and images with an eye to their potential 
for conceptual Inter-connectedness and 'web-like interaction'. " One finds such productive, 
conceptual consistencies in the examples cited above: institutions, thematic continuity and anti- 
fascist politics (respectively) provide their terms. 
But the question for Deleuze's reader is not whether such lines of connectivity can be 
formulated-clearly they can-but whether (and how far) one ought to stretch one's arguments in 
order to define them and 'make them work'. It Is all very well to adopt Deleuze's creed of 
conceptual connectivities and transitions, but to move restlessly across terrhories defined by 
disparate Images and concepts risks making Deleuze's corpus Into a uniffed system, a closed 
and integrated whole, contrary to the lessons of the rhizome. (Although I don't mean to' 
suggest that the lines of connection proposed above would fall to such a criticism. ) For these 
reasons, I have by-and4arge limfted my study of the Deleuzian subject to those works where the 
continuities are clear, pronounced and productive, and have also emphasized the dbcontinuities 
in Deleuze's thinking of it. 
An altogether more demanding challenge to my interpretation Is posed by Deleuze's 
essay, 'Immanence: A Ufe ... 'which, like parts of Kftt Is PhilosqpW, constitutes a movement - 
in the later works towards greater metaphysical abstraction. If Deleuze's Images and concepts 
invite an unjustifiably systematic Deleuzian 'theory of everything', then this essay, published In 
1995, is Deleuze's own attempt at such a totalizing metaphysics. "' Its challenge to my reading 
is more practical than theoretical, and deserves comment. 
On my Interpretation, Deleuzels ethics of the event Is In lhvd AM the time of passive 
synthesis and the production of the dynamic subject. As such, the temporality of thinldng, ' 
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production, action and memory are meshed according to the coincidence of dur6e and the 
effect of interactions between lines of development, evidenced by the apparent unity that 
characterizes the starting-point for transcendental empiricism. The passive subject Is able to 
participate actively in the formulation and adoption of transformative ethics precisely because 
the 'speed' of production of immanent effects matches the speed of thinVing. 
But Deleuze's accounts of the subject are not always characterized by such an 
alignment In some of the later works, where Spinozaýs Influence is strongest, Deleuze 
conceives of events as occurring at infinite speed. " He contends that consciousness 'crosses 
the transcendental field [of events] at an infinite speed which is everywhere diffuse' and 
'expresses itself as fact only by reflecting onto a subject which refers It to objects. 02 In other 
words, events are actualized at such a pace that there is no room for conscious Intervention or 
active transformative ethics. Productive Interactions between the world of objects and Inner-life 
are so rapid that every consfitutive event of consciousness Is always already surpassed by the 
next. Eternal return in its ontological guise ensures that the subject always becomes other than 
Itself, but the transition Is so quick that the subject has no capacity to respond, let alone to 
Intervene with affirmative willing or conscious creative effort. How, then, might one 'live up to' 
the event in the manner championed by Deleuze in his Nietzschean moments? How might 
philosophy Intervene in favour of a 'people yet to come? How might one affirm becoming such 
as to become 'a master of one's speed'? (LS, 123) Deleuze provides no answers. 
Furthermore, in What A; PhllosopW, Deleuze and Guattari claim: 'this speed requires a 
milieu that moves infinitely in Itself-the plane, the void, the horizon. Both elasticity of the 
concept and fluidity of the milieu are needed.... to make up "the slow beingsý that we are. ' This 
non-extended, unthinkable and imperceptible virtual plane of Immanence Is the 'horizon' upon 
which all events become. 13 Production Is related to the plane's infinite speed, rather than to-the - 
temporality of any specific concept With this plane of Immanence, then, Deleuze's focus has 
shifted from the constitution of a Me, the life of Individuation, to L* the condition of possibility 
of all events and concepts, Including any particular life. Thus the passivity of the dynamic 
subject is multiplied to infinity. 
This is not to say that Deleuze Ignores altogether the place of particular lives upon the 
plane. But now he conceives of a life as just a kind of labstract line', a certain 'living subject' 
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which 'passes through' points on the plane but is 'freed' from any relationship with 'the 
subjectivity and objectivity of what happens'. 14 Conceived In this way, broad consistencies with 
the Humean and Bergsonian visions remain. Each life can be conceived as a continuous 
relation between Interpenetrating and impersonal haecceities defined by internal differences. On 
the plane of Immanence, as Deleuze puts it, 'the singularities or events constitutive of a life 
coexist with the accidents of the corresponding life, but neither come together nor divide in the 
same way. '15 The abstract line can be conceived as representing a unity between individual and 
circumstance, subject and object, consistent with Deleuze's metaphysics of movement and 
difference and his disclosure of the fallacy of the transcendent and subsumptive subject" 
But difficulties arise when the minutia of the plane of Immanence are teased out. 
Deleuze envisages that events of a life and events of Ufe 'do not communicate with each other 
In the same way as do individuals'. " He argues that the line of a life connects in some 
mysterious way with all events on the plane, just as evelyffiing is interconnected with every- 
thing else In a dense web of heterogenous forces (N, 146). "' The consequences for the 
account of the subject are extreme. In Spinozx PractkelPhilosqphy, Deleuze claims that'there 
Is no longer a subject, but only Individuating affective states of an anonymous force'. " In The 
Logic of Sense, he defines the subject as a nomadic becoming Incorporating haecceities, but 
goes on to claim that it'traversee humans, plants and animals, unconstrained by particular 
kinds of Individuation and indicative 'tendencies! (LS, 107). In D#Yemnce anct Repetffiol% 
Deleuze first asserts that 'we should not say that the Individuals of a given species are distin- 
guished by their participation in other species: as W, for example, there was ass or lion, wolf or 
sheep, In every human being', but then goes on to claim that 'the thinker ... is laden with stones 
and diamonds, plants 'arid even animals"' (DIt 254). 0 
To disagree with such extravagant claims Is not just to take Deleuze too literally, but to 
oppose the plane of immanence as an imprecise philosophical model in the Bergsonian sense. 
To agree with Deleuze that 'one does not think without becoming something else' does not 
mean that the 'something else' Is of an alien kind, a kind that does not think-an animal, a 
molecule, a particle' (even if we define each of thew just according to 'what it can do' in terms 
of its relations, perceptions and environment). " In becoming other, the subject Is Individuated 
as a human kind according to external differences. Even ff the frontier between internal and 
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external differences is always shifting--as Deleuze has argued-4ranscendental empiricism 
remains capable of discerning the genre defined by external difference. In short, Deleuze 
seems to have forgotten the principal lesson of Bergsonism: that one should 'rediscover what 
differs in kind in the composites that are given to us and on which we live' (A 26). The 
consequence of excluding genre from his theory of the plane of immanence Is to devalue his 
rich accounts of the concrete conditions of distinctive human experience-of social, historical, 
judicial and economic circumstances, and their psychological and ontological Import--in favour 
of an abstract metaphysics in which such circumstances are but the 'white noise' of becoming. ' 
Apart from the Imprecision of an all-encompassing plane of immanence, there are other 
reasons for preferring Deleuze's earlier conceptions of the human individual over later ones. 
Some commentators have expressed unease over the political implications of both the philoso- 
phy of desire and the universal plane of immanence. If the politics of desire is aboutbreaking 
down' the 'dichotomy between desire and interest, so that people can begin to desire, think and 
act in their own interests, as Goodchild describes it, and If there is no complimentary mecha- 
nism for integrating and regulating their actions, then the consequent politics is certainly 
troubling. '3 Yet this is precisely the case with Deleuze's later theories which, as Descombes 
points out, incorporate no philosophy of responsibility, right, justice, community or personal 
morality, and just the thinnest account of inter-subjectivity. Such deficiencies (amongst others) 
lead Bernard Flynn to warn of the 'dangerous political Implications! of Deleuze and Guattari's 
pronouncements on the pathological and schizophreniC. 24 
Deleuze states: 'a theory is exactly like a box of tools.... It must be useful. It must 
functliorL And riot for itself. If no one uses it, ... then the theory is worthless or the moment is 
Inappropriate. " Therefore he prefers his readers to ask just one (composite) question of his 
philosophy: "Does it work, and how does it work? " Does it work for you? ' (N, 8) The principal 
positions'advanced in C4o&aftm and Sch&qphr&n14 and the essay on the plane of Immanence 
do not 'work'. They do not provide a set of concepts that address the nature of consciousness 
or human existence precisely. Rather, these works are deliberately abstract and unworkably 
imprecise and speculative, far removed from the carefully justified methodologies and concepts 
that governed Deleuze's earlier studies of consciousness and self. 28 How might Deleuze's 
reader relate the fragmented desiring-machine to the need for consistent actions in attending to 
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life's practical exigencies? How can the body understood as an anonymous recording surface 
be correlated with one's ow7 physical pains and pleasures? The later works rarely even 
acknowledge such challenges, let alone deal with them adequately. 
29. THE BECOMING-SU13JECT 
I have defended the thesis that there is an evolving theory of the subject latent within 
some of Deleuze's texts from the 1950s and 1960s. In two of these works, Deleuze actively 
reappropriates inherited theories. In the others, he 'breathes life' Into the subject In the course 
of studying other concepts and images of thought. Critical exegeses of these texts have shown 
why Deleuze considers it a mistake to conceive of the subject as a relatively stable, objective 
and rational centre of identity: because the dynamics of consciousness preclude such an 
account. For Deleuze, the subject is a passive but ever-changing effect of a oonfluence of 
psychological, material and ontological forces, and his texts provide a workable (though 
sometimes under-developed) account of the origins and nature of these characteristics. 
Chapter 1 showed that EmpIrlh(sm and SubjectMy yields a preliminary account of the 
subject as a relatively stable system of dynamic interactions between atomistic ideas. The 
system is structured according to the dictates of 'passions', on the one hand, and a confluence 
of stabilizing rules and fictions, on the other. On this account, the human genre is definable in 
terms of introspectively evident tendencies located in the 'space' between ideas, the field of 
difference and activity which recurs in varying forms throughout Deleuze's corpus. According to 
the Humean Deleuze, the subject Is a habitually constructed and fictional entity that is necessary 
for the imagination's consistent operation and the capacity to live within a community. - The 
name T refers to the product of such thinking, the apparently stable 'structure' arising out of 
atomism and associationism. 
Hume's exaggeration of the systematicity and stability of this structure, coupled with his 
failure to theorize adequately the origin and nature of ideas, leads Deleuze towards Bergson. 
Chapter 2 showed how Delouze, having adopted Intation ph&sWhique as his method and a 
strict transcendental empiricism as his strategy, reveals Hume's account to be imprecise and 
inconsistent with the temporality of consciousness. For the Bergsonian Deleuze, consciousness 
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is experienced as an interpenetrative flow of mental states, always moving and changing rather 
than being re-constituted by the introduction of movement 'between' ideas. 
The various kinds of ideas evident within the flow suggest that the life of the subject is, 
in a sense, dualistic, relating an 'inner life of ideas to an 'outer' world of objects. This realiza- 
tion serves as the starting-point for Deleuze's quest after the preconditions of subjectivity. By 
tracing the operative conditions on each 'line of development', he finds that difference Is 
Implicated in every function and mechanism. In the first place, there Is difference between self 
and object; in the second, between particular sensations, bodily dispositions, and responses; In 
the third, between memories in virtual and actual form; in the fourth, between the two lines of 
development themselves; in the fifth, between moments of a life. By working through the 
production and effects of these differences, Deleuze theorizes the present as a particular but 
passing moment, the transitory 'point' of experience at which the subject is constituted. As 
such, the temporality of the subject's production and consciousness are wedded together. 
The distinction between virtual and actual is central to Bergsonism, but its full import Is 
only realized later, in Difference and Repetifion and The Logic Of SenSe. Chapter 3 showed 
how Deleuze accounts In these works for the Individuality of the T as a p&ticular unity of 
mental states and bodily effects and affects. Deleuze uses'the event'to describe the singularity 
and implicit dynamism of each moment of a life (whether defined In terms of Hume's principles 
or Bergson's lines of development) and a version of Nietzsche's eternal return to delineate the 
ongoing becoming and mutual implication of such moments. On this account, each Instant of a 
life, qua event, is defined by its 'internal difference', the particularity of circumstances Implicated 
in its production, whilst the repetitive becoming-different of subject-events ensures that the 
moments of a lifetime cohere. Paradoxically, the distinguishing difference of each mental state 
determines it to be part of a union of such states, so that past moments invariably are Impli- 
cated In the production of future ones, even though the subject lives just in the present As 
such, In every moment of a distinctively human existence, the subject becomes-different or 
'other than itself, whilst forming simultaneously a 'virtual whole' or 'multiplicity' nameable asT. 
In other words, the potential entailed by each virtual point of intersection between Bergsonian 
lines is actualized as a particular moment in the life of a subject: repetition is not a function of 
the subject, but rather the subject is an effect of repetitive actualization. " 
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The extent to which Deleuze's changing theory of the subject implicates his core 
philosophies of difference and becoming makes all the more surprising its widespread neglect 
by commentators. One's conscious life is 'one's own' not just because the mental states that 
define it differ in some respect(s) from those of others' 'inner lives', but also because they are 
defined by yet'deeper' layers of difference and contingency. Difference between actualizations 
Is not determined just by the particularity of the actual, but by the differing history of every 
production, beginning with the disturbance of thought by some specific external circumstance 
and accentuated throughout the range of repetitious mechanisms and functions. From the 
succession of such elements arise 'emissions of singularities' possessing 'a mobile, Immanent 
principle of auto-unification', and Deleuze's theory of becoming serves to explain this principle 
(LS, 102). 
The 'open set' or 'virtual whole' of such differences Is not referred to a transcendent 
structure (or concept) in order to ensure its lived coherence: Deleuze's theory contains no 
universal Subject Unity, Object, Reason or Judgement. Nor can the Integration of differences 
rest upon consciousness, because consciousness and subjectivity are productions of the 
Interaction between differences of certain kinds (LS, 102). Instead, for Deleuze, the continuity of 
a life rests upon contingent and Intuitively accessible processes which are 'sometimes unifying, 
subjectifying, rationalizing, but just processes aJI the same' (N, 145-6). As such, Wl of thought 
Is a becoming ... rather than the attribute of a Subject and the representation of a Whole. '26 As 
a becoming in Deleuze's sense, it lacks any fixed terms; it Is without origin or goal, beginning or 
end. As Deleuze and Guattarl put it: 'what is real Is the becoming itself, ... not the supposedly 
fixed terms through which that which becomes passes.... [A] becoming lacks a subject distinct 
from Itself. '29 Instead, the subject is an effect of becoming, a passivity resting upon a range of 
contingent transitions. 
Under these conditions, T does not designate a subject qua object of attention, as in 
the Cartesian model, but a particular process of becoming; that Is, 11' refers to becoming 'itself , 
naming 'something which happens... between two terms which are not subjects'. 30 More 
specifically, T refers to the conditions of transformation and difference constituting a subjects 
unity, making it a'life-enhancing fiction' for fashioning strategic generalizations without Introduc- 
Ing a stifling identity, as Susan Bordo and Mario Moussa point out. $' T and 'self signify the 
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human qua distinctive genre or kind, even if, for Deleuze, they are 'perhaps no more than 
indices of the species: of humanity as a species with divisions' (italics added)(DR, 151). In so 
far as 'the human' is distinguishable in these earlier works, Deleuze is no anti-humanist In 
Frank's or Ferry and Renaut's sense. 
Because Deleuze's account rests upon the contingency of events, and thus upon 
con I ngent circumstances and processes, he claims that 'the transcendental field is no more 
Individual than personal, and no more general than universal', although it exhibits nonetheless a 
'surface organization' which 'however impersonal and pre-individual' serves as a condition for 
the definition of the human genre (LS, 99). As such, in his theory, 'the notion of subject has lost 
much of its interest on behalf of pre4ndivldval singularitles and non-personal indUdiAodond. 32 
This is not to say, however, that we lose interest in the subject asalivedreality. (Neitherdoes 
Deleuze, for as Frangois Zourabichvili points out, it is the 'passage of life' which points Deleuze 
33 1 towards the unformedness of becoming in place of the static self. ) One lives In terms of one s 
lifetime: I guard my health, plan for the future, cherish my memories, andenjoy or suffer each 
moment. The subject is indeed transitory, becoming-different at every instant, but Deleuze's 
theory of productive recurrence also emphasizes its continuity, and it is in the interplay between 
these two aspects of Deleuzian subjectivity that we locate another kind of potential. 
As Deleuze puts it, 'the dissolved self opens up to a series of roles', so that 'it Is not a 
question of our undergoing influences, but of ... merging with them' (LS, 298). We are able to 
experiment with our becomings-as Deleuze and Guattari put it, to 'make consciousness an 
experimentation in life, and passion a field of continuous intensities'--and embrace life as a 
process of change by living and thinking creatively, partaking of the richness of one's experi- 
ences according to new or modified images of thought. 34 But this is no pop-exilstentialism-A 
has a rule for engagement (the thought of eternal return), an ontological reality (difference, 
becoming) and a temporal one (memory, futurity), non-conscious elements (bodily reflex and 
planned response), and constraints upon our creative freedom (community, law, economics). 
Moreover, If the human tendency Is to think in terms of unity, sameness and fixed principles, as 
Deleuze contends, then his theory of the subject reveals an alternative genre of consciousness, 
defined by creative discord, difference and changeable concepts. 'I is an other is not just the 
lesson of Deleuze's philosophy of difference and repetition, but the creed of a liberated subject. 
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For Deleuze, philosophy is about formulating new concepts and rehabilitating Inherited 
ones. His account of the subject uses novel concepts to show how Inherited versions like the 
autonomous Enlightenment Self and transcendental ego under-value the dynamism of the 
conditions and processes of lived reality. The subject is always a dynamic production of a 
range of cultural, linguistic, social, historical, psychological, physiological and unconscious 
forces. But Deleuze's project is not wholly critical. By tracing the conditions and consequences 
of these forces, he theorizes precisely how the various transformations Implicated In subject- 
formation culminate at the level of difference-in-Itself and repetition-for-Itself. Each of the texts 
studied here brings a new perspective to this task, so that Deleuze's theory evolves continually: 
for Deleuze, philosophicaJ precision is not about stasis or theoretical bedrock, but creativity. 
The reward for pursuing the thematic continuity defined as 'the subject' through Deleuze's more 
systematic works is a concept refreshed by exposure to new methodologies, psychologies, 
ontologies and ethics, bringing to consciousness the nature and fichness of the dynamic of 
consciousness itself, and this, after ah, is Deleuze's idea of 'doing phil6sophy. 
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45. Hallward, 'Redemption from Interest,, 10. 
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of playing out the definition of matter in the relationship of body to mind, a tradition which 
ich srp ed to means that 'French philosophy reserves a seat of honour for psycholog , wh 1e ut 
study this relationship' (Modern French Philosophy, 57). For this reason, Delouze's study of 
perception, like his work on Hume, is as much philosophical psychology as metaphysics. 
47. Bergson, Mind-Energy, 8. 
48. Delouze points out that one's image of matter need not be complete, but that additions to It 
will not complicate Bergson's characterization: 'No doubt there can be more in matter than in 
the image we have of it, but there cannot be anything else in it, of a different Wind' (8,41). 
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49. Bergson sometimes suggests that the world of individual things and substances is merely a 
fiction of the intelligence. But the infrequency and location of such claims suggest that this is 
not his favoured position. For a discussion, see Copleston, History of Philosophy, 183-4. 
50. Deleuze, Fold, 97. 
5 1. See Boundas, 'Ontology of the Mrtual, ' 84. 
52. See for example Gordon M. Shepherd, Neurobiblogy, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1994): 229-378; James W. Kalat, Mological Pýpvhology 2nd ed. (Belmont, USA: Wadsworth, 
1984): 27-178. 
53. Bergson's studies of the effects of damaged nerves are meant to support his view that 
perception involves a 'flow of current' from the periphery of the body to the brain, rather than 
some function of the brain itself; see for example MM, 21. 
54. Deleuze contends that 'something in the world forces us to think. This something Is an 
object not of recognition, but of a fundamental encounlW (DR, 139). 
55, Lacey, Bergsol; 131. 
56. Ibid. 
57.1 n anetm 1, Deleuze defines 'need' or 'interest' negatively, as 'the lines and points that we 
retain from the thing as a function of our receptive facet, and the actions that we select as a 
function of the delayed reactions of which we are capable' (C1,63). This definition does little to 
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58. See Bergson's famed (and problematic) example of a dog welcoming its master (MM, 82). 
Presumably, the dog does not recognL-e its master, but just habitually associates its master's 
appearance with the trained or conditioned response of tail-wagging. 
59. In Emplliclsm and SubleeMy, Deleuze hinted that the body has a role In constitution of the 
subject, but his effort was short and cryptic. He writes that In respect of practice, the body 'is 
the subject itself envisaged from the Viewpoint of the spontaneity of relations that, under the 
Influence of the principles, it establishes between ideas. ' (ES, 96-7) Deleuze does not return to 
this claim. 
60. According to Deleuze, cinema has been an ambiguous ally In revealing this. In early cinema, 
time was represented primitively, by the movement of otherwise static objects, thus 
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Douglass, 'Delouze's Bergson, ' 381-82 and Rodowick, Deleuze ý; 77ime Machine, 18-38) 
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62, Maras, 'Bergsonian Actualization, ' 59. 
63. Deleuze, Proustand&gnA 56-7. 
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66. Medeau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Parcepbor; 413. 
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68. See also 8,54. 
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their division. (See 7he Remembered Present [New York: Basic Books, 19891. ) 1 mean just to 
provide a workable reading of Deleuzes position, and not to survey the range of alternatives. 
70. Bergson, Mind-Energy, 56-7. 
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74. Deleuze, Proust and SIýFnA 56ff.; Bergson, Mind-Energy, 186-230. 
75. Deleuze, 'La conception de la diff6rence, ' 101. 
76. Sartre, Being and Nothlngnessý 81-2,161-2,163,693. 
77. Ibid., 163. 
78. Deleuze's later reports of Bergson's model are little different; see for example DR, 8off. 
70. Goodchild, Deleuze and Guattad, 25. 
80. Boundas, 'Ontology of the Vrtual, ' 93. 
81. For an account of the 'blending' of past and present, see Kolakowski, Bergson, 42-3. 
82. Deleuze, Ta conception de la diff6rence, ' 107. 
83. See also MU, 220. 
84. Boundas, 'Ontology of the Vrtual, ' 94; Goodchild, Delouze and GUNW4 26. 
85. Douglass, 'Doleuze's Bergson, ' 370. 
86. Delauze's reference to a 'circuit' comes from Bergson's account of the relationship between 
an object perceived and a physical response that affects the object. Bergson writes that 'we 
maintain ... that reflective perception is a circuit, in which all the elements, Including the 
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mind: it must Wways find its way back to the object from where it proceeds' (MR, 104). In place 
of his more usual term-. 'composite'-Doleuze sometimes represents the two lines, when 
Interacting, as a 'mixture'. He claims that 'things, products, results are always rnixtures! ('La 
conception de la diff6rence, ' 84). 
87. Bergson, Mind-Energy, 17. A contrary position in Deleuze's later works will be criticized In 
the Conclusion. 
88. Deleuze and Guattarl, Met is PhilosophA 112. 
89. Bergson, Creative EvolkAo. 1 1; Bergson, '1914 Gifford Lectures, ' quoted by Lacey, Bergsol; 
138. 
90. Bergson, Creative Evolution, 1. 
91. For a discussion of this point in terms of Deleuze's broader project, see Goodchild, 
Questlon of Philosophy, 117. 
92. See also Delauze, 'La conception de la diff6rence, ' 89. 
93. Bergson, Creative Evolution, 3 and CM, 149. For Bergson, such a conception of the subject 
'has no reality' and is merely a symbol of the artificiality of placing mental states side-by-side, 
contrary to their Intuitable continuity (Creative Evolution, 4). 
94. Bergson, Creative EvoAlNot% 5; Rodowick, Deleuze's r1me MachIne, 150. Deleuze writes that 
'in the life of the psyche there is always otherness without there ever being number or several 
('La conception de la diff6rence, ' 88). 
95. Bergson, Creative Evolution, 7. According to Deleuze, Bergson's Vision of the living being as 
an open whole situated amongst and Interacting with other open wholes Is revolutionary 
precisely because it focuses upon relative movement between wholes rather than relative 
stability (Cl, 9-10). 
96. Thus Boundas holds that Deleuze's conception of mental states proceeds according to the 
formula, 'multiplicity= movement= becoming =difference' (, Ontology of the Virtual, ' 82). 
97. See for example MM, 133ff, Creative Evolalon, I and TFW 135,165,166,167,180, 
respectively. 
98. For Bergson's discussion of the associationist fault in the employment of atomism, see MM, 
163,241. Regarding the need to perceive change in Its natural indivisibility, see CM, 156. 
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Chapter 3: Repetition, Difference, and the Becoming of the Subject 
1. Deleuze and Quattarl, Mat is Pfflosophy?, 34. 
2. See Boundas, 'Ontology of the Mrtual, ' 100. 
3. Deleuze and Guattarl, Mat& Philosqphyg 157. 
4. Chisholm, Person and Object, 36. 
5. There are exceptions. See for example Rodowick's use of arguments from later texts to fill out 
his account of Deleuze's theory of cinema pejeuzeýq r1me MachIne) and Bogue's account of 
continuities with the historical works in discussions of DMerence and Repetition and The Logic 
of Sense (Deleuze and Guattad). 
6. Deleuze, 'La conception de la diff6rance, ' 80-1. 
7. Ibid., 82. 
8. Frank, What is Neostructuratism?, 377. 
9. Deleuze, What ip PhilosophA 156. See also Goodchild, Ovesfion of Philosophy, 48-9. 
Deleuze uses such a case to exemplify how one might 'grasp' difference (DR, 28-9). In A 
777ousandPlateauA 'event' is replaced by 'incorporeal transformation' to differentiate Deleuze's 
and Guattari's position from other philosophies of the event. 
10. Deleuze and Guattari, Met is Philosophyg 156. 
11. Deleuze, Fold, 52. 
12. Badiou, 'The Fold, ' 56. 
13. Massumi, Userý; Gulde, 18. 
14. Delauze and Guattarl, Ktat Is PhilbsophA 156. 
15. Marks, Gilles Delouze, 41. 
16. In 77)e Fold, Deleuze writes that 'relations are types of events' and 'events in their turn are 
types of relations; they are relations to existence and to time' (52). 
17. Delauze explicitly aligns the terms 'thinker and 'individual' at DR, 253: 'The thinker Is the 
individual [Car le penseur est 17ndividu mfte]'. 
18. Braidotti, 'Bugs and Women, ' 113. 
19. Deleuze refers to this issue In his study of Spinozds conception of consciousness. See 
Spinoza., Practical Philosophy, 2 1. 
20. Simondon, 'Genesis of the Individual, ' 317. 
21. Deleuze and Guattarl, 7housand RaleaiA 262. 
22. See DR, 152. 
23. May, 'Polifics of Ufe, ' 27. 
24. For a fine discussion of the metaphysics of Individuation and its implications for conceptions 
of the already-constituted individual, see Simondon, 'Genesis of the Individual, ' especially 297- 
300. 
25. Deleuze and Guattari, 7hoasandPlate", 261,263. For a discussion of the relationship 
between plane and concept, see MacKenzie, 'Creativity as Criticism, ' 8. 
26. Deleuze and Guattari, Mat& Phflosophyg 47-8. 
27. Deleuze and Guattari, Tho4mnd Plateai. A 263-4,507. See also DR, 176; LS, 140-41. 
28. Deleuze, 'Philosophical Concept, ' 112. See also LS, 344. 
29. Constantin Boundas gives an account of the relationship between individuals and 
singularities in terms of 'connection' in 'Serialization and Subject-Formation, ' 106-7. He argues 
there that individuals are constituted 'as they select and envelop a finite number of the 
singularities available to them. ' But this suggests that the Individual does the selecting, as 
though it has an eAstence apart from and prior to the process of selection, which is contrary to 
Deleuze's focus on the immanence and passivity of connections between singularities. 
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30. See NP, 39ff. Deleuze's interpretation follows KJossowski's reading of eternal return; see 
'Nietzsche's Experience' and Vicious Circle. 
31. Magnus, 'Nietzsche's Philosophy in 1888, ' 81-2; Staten, Nietzsche ýq Voice, 24,26; 
Winchester, Nietzsche's Aesthefic Turn, 76; Roth, Knowing and History, 199. 
32. Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche. - An Introduction to the Understanding of His PhilbsaphlcalActlky, 
trans. Wallroff and Scmitas (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1965): 352. 
33. Deleuze pays scant attention to another empirical conception of eternal return: as 
consequent to a finite quantity of matter within an infinity of time. For a discussion, see Magnus, 
Nietzsche ýq Existential Imperative, 218. 
34. See also DR67,241-2 and 299. 
35. See also Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 47-8. 
36. Stambaugh, Nietzsche ýg 7hought, 31-2. There is an abundance of other textual support for 
Deleuze's position; see Leigh, 'Eternal Retum, ' 216. 
37. For a partial list and discussion of references where Nietzsche emphasizes becoming, see 
Bell, 'Philosophizing the Double-Bind, ' 374. 
38. Ansell-Pearson, VlroldLft 66. 
39. For a discussion of this aspect of Nietzsche's texts, see Nehamas, Life as Oerature, 183-4 
and Ackermann, Nietzsche, 162-3. 
40. Deleuze and Guattarl, 7housandPlateaA 293. In a statement suggesting the dynamics of 
both Deleuze's Humean imagination and Bergsonian lines of development, Martin Joughin 
writes that becoming must be understood as 'a free play of lines or flows whose intersections 
define unstable points of transitory identity' such that becoming is 'intrinsically transformative, 
creative, and marginal', incorporating and producing multiple states from multiple events (N, 
186n8). 
41. As Braldotti puts it, Deleuze, 'defines the process of becoming as the encounter of eccO69 
single individualities that share certain attributes and can merge with each other because of 
them' ('Bugs and Women, ' 129-30). Goodchild provides an excellent characterization of these 
qualities; see Question of Philosophy, 93-4. 
42. Deleuze and Guattarl, 9bat is PhibsophA 158. 
43. This gives an unintended sense to Alexander Nehamas's claim thatthe eternal recurrence is 
not a theory of the world but a view of the self (Lffe as Literature, 150). 
44. Kant, Critique of Pure Reasol; 336-7 (A 354), 339 (A 348). 
45.1 mmanuel Kant, Mot Real Progress has Uelaoýysics made in Germany since the r1me ot 
Leibnlz and Woffif?, trans. Ted Humphrey (New York: Arabis Books, 1983): 73. 
46. Deleuze, Aantýq CrXealPhilosophy, Viii-ix. In the English translation, ýnol'has been rendered 
as 'ego'. For the sake of consistency, and to better reflect Deleuze's meaning, I have changed 
the translation to 'self, although the capitalization of the original is preserved. 
47. Kant, What Real progress has Metaphysics made?, 73. 
48. See also Deleuze and Guattarl, "at Is Philosophy, 31-2. 
49. Deleuze, Aantýg Critical Philosophy, viii. 
50. Deleuze and Guattarl, Mat is PhIlosophA 31; see also DR, 65. 
51. Deleuze and Guattarl, Mat& Philbsophy?, 31-2. 
52. Deleuze, Kantý; CriticalPhIlosophy, ix. 
53. Ibid., ix, 41. 
54. Goodchild, QueStiOn Of FhAlOsOphy, 49-50 presents the first synthesis in these terms. 
55. See Goodchild, Quesfion of Philosophy, 50. 
56. Deleuze and Guattarl, 7housanctPlateeiA 292. 
57. Note that this contrast between Delauze's position and Kant's is somewhat problematic. 
Deleuze is not specific about how we might distinguish Kant's conception of time from eternal 
return, and the difference between them is only clear on a reading of Difference and RePetftn 
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informed by later texts. As Bogue points out, Deleuze's quasi-Nietzschean definition of time In 
Kantý; Critical Philosophy could well be a definition of eternal return: 'the form of that which is 
not eternal, the Immutable form of change and movement' (Deleuzd and Guattarl, 132). 
58. Boundas, 'Ontology of the Virtual, ' 101. In place of my Insertion he uses the word Wfferentl- 
Ciation'to refer to his earlier discussion of processes which are the subject of his article. 
59. See Rodowick, r1me Machine, 209-10. 
60. Leigh, 'Eternal Return, ' 217. 
61. Salanskis, 'Idea and Destination, ' 65. 
62. Bogue, Deleuze and Guaftan, 66. 
63.. Boundas, 'Ontology of the Virtual, ' 101. 
64. Frank, Mat is Neostructunaftm?, 377. 
65. See LS, 93. 
66. Simondon, 'Genesis of the Individual, ' 306. 
67. Ibid., 311. 
68. Frank, What is Neostnicturalism?, 380-1. 
69. Deleuze finds a similar affiliation between internal and external differences in the Stoic 
conception of events. On his reading, the Stoics conceived of the event as Invoking a 'double 
causality', a mixture of bodies and external differences on the one hand, classified as cause, 
and, on the other, events and internal differences which are the quasi-causes of the event (LS, 
94). 
70. See also Simondon, 'Genesis of the Individual, ' 301. 
71. Ibid., 302. 
72. Ibid., 305. 
73. Deleuze cites Wossowsid's studies of the dissolution of traditional conceptions of Self as 
especially valuable; see LS, 178,283. 
74. Ungis, 'Will to Power, ' 51. 
75. In 'Nomad Thought, Delauze provides an alternative conception of such forces, 
characterizing them as 'instruments of codification'. 
76. Deleuze, 'Nomad Thought, ' 148. 
77. Deleuze gives a detailed listing of the attributes of dogmabc Images of thought at DR. 167. 
78. Goodchild, Dekae and Guaftarl, 46. 
79. Deleuze and Guattarl, What is PhilosqphA 51. 
80. Ibid. See also L$ 113. 
8 1. Nietzsche, Genealogy of mofwA 119; W111 to R2wer, 358. 
82. Deleuze, Foxatilt, im. 
83. Ibid., 92. 
84. The Spinozist line to Deleuze's theory, which is distinct In its essence from the other 
Influences, will not be pursued here. For a fine outline, see Macherey, 'Encounter with Spinoza, ' 
152-6. 
85. Deleuze, Fowault, 95. 
86. Bergson, Cývat"Uind, 157. 
87. Foucault, Counter-UemoT, 183; Deleuze, FoxauI4 91,130-1. 
88. See Goodchild, 'Deleuzean Ethics, ' 39; Foucault, Cbunter-AOmOry, 165; May, ReCOMOOM9 
MerancA 167. Hardt, Gilles Deleuze, 117-8 claims that Deleuze's Nietzschean and Spinozist 
studies of power provide an account of Deleuze's ethical sense. Foucault, Preface to Anti- 
OedipuA xiii. 
89. Ansell-Pearson, Uving for the Event' 25. 
90. Deleuze, 'Immanence, ' 5-6. 
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91. Deleuze and Guattarl, Khat is PhilosqphA 159. 
92. See also Deleuze and Guattari, Mat is phl7osophy?, 54. Note that Deleuze's Spinozist use 
of the term 'expression' means that life ought to be lived creatively. 
93. See LS, 178. 
94. See for example Deleuze, Foucault, 101. 
95. See Deleuze and Guattad, 141W is PhAlosophyg 11. 
96. For a discussion with respect to the 'truth' of Images, see Patton, Introduction to Deleuze., A 
CrItIcal Reader, 14. 
97. See also Deleuze and Guattarl, Mat isAhAlosophA 159-60. 
98. Deleuze, FoucauI4 87,117; see also NP, 25-30; LS, 59-60,180; DR, 198. 
99. Deleuze, Foucault, 87,117,97 respectively. 
100. Deleuze, 'Nomad Thought, ' 144. 
101. See Goodchild, Doýuze and Guattad, 131-2. 
102. For a good account of the depths and intricacies of Deleuze's dice-throw analogy, see 
Olkowski, 'Nietzsche's Dice Throw, ' 126ff. See also my Defence of Deleuzeý9 Interpretation, 40- 
2. 
103. For a more detailed account and critique of Qeleuze's use of eternal return as an ethical 
d evice, see my Defence of Delauze ý; Interpretation. See also Bog ue, Deleum? and Guattarl, 
Goodchild, Deleuze and Guatiarl, Leigh, 'Eternal Retum'; Olkowski, 'Nietzsche-Doleuze', 
'Nietzsche's Dice Throw. ' 
104. For a discussion, see Bogue, Deleuze and Guattan, 31. 
105. See Klossowski 'Nietzsche's Experience, ' 110., Vl'cious arcle, 68,71; Goodchild, Ouesdon 
Of PhAosophy, 49. 
106. See Deleuze, Foucault, 95 and LS, 173, and Ansell-Pearson, Wrold Life, 55,63ff. 
107. Deleuze's meaning in this section is lost in the English translation of LS, where 'onis 
translated as 'they' rather than as 'one'. 
108. See Maurice Blanchot, Death SentenM trans. Lydia Davis (New York: Station Hill, 1978) 
and Le Pas au-del. 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 1973). 
109. Deleuze, FoucauI4 132. 
110. See Haar, 'Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language, ' 24 and Ackermann, Nietzsche, 162. 
111. See Deleuze and Guattari, l4tat is PhilosophA 108,21 B. 
112. Deleuze, 'Nomad Thought, ' 145. 
113. See C: 2 133. 
114. For a discussion of time as scAssion, see Canning, 'Crack of Time, ' 8 1. 
115. Deleuze, Foucault, 105. 
116. Rodowick, 7-1, me Machine, 192. 
Conclusion 
1. Lecercle, 'Looking-Glass, ' 88; Frank, What Is Neostfuctilrallsm?. 347. 
2. Deleuze and Guattari, An#-OedpuA 29. Afthough I present Deleuze's theory of difference as 
distinct from the philosophy of desire, Goodchild finds a continuity between them predicated 
upon sexual desire as a paradigm case (Deleizze and Goattad, 41). 
3. Deleuze and Guattari, An#-Oedpus, 16. 
4. Goodchild, Deleuze and Guattar4 65; Bogue, Delouze and Guatt&l, 3. See Renaut, Era of the 
Individual, 113-4 for a version of the latter proposal. 
5. Deleuze acknowledges these two relatively distinct stages in his work, along with a later One 
focusing on aesthetics (N, 135). 
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6. Baugh, 'Transcendental Empiricism, ' 144. 
7. Deleuze and Guattari, 7housandPlateauA 460. For descriptions of the means to this end, see 
451-3p 456-9. 
8. For a description of the relationship between concept and plane further to that advanced in 
Chapter 3, see MacKenzie, 'Creativity as Criticism', 8; May, 'Difference and Unity, ' 36. 
9. Braidotti, 'Bugs and Women, ' 114. 
10. Gordon uses the phrase 'theory of everything' to invoke the possibilities entailed by a de- 
transcendentalized philosophy and non-hierarchical discourse ('Subtracting Machine, ' 33). 
11. For example, Deleuze, 'Immanence, ' 3; Deleuze and Guattari, What is Ahilbsophyg 48. 
12. Deleuze, 'Immanence, ' 3. 
13. Deleuze and Guattari, What is PhilosophA 36. Uke many of Deleuze's concepts, his 
definition of 'the plane of immanence' and its variants shift subtly between texts. Compare the 
account in What Is Philosophy?, where it is characterized at one point as the unthought image 
of thought, with those in Cinerm I and 'Immanence. ' 
14. Deleuze and Guattari, ThoasaW PlateatA 280; Deleuze, 'Immanence, ' 5,4. 
15. Deleuze, 'Immanence, ' S. 
16. On this latter point, see Deleuze, 'Immanence, ' 5 and Deleuze and Guattari, Mat is 
Philosophy?, 45,47-8. 
17. Deleuze, 'Immanence, ' 5. 
18. See also Ansell-Pearson, VlroldLffe, 46, 
19. Deleuze, Spinoza., Practical Philosophy, 128. There is a similar claim in Deleuze and Parnet, 
Dialogues; 93. 
20. Similar claims are made by Deleuze and Guattarl in Anti-OadipuA 85. 
21. Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosoplýy 42. See also Delouze, Spinoza., Practleal 
Philosophy, 482. 
22. For a discussion of Delauze's study of kinds in terms of anthropomorphism, see Massumi, 
'Autonomy of Affect, ' 231. 
23. Goodchild, Delauze anel Guattaf i, 6. 
24. Descombes, 'Nietzsche's French Moment, ' 87-90; Flynn, 'Review of "The Logic of Sense, *' 
309. 
25. Deleuze quoted In Foucault, Counter-Memory, 208. 
26. Hardt writes that Deleuze 'operates on the highest planes of ontological speculation'. In 
respect of the later works, I do not read this as a compliment (Gilles Deleuze, Ail). 
27. See Canning, 'Crack of Time, ' 87. 
28. Deleuze and Guattarl, Thousand PlateaiA 380. 
29. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand PlateauA 238-9. 
30. Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 51. 
31. Bordo and Moi issa, 'Rehabilitating the "1, " 129-30. 
32. Deleuze, 'Philosophical Concept, ' 95. 
33. Zourabichvili, 'Six Notes on the Percept, ' 196. 
34. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 134. 
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